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Abstracts This study involved a partial replication of an experiment performed by Held & Rekosh (1963) on the relation between
prism-induced changes in visuomotor feedback and shifts in the perception of straightness. The Held & Rekosh study is important because its
methodology makes it possible to clearly separate changes in perception due to visuomotor feedback from those due to other perceptual factors.
Thus it bears unambiguously on the hypothesis that the neurological processing of sensory input is dependent on the organization of motor
activity. The present paper consists of a brief review of theory and experiment on sensorimotor phenomena in perception, followed by a
detailed consideration of the Held & Rekosh study and the present replication. For greater effectiveness, Held & Rekosh should have used
base-up and base-down prism orientations rather than the base-left and base-right orientations that they employed, but in any case our
replication yielded negative results for both base-up and base-right. It is concluded that, given the minimally effective prism orientation and the
attentional loads characterizing the Held & Rekosh study, there is need for further experimentation with these two variables. A more drastic
suggestion is that there may be a need to confront anew the evidence for sensorimotor processes in perception.
Keywords? afference; attention; feedback; geometry of visual space; motor activity; plasticity; prism-induced transformations; sensorimotor
integration; visual rearrangement
The present study is in part a replication of an experiment published
under the same title by Held and Rekosh (1963). A replication was
called for in view of (1) the theoretical importance of the research
and the novel method that formed the basis of that study, (2) its
exceptionally strong and uniform findings, which stand in some
contrast to what is usually obtained in this type of research, and (3)
the authors' failure to pay specific attention to certain theoretical and
methodological problems.
Theoretical background
The Held & Rekosh study was designed to show that motor and
visual-sensory processes interact to produce percepts. As pointed out
by Gyr (1972, 1975), this approach to perception may be contrasted
with another important approach in psychology (e.g. Gibson, 1966),
which has been concerned chiefly with the detailed analysis of
external variables in the visual array (such as texture gradients,
motion parallax, etc.) for predicting specific perceptual events.
Unlike Held and his coworkers, researchers from this latter school of
thought generally have not been interested in studying whether, with
the visual array constant, nonvisual events such as motor processes
produce specifiable perceptual effects.
Attempting to show that perception can be accounted for solely by
visual parameters has, of course, always been very appealing to a
large number of psychologists, if for no other reason than that the
variables one has to deal with are relatively easy to observe and
control experimentally. The neuropsychological models one consid-
ers are also simpler and more in accord with conventional stimulus-
response thinking (Teuber, 1964). Postulating an interaction between
motor and sensory processes in perception, on the other hand,
involves additional experimental variables and more complex theo-
retical models. The former, simpler theories either avoid neurophy-
siological interpretations altogether (Gibson, 1966), or at best simply
assume a retina-to-visual cortex pathway in the brain. By contrast,
the latter, more complex perceptual theories posit, in addition, an
active involvement of areas of the motor cortex and motor-sensory
feedback systems in the perceptual process. The latter processes and
connections have been less well explored.
The more complex theories of perception (henceforth called
sensorimotor theories) are the ones under discussion here. Many of
the relevant experiments have been reviewed extensively elsewhere
(Epstein, 1967; Gibson, 1969; Gyr, 1972, 1975; Harris, 1965; Hoch-
berg, 1971; Howard & Templeton, 1966; Rock, 1966; and Welch,
1974). The scope of this research is so vast as to preclude a detailed
analysis here. Instead, some well-known prototypical studies will be
briefly discussed, and the main findings and conclusions of this body
of research will be summarized to provide a context for the discussion
of the work by Held & Rekosh, which will be considered in some
detail.
The theoretical problems inherent in assigning a critical role to
motor activity in visual perception are the following. (1) It must be
shown that, with visual input constant, changes in the state of the
motor system do produce changes in perception. That is, motor
output (efference, the efferent copy, or related mechanisms; see
Bischof & Kramer, 1968; von Hoist, 1954; Sperry, 1950) must be
shown to be necessary to the perceptual process. Theoretically, there
would be a potential role for the motor system in perception if the
organism were to have CNS motor information at its disposal prior to
the occurrence of the motor act itself, prior to the occurrence of
motor-activity-induced reafferent feedback. As Teuber (1964) has
suggested, if the organism has information about its own motor
contribution to the construction of the stimulus, independent of
action-produced peripheral feedback, one function of the response
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may be to "prepare the sensory structure for an anticipated change."
(2) The second problem on which evidence must be gathered
therefore concerns the issue of whether organisms are in fact able to
monitor their own motor behavior at a central level [see Roland, BBS
1:1, 1978].
Experimental findings concerning whether or not motor
processes are necessary In perception The classical evidence for
motor involvement in perceptual processes was provided by von
Hoist & Mittelstaedt (1950) and Sperry (1950). The former's studies
on flies are instructive because they show that identical visual input
can signal either subject movement or stimulus movement,
depending on whether or not self-initiated movement by the sub-
ject is involved. If a iy is placed in the center of a black-
and-white-striped cylinder rotating in one direction, the fly follows
this movement by rotating Ipsiversively (the optokinetic response).
However, if its head is surgically rotated 180 degrees so that left and
right sides of the eyes, and hence the visual signals, are reversed, the
fly Instead rotates contraversively. If a stimulus such as a smell is
placed to the left side of a fly In a stationary cylinder, the animal will
turn towards it, thereby making a movement contraversive to the
movement-Induced rotation of its visual array. Under this condition
the fly does not exhibit the optomotor reflex; that is, the same
afferent input evidently no longer signals rightward turning of the
environment and hence fails to elicit ipsiversive tracking. The fly
merely initiates leftward movement, stopping when it reaches the
source of the smell. Von Hoist and Mittelstaedt (1950) interpreted
this to mean that efferent information contributes to the nervous
system's Interpretation of afferent input, somehow blocking the
optomotor reflex. To refute this possibility, the authors repeated
these experiments on the flies with their heads surgically rotated 180
degrees, reversing the visual signals; this gives rise to a contraversive
optomotor reflex to cylinder rotation. When an olfactory stimulus is
placed to one side of such an operated fly, It will turn toward the
stimulus but then continues to rotate In that direction until
exhausted. This only occurs if the environment Is textured however;
In a visually homogeneous environment the animal moves normally
and stops at the location of the smell. These findings suggest that in
the operated animal the optomotor reflex is not blocked during
movement, and that the behavior observed in both normal and
operated flies is a function of reafference and its relation to the
activity or nonactivity of the efferent system.
Von Hoist (1.954) explained the results of the above experiments by
postulating a built-in comparison between monitored efferent and
afferent signals. According to von Hoist, if the normal animal moves
In one direction in a stationary environment, an efferent copy of the
movement as well as the reafferent signals associated with such
movement (i.e., contraversive movement of the visual field across the
retina) are compared in the central nervous system. In this case these
two signals, according to a convention assumed by von Hoist, are of
opposite sign and cancel one another. This means that this particular
reafferent input will not signal changes taking place in the
environment Itself and will hence fail to elicit optomotor tracking. If
the same afferent Information is not accompanied by an efferent
copy - such as when the environment moves and the fly is station-
ary - the meaning of the afferent input is changed and leads to
ipsiversive tracking to follow the motion of the environment. If there
is effereece as well as reafference, but with the latter reversed as in
the case of the operated flies, the two signals have the same sign,
summate, and produce continuous circling.
A set of findings similar to those of von Hoist was reported by
Sperry (1950). Working with fish, Sperry found that strong circling
tendencies were induced by surgically rotating the eye by 180
degrees. Thus, when attempting to turn left, for example, the
operated fish will continue to turn Indefinitely. On the other hand, a
normal fish turning to the right (thereby producing the same
motion-induced visual input as the operated fish turning left) shows
no evidence of circling. A series of brain ablations and extirpations of
the vestibular system failed to support the hypothesis that the
relation between visual and motor factors .was crucial. In fact,
Sperry's finding that ablation of the optic tectum Interfered with the
optokinetic response while bilateral labyrinthectomy did not, clearly
seemed to favor a purely visual explanation of the data. A
labyrinthectomy - on the hypothesis of extraretinal motor factors -
should have led to interference with a circling response. However,
the additional outcome (consonant with the von Hoist and
Mittelstaedt findings) that exactly the same pattern of excitation
from the retina will induce circling when the eye is rotated but not
when the eye is normal, depending entirely upon the direction of
the movement accompanying the retinal input, made a purely
visual hypothesis seem unlikely to Sperry. The movement itself had
to be brought in as a necessary determinant of the perceptual process.
This argument, coupled with the negative findings following
extirpation of the vestibular system, led Sperry to formulate the idea
that the motor component arises not peripherally but centrally, as
part of the efferent command eliciting overt movement. He thus
proposed what might be considered to be the equivalent of von
Hoist's (1954) "efference copy" theory, namely, "any excitation
pattern that normally results In a movement that will cause a
displacement of the visual image of the retina may have a corollary
discharge into the visual centers to compensate for the retinal
displacement" (Sperry, 1950, p. 488).
The problem of the nature and development of the relation
between motor processes and perception has also been investigated in
behavioral studies on phylogenetically higher organisms. Hein &
Held (1962) reared kittens with one of their eyes open only during
normal, active locomotion and the other eye open only while they
were passively transported over equivalent areas. Following several
months of this experience, the "active" eye produced normal
visually-guided behavior but the "passive" eye was functionally
blind. "These experiments clearly Implicate the motor system in
processes regarded as sensory" (Held, 1964, pp. 808-309).
Held & Hein (1963) also found that self-produced movement is
necessary for the development of visually-guided behavior. Cats
prevented from executing voluntary movement during early pattern
visual experience fail to show any subsequent behavioral evidence of
depth discrimination on the "visual cliff" (Walk & Gibson, 1961).
Kittens with early visuomotor deprivation also cannot perform
visually-guided paw placement, which involves being slowly carried
forward and lowered toward the edge of a table with only head and
forelegs free. Only the normally reared animal displays
visually-mediated anticipation of contact by extending its paw as it
approaches the edge. Peripheral atrophy resulting from disuse of
various organs was contraindicated by the presence of pupillary and
pursuit reflexes and the rapid functional recovery once passive
subjects were given their freedom. Debility specific to the motor
system can also be -ruled out, according to the authors, because
passive subjects show normal tactile placing responses and other
nonvisual motor activities.
The issue as to whether or not efferent activity is necessary for
normal perception can be further Illuminated by contrasting two
classic experiments performed, respectively, by Eiesen & Aarons
(1959) and by Meyers (1964). Riesen & Aarons showed that
movement-deprived kittens cannot discriminate a rotating
environmental object. For their first three months these kittens were
given an hour of patterned vision a day, during which they were
prevented from moving head or body. They then had to discriminate
a stationary target from the same target revolving, by making an
instrumental locornotor response toward the correct stimulus. The
discrimination task and rearing were the same in Meyers's (1964)
experiment, but discrimination was ascertained not by an
instrumental response but via a classically-conditioned leg flexion
(elicited by shock and then conditioned to the presentation of a given
visual pattern). The cats in the Riesen & Aarons study failed to
discriminate the moving target, while Meyers's cats were successful.
Clearly the difference was that in the former case inputs to the eye
were produced by an organism in motion, with the effective solution
to the task depending on the kitten's ability to discriminate inputs
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produced by its own locomotor activity from inputs due to
movement of the environment. Such a discrimination might (e.g., as
suggested by Held, 1964) have to depend on a history of
efferent-afferent comparison, of which these cats had been
specifically deprived.
Much of the human research on the problem of the contribution of
motor processes to perception, such as that of Held & Rekosh (1963),
Festinger (e.g., Festinger, Burnham, Ono, & Bamber, 1967), and
many others, had relied on studying the contribution made by
voluntary (as opposed to passive experimenter-induced) movement
to the perceptual readaptation of experimental subjects exposed to
optically-induced visual rearrangements - e.g., by prisms
systematically displacing images from their objects' true loci. Much
of this work has also implicated voluntary movement as a necessary
component in perceptual adaptation. We will now examine the Held
& Rekosh (1963) study (H & R) in detail.
The Held & Mekosh study. The purpose of the H & R study was to
reveal a link between motor and visual mechanisms in the production
of visual adaptation. The starting point for their research was an
earlier finding on adaptation to spatial rearrangement. Held (1961)
had reported that self-produced movement of the body or the head,
with associated feedback of visual stimulation, was required in order
to compensate for visually-induced errors of localization. (For
example, looking through prisms with base-left orientation will
produce an apparent rightward displacement of objects in the visual
field and leads to errors of pointing and/or gaze, which, Held
reports, can be fully overcome by self-produced movements and the
accompanying visual feedback.) H & R argued that prism-induced
changes in shape also represent an alteration of spatial relationships
in the visual field. (An example of a visual rearrangement of shape is
that straight lines appear curved when first viewed through a prism.
As adaptation occurs, they begin in due time to appear less curved to
the experimental subject (S). Upon removal of the prism, S
temporarily sees objectively-straight lines as curved in the opposite
direction.) H & R accordingly reasoned that shape adaptation, like
adaptation to displacement, ought to be inducible by having S
experience spatial rearrangement associated with voluntary
movement, but that this need not involve direct exposure to
actually-rearranged curved or straight lines. It is on this point that
the H & R study diverged from the rest of the literature on visual
shape adaptation (e.g., Festinger, Burnham, Ono, & Bamber, 1967;
Gourlay, Gyr, Walters, & Willey, 1975; Gyr & Willey, 1970; Sirigatti,
1974; Slotnick, 1969; and Victor, 1968). By not training S with actual
curved contours, H & R did not need to control for other variables
that have plagued the interpretation of many other studies, such as
the so-called Gibson effect (Gibson, 1933), which concerns the
induction of shifts in the perception of straightness after brief
fixation of a curved line. The Gibson effect is thus quite independent
of rearranged visuomotor feedback but needs to be taken into
account in all adaptation studies in which S views curved lines.
In experiments on the perceptual recalibration of shape, S
typically looks through visual or other spatial-displacement devices
at contours that appear straight or curved but do not provide the
perceiver with the usual visual feedback when scanned, traced with
the arm, and so on. It is assumed in such studies that the
initially-experienced discrepancy with habitual sensorimotor
relations will adapt, leading to a change in the motor and/or visual
parameters controlling the visuomotor process. For example, there
has been a hypothesis that the need to make curved eye movements
in order to scan and fixate an apparently straight line will modify the
visual judgment of straightness.
In the H & R study S did not experience discordant sensorimotor
feedback in connection with the scanning of normally straight or
curved contours during training. Rather, instead of presenting a
patterned field of straight or curved lines, H & R had S walk around
inside a six-foot-diameter cylinder while looking through a base-left
or base-right prism. The walls of the cylinder consisted of a random
array of dots. This randomness was not altered by prismatic
Gyr et al.: Motor-sensory feedback and visual space
displacement. What then was altered? H & R are rather cryptic on
this matter, however one could argue that S's movement would cause
lateral displacement of the centroid of the retinal flow pattern.
(When one moves straight ahead without prisms, the centroid of the
flow falls on the fovea.) In addition, had the orientation of the prisms
been up or down instead of left or right, then as S walked around
inside the cylinder, the rate of displacement of the dots would not
have been linear, as S would expect from normal experience. For
example, under base-up/base-down conditions, distant points
appearing to be at eye level would appear to move up or down
(depending on prism orientation) when approached. Moreover, their
apparent motion would be a nonlinear function of their distance
from the viewer. This kind of information, available only from
prisms oriented up or down, would seem to be germane to shape
adaptation.
H & R argued, even concerning their base-right/base-left prism
conditions, that the prism induces an alteration of the spatial
relationships among points within the visual field. They predicted
that such an alteration could then lead to changes in the perception
of straightness.
H & R obtained strong and uniform results with eight Ss under
active movement conditions. Not only did all Ss show positive
adaptation (a rarity in this kind of research), but, upon release from
the measuring apparatus, most of them, reported apparent curvature
when fixating straight vertical contours in their normal surroundings.
A control group of eight Ss under a passive movement condition
showed no adaptation.
Critiques and counterstudleSo Work in this general area has also
elicited a number of critical comments and counterstudies. Gibson
(1966), for example, has criticized the experiment of von Hoist &
Mittelstaedt (1950) and, implicitly, Sperry's (1950) study as well.
Gibson's point is that in nature the rotation of ambient light around
the animal, such as that experienced by von Hoist & Mittelstaedt's
fly, is never due to a rotation of the environment itself but is always
the result of a circling motion by, or imposed upon, the animal. Thus
it signals movement on the part of the animal, according to Gibson.
Given this tenet, he interprets von Hoist & Mittelstaedt's results as
follows. In the experiment in which the cylinder moves, the animal
interprets this as its own nonvoluntary motion, caused by external
factors, which in nature might be wind, and so forth. It resists these
external forces, and hence optokinetic movement occurs. With
voluntary movement, on the other hand, the animal has the
information that it is activating its own responses, which allows it to
stop circling when opposite the appropriate point. With the operated
fly the scenario is that it activates its own movement but then
becomes aware that it is apparently also being acted on by external
forces, for which it tries to compensate by optokinetic movement.
The gist of Gibson's critique of von Hoist & Mittelstaedt is to deny
their argument that the same afferent input (rotation of ambient
light) in one case specifies movement by the environment and in the
other, movement by the observer. Gibson suggests that this input
always specifies motion (either voluntary or passive) by the observer.
That being the interpretation, the contention that afferent
information alone determines perception can stand.
With respect to the fly, there are insufficient data at this point to
resolve the argument. However, at the level of human perception it
can probably be said that Gibson's critique does not hold. That is, a
human observer placed inside the cylinder would under some
conditions indeed see the cylinder as moving and thereby have the
experience that Gibson suggests the fly does not have.
Human counterstudies have attempted to show that adaptation to
displacement can occur in the absence of any voluntary activity. In
one study, for example, cues as to the visuomotor conflict were
successfully provided in the absence of any voluntary activity by
having apparently-displaced moving objects collide with the passive
perceiver (Howard et al., 1965). As Taub (1968) has pointed out,
however, these adaptations (in terms of a subsequent pointing
response) presuppose prior well-established sensorimotor relations
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and hence cannot contribute to the decision as to whether or not the
efferent motor signal is necessary to adaptation.
Evidence of a central mechanism to monitor behavior. Consider
next the question of whether organisms are in fact able to monitor
their own motor behavior at a central level. Positive evidence on this
matter would at least provide a theoretical basis for findings of motor
involvement in perception. The evidence here comes from the
classical studies on deafferented animals, summarized by Konorski
(1967) and Taub & Herman (1968).
The deafferentation work issues from early findings reported by
Mott & Sherrington (1895) and Sherrington (1931) that deaf-
ferentation of a single limb leads to its total incapacifcation for any
purposeful activity. These results seemed to support Sherrington's
theory of the relex arc based on investigation of the afferent and
efferent spinal neuron. The work was superseded, however, by
further studies with rodents, cats, and monkeys, exploring conditions
under which deafferented systems do manifest purposeful activity.
The newer findings forced a revision of the Mott & Sherring£on
interpretation.
The research was initially designed to ensure, by deafferentation
of relevant parts of the spinal cord, that the animal did not get any
direct proprioceptive feedback from its own voluntary movements.
Subsequent research also became concerned with eliminating all
indirect peripheral feedback. Examples of such indirect feedback are
the sound of a buzzer signalling the onset of the animal's
shock-avoidance response, skin distension with movement of the
deafferented limb, and stimulation of the middle ear during
voluntary activity. The concern with the elimination of indirect
peripheral feedback from the animal's own activity led later
investigators to expand the deafferentation so as to eliminate most of
the somatic and interoceptive feedback. Moreover, there was an
interest not only in gross but in fine movements as well. Finally, trace
conditioning was used in an attempt to eliminate associations
between voluntary movement and the conditioned stimulus.
The number of studies involved precludes a detailed review here.
A summary of the major findings follows, (a) Under conditions of
partial deafferentation to prevent feedback from a given
instrumental limb or pair of limbs, total deafferentation plus
blindfolding, or combined surgical and pharmacological interruption
of the autonomic nervous system, the animals in question could be
trained to produce the instrumental response; if trained previously,
they retained the instrumental response or could be retrained, (h)
Both gross instrumental responses such as forelimb flexion and fine
instrumental behavior such as finger movement were preserved or
could be trained under the above conditions, (c) Under
freely-moving conditions both partially and totally deafferented
animals exhibited total restoration of function. Partially deafferented
animals, for example, became successful at climbing a wire mesh
fence within two to six months. Totally deafferented animals showed
restoration of function of the forelimb, but, because they did not
survive long enough, it could not be determined whether hindlimb
function would have recovered too. (d) The only restriction to be
placed on the findings under item (c) above is that if only one limb
was deafferented, the animal's unaffected limb had to be restrained
during training. If it was not, the findings for the free-movement
condition (c) did not occur. Taub & Herman's (1968) explanation for
this is that the movements of the unaffected limb have an inhibitory
effect on the other limb, which, due to the operation, is no longer
held in check by the ipsilateral segmental afferent inflow. This
problem does not arise, however, when both limbs are deafferented.
(e) When a totally deafferented animal, deprived of all somatic
feedback as well as all feedback from sympathetic and sacral
parasympathetic pathways, was also deprived of feedback from most
of the cranial parasympathetic system, it still made avoidance
responses. Elimination of all feedback, however, tended to put the
animal to sleep.
In summary, one can conclude from this review of theory and
experiment on the sensorimotor theory of perception, that motor
variables do appear important in various aspects of visual perception
sucfo as perceptual adaptation, and that research has revealed the
neurophysiological mechanisms whereby the motor system might
participate in perception.
The Replication of the Held & Rekosh Study
As suggested earlier, the present replication of the 1963 study by
H & R was undertaken because it stood out from other studies on
sensorimotor processes in visual shape adaptation, by virtue of its
greater conceptual directness and elegance and the exceptionally
strong findings it reported.
It would appear that such strong results speak for themselves.
Nonetheless, critical evaluation of the study raises some interesting
points and further problems. As mentioned above, it would appear
that, for greater effectiveness, H & R should have used base-up
and/or base-down prism orientations instead of the base-left and
base-right they actually employed, because the latter two orienta-
tions cause the nonlinear displacements associated with curvature
only under vertical movement of the body, while the former cause
nonlinearity under horizontal movements. Since, except for some up
and down head motion, walking along the cylinder wall produces
primarily horizonal motion, the strength of the discrepant displace-
ment stimulus would be far greater with the prism base up or down
than with the lateral orientations used by H & R. Essentially the same
argument has been made by Rock (1966) and by Victor (1968). Given
this- consideration, the positive findings obtained by H & R under the
base-right/base-left conditions are even more striking. It would
appear that their results can be explained only if it is assumed that in
their experiment S moved his head up and down to a considerable
extent while walking, or if the change of the location of the centroid
of'the visual flow, mentioned earlier, constitutes important informa-
tion.
A second question worthy of attention concerns the conditions
under which the discrepant nonlinear displacement effects would be
noted by S while walking past an array of randomly distributed dots.
In order to observe this particular property, S cannot merely let his
gaze wander at random from one dot, or set of dots, to another while
walking. Rather, he must observe discrepant displacement on the
part of one particular dot, or the discrepant displacement and
associated change in shape of a set of specific dots. That is, under a
random distribution of dots the succession of different randomly
chosen dots under transformation is also random.
Neither this issue nor the problem of base orientation of the prism
was analyzed and discussed by H & R. Yet both should have
considerable effect upon the outcome of the experiment.
The present replication explicitly takes account of the problem of
prism orientation. Not considered in this replication has been the
problem of how systematically S scans his visual field while in the
cylinder. The realization that this was a relevant issue came only
after the completion of the replication. As will be seen, the negative
results obtained suggest the latter variable as a possibly important
Experimental design. The purpose of this study was, first of all, to
replicate one of the experimental conditions for which H & R
obtained strong positive results. The condition in which S walked
around: inside the cylinder, looking with the right eye through a
base-right prism while the other eye was occluded, was chosen for
this purpose. In addition, in order to ascertain whether, as
hypothesized above, stronger results would obtain with a base-up
prism, this variation was also run as an experimental condition. Pre-
and post-test measures of S's straightness judgments made it possible
to: ascertain whether the training condition had had an effect on the
perception of shape.
Apparatus, For the straightness tests the same kind of rotary prism
was used as that employed by H & R. This consisted of a variable
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prism whose power ranged from 20 pd base-left to 20 pd base-right.
With his right eye S viewed a prismatically-displaced grating of
straight black bars %-in. wide and separated by white strips "%-in.
wide. For Ss who had gone through the base-right training procedure
the grating consisted of vertical bars, while Ss trained under a
base-up condition were tested with horizontally-aligned bars. As in H
& R, the target was viewed through a narrow-band filter (Kodak
Wratten No. 61), which eliminated any prismatically-
induced color fringes. Increasing the power of the prism made the
bars of the grating look increasingly curved. S's task was to rotate the
prisms until the bars of the grating appeared straight. The power of
the prism setting for which this judgment was obtained could be read
from a scale to an accuracy of 0.5 pd.
Again, in line with the H & R experiment, the cylinder within
which S was placed was 6 ft. in diameter, 6 ft. high, and 2.5 ft. above
the floor. S walked in a counterclockwise direction along the inside
wall of the cylinder, wearing a 20-pd prism in front of his right eye.
The prism was mounted on welder's goggles and provided an
approximately 60-degree field of view. The cylinder was made of
off-white tent canvas. On the inside of the cylinder were randomly
tacked, a large number of circular red, blue, and green dots made of
CONTAC paper, %, %, and 3/i6 in. in diameter, respectively. The
maximum and minimum distances between dots were approximately
3.5 and 1 in.
Subjects. Thirty-six University of Michigan volunteer students
participated in the study. Of these, half were used in the base-up and
half in the base-right condition.
Procedure. S was given eight pre-tests, with the initial settings of
the prism starting at —20, +20, —15, and +15 pd. This order was
repeated twice so as to yield a total of eight judgments of straight-ness
from each S. S would alter each initially-given setting until the :bars
of the grating viewed through the rotary prism appeared straight.
The procedure described above is in somewhat sharp contrast with
that of H & R, who used only positive initial settings - that is, settings
corresponding to an initial curvature in the bars of the grating that
was in the same direction as that of the predicted adaptation effect.
Since the use of this latter procedure did not receive any express
justification by H & R, and since it fails to conform to the usual
practice of counterbalancing initial test settings, the counter-
balancing method was adhered to in the present study.
Upon completion of the pretests, S was led to the inside of the
cylinder and the 20-pd prism was mounted on the welder's goggles
over the right eye. S was asked to observe the dot patterns for 30 min.
while walking counterclockwise within the cylinder with his right
shoulder close to, but not touching, the wall.
Following the 30-min. exposure, S was blindfolded and led back to
the test apparatus. The prism was removed from the goggles, and
eight post-tests identical to the pre-test were administered.
Results* Adaptation was computed as a post-test minus pre-test
shift in the pd setting of straightness. Positive adaptation as a result of
base-up prism training would correspond to a tendency to shift
judgments of straightness toward a curve with the center higher than
the ends. In the base-right condition this would consist of a shift in
straightness judgment toward lines whose midpoint had shifted to the
right. A numerically positive score constitutes a score in the direction
of positive adaptation in both experimental conditions.
The mean adaptation and standard deviation for the base-up
active movement condition were +0.63 and 3.86, respectively. For
the base-right active movement condition they were +0.34 and 4.31.
Both these means represent chance effects, as indicated by t-tests,
and it is clear that neither training condition produced any
adaptation. The number of positive adaptors in the base-up and
base-right groups was 10 and 7, respectively. This finding also goes
counter to the results obtained by H & R, which showed that all Ss in
the active condition adapted.
No adaptation was obtained by H & R for the passive movement
condition. This finding roles out the possibility that the positive
adaptation reported for the active movement condition might have
been an artifact due to the use of unbalanced pre-and post-tests. Thus
there is a rather perplexing discrepancy between this replication and
the H & R study, for which an explanation must be found.
Conclusion. While the results of the replication could lead one to
doubt either the findings reported by H & R or those of the
replication itself, the possible cause for negative results mentioned
earlier is probably worthy of exploration. That is, as was suggested,
neither in the H & R study nor in the present replication was any
attempt made to ensure that S systematically observed and followed
the transformation of specific sets of points. (Admittedly, to explain
the discrepancy on the basis of differences in attention poses the
problem of guessing why the H & R study created more attention. No
reasonable hypotheses suggest themselves.) To investigate the
question of attention in some depth, it may be necessary to explore a
relatively large set of stimulus conditions. Some of these should
perhaps be simpler than that used by H & R (as well as this
replication), which by its diffuseness and non-specificity placed an
enormous attention load on S.
Two additional possibilities for further investigation should
perhaps be considered. One is to replicate the replication, but with a
change to ensure that the stimulus provided by the inside of the
cylinder has exactly the same dot density as that in the H & R study
(a parameter not reported by those investigators). Second, the results
of the present replication may necessitate a further series of more
refined theoretical and methodological challenges to a sensorimotor
theory of perception than have been made hitherto.
In general, with the exception of J. J. Gibson, relatively few
students of perception will deny that discordance between motor
command and reafferent visual signals can play a role in perceptual
adaptation. However, Gibson's criticism may be worthy of further
attention from sensorimotor theorists. First of all, as suggested earlier
in this paper, in the case of the fly and perhaps some other animals as
well, Gibson's simpler model of direct visual perception may well be
closer to the data than the sensorimotor model. This whole issue
should be explored further. Even in the case of human experimental
subjects, it is possible that a direct visual mode of perception, in
which judgments are based on afferent information only, has
precedence over judgments requiring the confrontation and
resolution of conflict between efferent and reafferent sources of
information. For example, in the case of visuomotor conflict in a
pointing response, it may be that S is willing to "live with" or in some
way rationalize or interpret the fact that the visual target does not
look as if it is in the place where sensory information from the arm
would seem to indicate it to be. If S does not actually confront and
resolve the conflict, adaptation can hardly be expected. On the other
hand, it is known that in certain cases a resolution of the conflict
appears to be the only option that S selects. Such appears to be the
case, for example, when convergence and accommodation are in
conflict. S cannot perceive one object at two different distances. It
may well be that the sensorimotor model, when applied to such
situations, will be more readily validated. It would seem that work
with the latter variety of perceptual phenomena may constitute a
promising approach to the validation of a sensorimotor theory of
perceptions, which, after all, still has a great deal of residual
plausibility.
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by Bruce Bridgeman
Psychology Board of Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, Calif. 95064
Adaptation and the two-visual-systems hypothesis. I would like to offer two
comments on the provocative article by Gyr et al.: the first concerns the role of
motor activity in visual perception; the other discusses new data relating to the
independence of sensory and motor branches of the visual system. Finally, I
would like to examine possible reasons for the discrepancy in results between
Gyr et al. and the similar H&R study.
In the context of Gyr et al.'s discussion there is no question that motor activity
plays a role in perception. I will add one additional bit of evidence to that given by
Gyr et al., by reinterpreting one of the most common observations used to
differentiate the perceptual effects of active and passive movements in percep-
tion. This is the simple demonstration that pushing on the eyeball with a finger
results in an apparent motion of the visual world. Normally this is interpreted as a
motion of the retinal image without a concomitant eye movement, resulting in an
apparent motion of the world in the context of efference-copy theories. I submit
that the circumstances of the demonstration can be the exact reverse of the
traditional interpretation. To show this, find a fixation point and push slowly on the
eye: most people have no difficulty in maintaining fixation despite the apparent
motion of the world. But the actual motion of the image on the retina is then
minimal, limited to the few minutes of arc of "retinal slip," and a substantial
movement of the world is perceived without a substantial movement of the retinal
image. The interpretation of the motion effect must now be reversed, for the only
effect on the visual system is not sensory but motor: as one pushes harder and
harder on the eye, the extra-ocular muscles must work harder and harder to
maintain fixation, and it is the muscle action, not the image movement, that results
in perceived motion of the visual world. Whether it originates from an inflow or an
outflow signal, only the extraretinal signal changes in a way that corresponds to
the perceived motion.
The situation is not as unnatural as it seems at first, for the foveal stimulation
becomes similar to that found in pursuit tracking, where a small retinal slip acts as
an error signal to initiate and maintain pursuit eye movements (I thank Ian Howard
for pointing out this similarity). The crucial difference for the problem of motorsen-
sory feedback is that no relative-motion cue is available to the perceptual system,
as would normally be the case during pursuit (Gibson 1966 op cit), but apparent
motion is still obtained. Thus the motor cue alone, without relative motion, can
induce a perceived motion very like that experienced in more naturalistic motion
stimulation.
My second comment expands on Gyr et al's point that in cases of sensory
motor conflict the subject (S) may be willing to "live with" the discrepancy under
conditions that do not induce adaptation. Recent evidence from my laboratory
confirms the idea that sensory and motor-oriented aspects of visual function can
be influenced independently under the proper conditions. We began with the
phenomenon of saccadic suppression of displacement (Bridgeman, Hendry, &
Stark 1975), which showed that Ss sometimes fail to respond to target displace-
ments of up to 4° if the displacements occur during large saccadic eye
movements. This implied that information about the positions of objects in visual
space was degraded by saccades. Yet we know that humans are not disoriented
after saccades and can function quite adequately in space while making large
numbers of saccades. We combined these two discrepant observations into a
single experiment with the hypothesis that information about position could enter
the motor-visual system without influencing the cognitive system (Bridgeman &
Lewis 1976). A subject would press a button whenever a continuously-visible
target was flipped 2° to the left or right; sometimes S would fail to press the
button because of the effect of a saccadic eye movement. Following either a
detection or a failure to detect the displacement, the experimenter could
extinguish the target, thus providing S with a signal to point to the position of the
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target when it had disappeared. S pointed with an unseen hand into a blank field,
forcing him to use only the internal calibration of the motor system for pointing.
The somewhat surprising result was that Ss pointed accurately whether or not
they had detected the target displacement in the button-press phase of the
experiment, showing that the motor system could receive information that was
masked from the cognitive system. A second experiment used a criterion-free
measure to show that Ss could not detect the target displacement under these
stimulus conditions.
The implications of these results for the Gyr et al. paper are clear: Held himself,
a few years after the publication of the H & R study, gave some of his deprivation
experiments in kittens a similar interpretation in terms of two visual systems (Held
1968). We have demonstrated a similar independence of function in the normal
human—the realm of the Gyr et al. and the H & R studies.
The problem remains why H & R obtained adaptation in their active condition
while Gyr et al. did not. A close reading of the two experiments yields only one
significant difference in method not mentioned by Gyr et al.: the latter used small
circular dots to construct their texture, while H & R used "small spots of irregular
shape." It is possible that the irregular shapes underwent perspective transforma-
tions that were more salient to Ss than the rather subtle transformations of a
circular patch. Unfortunately, neither of the experiments specifies the angular size
of the spots at S's eye, but in the Gyr et al. study, where the largest dots were %"
in diameter, I conservatively estimate the angular size to be IV20 (assuming that
the observer is facing perpendicular to a radius of the drum, halfway between its
center and its edge). If the spots were of similar size in the H & R study, foveal
resolution would easily be adequate to resolve perspective transformations in
individual dots, even if Ss were unaware of this cue. Thus any replications of this
important study should use true point-sources of light as texture elements,
perhaps by backlighting pinholes in the drum. This would be the most powerful
test of the H & R hypothesis.
by Clarke A- Bumham
Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712
Adaptation to curvature in the absence of contour. The H & R study on
adaptation to the curvature produced by prism spectacles is important because,
as Gyr et al. note, Ss did not view contours. Gyr et al. have performed a valuable
service by attempting to replicate this study. Unfortunately, the results of their
replication do not permit one to specify the experimental conditions that will
produce adaptation, although the authors hypothesize that "attention" may be a
relevant variable.
What conditions lead to adaptation and what conditions fail to do so? Previous
adaptation studies, reported by Festinger et al. (1967 op. cit.) and by Gyr and his
associates, have found that adaptation occurs when Ss actively attend to the
contour in performing their experimenter-imposed tasks. In those studies, Ss who
failed to adapt were making analogous active movements, but they were doing so
independent of efferent commands coded with respect to the contour. In neither
the H & R study nor the Gyr et al. replication did Ss need to attend to the
differential displacement (curvature) and make movements with respect to it. Ss in
the H & R study may have done so, but they apparently did not have to. Perhaps
adaptation occurs only when Ss learn new afferent-efferent associations.
This conjecture would be more reasonable if there were clear evidence that,
even in the absence of contours, people adapt to the curvature produced by
prism spectacles when required to perform a task designed to promote the
learning of new afferent-efferent associations. I have conducted a study, currently
unpublished, which found adaptation in the absence of contours. This commen-
tary is a brief description of that study.1
S's task was to shoot a "machine gun," emitting a collimated burst of light
when a trigger was depressed, at targets (small dots) flashed on a screen. During
the task Ss wore prism spectacles with the base mounted upwards. They were
unable to see any horizontal or vertical contours. Two independent variables were
investigated in a 2 X 2 factorial design.
The first independent variable involved the manner in which the targets were
presented. Consider S's behavior in one of the target presentation conditions
(which will be descriptively termed the "single-flash" condition). He has just shot
at a target near the right side of the screen. A new target is presented to his left.
As S swings the gun to aim at this target, it will rise in the field of view, due to the
prism-induced curvature. As long as this new target remains visible while S swings
the gun to the new location, he can monitor the discrepancy between the current
vertical position of the gun and the new target position. S can thus use this
information to adjust the position of the gun as he moves it across the field.
Under the above conditions S will not have to relearn relationships between the
visual locus of a target and the efferent activity necessary to effect a movement to
that locus. However, there is a slight modification of the task that would be
expected to necessitate learning new afferent-efferent associations: as before, a
new target is presented after S shoots at the first. But as soon as S begins to
move to the new location, this target disappears, to reappear only when S has
reached his apparent location. On initial trials, S would be aiming below the
position at which the target reappears and would have to make a corrective
upward movement. After some experience with this situation, S would presumably
be able to move directly to the position at which the target reappears; he would
have learned new afferent-efferent associations. This target presentation condi-
tion may be descriptively termed the "double-flash" condition. (The experimenter
controlled the aperture of the slide projector, presenting the targets so as to
make them disappear and reappear.)
The other independent variable involved the efferent command issued to the
extra-ocular muscles. When S is wearing prism spectacles, this efferent
information is inconsistent with that issued to the head, torso, arms, and so
forth. If, when S is wearing base-up prisms and viewing an objectively-straight,
horizontal contour, he is asked to scan along it without making any head
movements, his eyes will move in a curved path. The eye movements are
consistent with the distorted array, and hence would not, by themselves, produce
adaptation. If S is somehow forced to scan the array by moving his head from
side to side and keeping his eyes stationary, his head will move in a straight path.
If he is allowed to move both head and eyes, efferent output to the muscles would
be a mixture of commands to move the head in a straight path and to move the
eyes in a curved path. Since efference to the extra-ocular muscles might well be
more intimately involved in determining perception than efference to the neck
muscles, free scanning might result in less adaptation than would occur in a
condition in which eye movements were minimized. In the machine gun study eye
movements were minimized for one-half of the Ss by the use of an artificial pupil (a
small hole in a sleep mask worn behind the prisms). In this condition Ss were able
to see the entire field when gazing straight ahead. If they moved their eyes to
foveally fixate a peripherally-glimpsed target, however, the target would no longer
be visible. The light rays from the target would no longer pass through the artificial
pupil and the pupil of the eye. Hence the artificial pupil would be expected to
produce a reduction in saccadic eye movements. No such restriction was
imposed on the other Ss.
A few more details: There were ten male Ss in each of the four conditions. They
viewed the targets monocularly while wearing 30° prisms mounted base upwards
in welder's goggles. The possible target positions subtended a horizontal visual
angle of 21° and a vertical visual angle of 9°. There were two six-minute shooting
periods, separated by a three-minute break during which S rested with his eyes
shut. S shot at approximately 200 targets. Adaptation was measured by changes
in the pre- to post-test settings to apparent straightness of a grating of horizontal
lines viewed through an adjustable (Risley) prism. It is extremely unlikely that this
measure, a measure of the after-effect of adaptation, would reflect conscious
error correction
The results were clearcut. Only those Ss whose eye movements were
restricted and who were in the "double-flash" condition adapted to the curvature.
Their mean adaptation was 4 25 pd, with a standard deviation of 4.27. This
amount of adaptation is significantly different from zero and is also significantly
different from the amount of adaptation in the other three conditions, which
amounted to —0.20 pd in the free eye movement/single-flash condition, 0.77 pd
in the free eye movement/double-flash condition, and 0.85 pd in the restricted
eye movement/single-flash condition. Of course, additional exposure might have
resulted in significant adaptation in these latter two conditions.
These data show that under some conditions adaptation to the curvature
produced by prism spectacles does occur, even in the absence of contour. Two
variables have been shown to affect the magnitude of this adaptation. Adaptation
occurs when eye movements are restricted and when S is required to learn a new
set of commands to the musculature controlling the head, torso, and arms in
response to the altered visual input.2 Why did H & R obtain adaptation while Gyr et
al. failed to replicate their finding? I would hypothesize that the stimulus environ-
ments and instructions used in the studies were sufficiently different so that the
participants viewed and processed the dots in different ways. It should be noted
that S's movements in the Gyr et al. study were constrained; they walked around
the drum in a circular path and remained near its perimeter. Ss in the H & R study
were apparently able to move more freely within the drum (Held 1965). These are
speculations, however. What we need is more experimentation to delineate the
conditions that facilitate adaptation.
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NOTES
1. A detailed report of the study is available from the author.
2. An earlier manuscript of this study failed to be accepted for publication
because a referee very correctly noted that the greater adaptation with
restricted eye movements may have occurred because the manipulation to
reduce eye movements could have increased head movements. However, I have
since conducted a control study in which I measured S's head movements in the
restricted and unrestricted eye-movement conditions. The head movements did
not differ.
The necessity to swing the head and torso behind the sights of the machine
gun was probably responsible for the equivalence of the head movements. The
difference in adaptation between the free and restricted eye movement
conditions may be attributed to the presence versus absence of saccadic eye
movements. When a new target was presented, the Ss in the free eye movement
condition would initiate the body and head movements necessary to swing the
gun toward the target and, simultaneously, initiate a saccade to foveally fixate
it. The efference issued for these two sets of movements would be inconsistent,
and the efference issued to the extra-ocular muscles would be consistent with
the distorted array. If the efference to the extra-ocular muscles is more
intimately involved in determining perception, the presence of efferent
commands to the extra-ocular muscles consistent with the distortion would
minimize adaptation. Ss in the restricted eye movement conditions learned that
they should not make this saccade, since it caused the target to disappear from
view. Adaptation would be produced by the altered efference to the body and
head.
by Brian Craske
Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's,
Newfoundland, Canada A1C 5S7
A stationary subject does perceive curvature when wearing a prism in a
spotted drum. The background to the reported studies consists of early work on
adaptation to laterally-displacing prisms that suggested a link between adaptation
of perceived direction and prior active movement. The necessity for such a link
has long since been denied (Craske 1967; Pick & Hay 1965; Singer & Day 1966b;
Templeton et al. 1966; Weinstein et al. 1964). Changes in registered eye-in-head
position, which underlie part of this kind of adaptation, are not logically related to
pattern perception, which is the class of phenomena to which the perception of
straightness (with eyes stationary) belongs. Thus even if motor activity were a
necessary condition for changes in registered eye-in-head position, its necessity
for perceiving straightness is wholly speculative.
An examination of the rationale for the experimental protocols in the original
H & R study reveals considerable confusion. The argument is essentially as
follows. When S wears the base right or left (BR or BL) prism, it curves verticals in
the outside world, but in the drum the random dots undergo an identity transform
and there are no perceived curves or changes, except when S moves. During
movement there is a complex transformation of the visual input, which with active
movement can lead to adaptation and an after-effect of bowing of verticals. This
argument is both mistaken and misleading, which should be made clear by what
follows.
In order to consider the effects of wearing BR prisms in the drum, I constructed
a facsimile with a spot density of 2/cm2. The most pertinent observation is that,
with a 20-dioptre BR prism over the right eye and a 60° field of vision, S's
impression of the cylinder is that it looks like the inside of a barrel; the surface
defined by the spots is curved away from S. This is so whether or not S is moving
around the cylinder. This directly contradicts the idea that there is an identity
transformation when inspecting random dots via a prism. When moving around
the perimeter (which is easily accomplished and does not require seeing one's
body), the path of S's gaze takes the form of a chord of the circle. When I acted
as S, I used frequent saccades of 25 to 35 cm. The visual array was noticeably
compressed on the right-hand edge, thus the flow of images over the retina was
not uniform in speed but was orthogonal to the stripes used to test for adaptation
in the reported experiments. Two points emerge from this: 1) Merely standing in
the cylinder puts S into a curved environment: this is likely to generate Gibsonian
after-effects whether or not S remains stationary. 2) Movement seems unlikely to
produce retinal stimulation that is at all relevant to subsequent perceived change
in the straightness of verticals.
An unanswered question is why any investigator would expect changes in
straightness of verticals in particular as a result of the visual input resulting from
movement when wearing BR prisms in the drum. I do not know the characteristics
of the visual input in this case, and I have not seen an analysis of such a complex
situation: if these things are not known, I fail to understand how a prediction about
an after-effect in the perceived straightness of verticals could have been made on
the basis of the obvious characteristics of the retinal-flow pattern, irrespective of
whether this was contingent upon movement. Indeed, it is a most unusual
experiment that predicts that the unknown characteristics of a stimulus will have
any specific effects. Gyr et al. are also perturbed about this problem: "It would
appear that the H & R results can be explained only if it is assumed that. . . S
moved his head up and down to a considerable extent;" such movements,
however, are not typical of human locomotion.
As a result of this disquiet, Gyr et al. introduced a base-up (BU) prism and a
horizontal test for perceived curvature. This is appropriate because in the
experimental condition the trajectory of a given spot will move up as it gets closer
to S, thus providing an opportunity for the occurrence of horizontal curvature
adaptation. My own experience in the cylinder while wearing BU prisms, however,
brings to light a further problem. Under these circumstances the shape of the
visual world consists of a flared flowerpot, the effect being particularly
pronounced when one is standing near the perimeter apparently looking along a
chord. This perceived shape is again likely to produce regular curvature adapta-
tion, for verticals or near verticals (not horizontals), whether or not S is moving.
For both BR and BU exposure I would predict strong Gibsonian adaptation for
grating-test stimuli of length and distance appropriate to those seen in the
experimental situation.
There is one other question, namely: whether the spatial distortion of the
cylinder can always be perceived by S. This could possibly be a function of spot
density; it is likely that the lower the density, the less visible the apparent shape of
the surface. This may account for Gyr et al.'s failure to find significant (Gibsonian)
adaptation in the BR condition. After the BU condition, however, there was no
appropriate test for this form of adaptation. The failure to obtain adaptation in the
BU test suggests that even given this appropriate experimental situation for the
production of movement-contingent curvature adaptation, the speculation as to
its occurrence was incorrect, as indicated in the opening paragraph.
H & R's positive results for the active case probably amount to normal
curvature adaptation; I cannot see how the stimulus conditions could allow for
anything else. The failure to obtain adaptation in the passive condition is more
mysterious but could well reflect the lack of attention or motivation that Efstathiou
(1963) first noted could be absent in the passive condition.
In conclusion, it would seem that no clear case has been made for the role of
movement (other than eye movement) in the perception of form, and I am not
surprised that these replications failed to find any. The H & R methodology has
been used without analysis of the characteristics of the visual input to the system,
and for BR and BL prisms it is not clear that any component of such input will yield
the kind of information necessary for the brain to adapt the part of its perceptual
system that is concerned with the straightness of verticals. Finally, the experimen-
tal situation is neither elegant nor powerful. The drum is far from providing "an
environment specially patterned to prevent the appearance of curvature when
viewed through a prism" (Held 1965). There is ample curvature information with a
2/cm2 spot density; thus conventional curvature adaptation is likely to be
present.
by R. H. Day
Department of Psychology, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia 3168
What is self-induced motor activity adapting to? Gyr et al. are quite right to
regard the H & R experiment on visual adaptation to prism-induced curvature as
important from the standpoint of the sensorimotor theory of space perception.
This experiment, together with two on prism-induced tilt by Mikaelian & Held
(1964) - apparently submitted earlier but published later - were interpreted as
overcoming a major difficulty for the theory, or rather for the valid testing of the
theory. Gibson (1933 op. cit.) and Gibson & Radner (1937) had shown that during
prolonged inspection of curved (or tilted) lines, perceived curvature (and tilt)
diminishes (adaptation), and that after inspection, straight vertical lines appear
curved (or tilted) in the opposite direction (negative after-effect). Gibson showed
that these effects occurred either when the lines were actually curved (or tilted) or
when straight lines were rendered so by prismatic refraction. Thus, in proposing a
second and independent class of adaptation involving self-induced movement
while viewing through wedge prisms (Held 1961 op. cit., 1962), it was necessary
to show that such adaptation occurred under conditions that could not give rise to
sensory adaptation and after-effect, as described by Gibson.
Mikaelian & Held (1964) claimed to have achieved this for object orientation by
requiring subjects (Ss) to set a bar to apparent verticality before and after active
and passive exposure to randomly arranged, dim, luminous spheres hanging in a
darkened room. A small (2.1°) but significant shift in the apparent vertical
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occurred after Ss walked about the room, but not after they were moved about
while standing on a trolley. Following a challenge by Hochberg (1963), Held &
Rekosh (1963 op. cit.) made a similar claim for sensorimotor adaptation to
curvature, as described by Gyr et al. The latter have failed to confirm the earlier
finding. Incidentally, this is bound to call into question the results from Mikaelian &
Held's experiment on apparent verticality.
Two issues arise from Gyr et al.'s experiment: possible reasons for the
inconsistency between the original experiment and its replication, and the logic of
the argument on which the original experiment rests.
On the first issue it can be argued, of course, that failure to confirm the original
outcome is attributable to lack of exactness in repeating the earlier conditions.
However, this implies also that the original positive outcomes derived, not from
self-induced locomotion during a period with prismatically-distorted input (which
was faithfully reproduced in the replication), but to some unidentified variable.
Thus, to argue that the conditions were not exactly the same is to imply that the
original results are not robust and lack generality. Another possibility that must be
raised concerns the expectations of both Ss and experimenters. There is now an
impressive body of data (Rosenthal & Rosnow 1969; Rosnow & Rosenthal 1970)
to show that what Ss and Es expect to occur can markedly bias the outcomes of
an experiment [see Rosenthal & Rubin: "Interpersonal Expectancy Effects" BBS
1(3) 1978], Further work would be needed to establish the basis of the
inconsistent findings.
The second issue is more fundamental and relates to the sensorimotor theory
itself. To prevent the occurrence of purely sensory adaptation and aftereffect as
described by Gibson (1933 op cit), Mikaelian & Held (1964) and H & R used
stimulus arrays consisting, respectively, of randomly-arranged, hanging spheres
and randomly arranged and randomly-shaped wall elements. As Gyr et al. point
out, H & R are cryptic on the question of what particular aspect of the stimulation
was thereby altered by prismatic refraction. Gyr et al. suggest that it might have
been the centroid - that is, the focus of expansion - of the retinal flow pattern.
However, Johnson, White, & Gumming (1973) have shown that this focus is very
difficult to judge, and errors are usually quite gross. Thus the question that has to
be asked is: If changes in curvature and orientation due to refraction are not
discriminable in random patterns, what then is rearranged? It seems odd to
expect adaptation to rearrangement to occur if no rearrangement is discernible.
There is a paradox here. On the one hand it has been argued repeatedly and
forcefully (although the argument is now in question) that for sensorimotor
adaptation to occur, motor activity must be self-induced - that is, it must be
commanded and deliberately-initiated activity of which the observer is presumably
aware (cf. Roland: "Sensory Feedback to the Cerebral Cortex During Voluntary
Movement in Man" BBS 1(1) 1978], However, it appears that on the sensory input
side the change to which adaptation occurs can be almost or wholly unnotice-
able. That is, the observer presumably need not be aware of any alteration
Therefore, the question: What is self-induced motor activity adapting to? is fair
and relevant. The data reported by Gyr et al. indicate that adaptation does not
occur at all under such conditions. This hardly seems surprising, since there is no
discriminable change in stimulation to which the motor system can adapt.
One final point is worth making. Pick & Hay (1964) pointed out that wedge
prisms give rise to a number of distortions, including displacement of the image,
curvature, spectral dispersion, differential image displacement with angle of
regard, and tilting with head movement. They found that after three days of
continuous wearing, adaptation to curvature was only 11.2 percent, while that to
horizontal displacement was 44.6 percent. It is conceivable that after a mere 30
minutes of exposure to curvature, the adaptation, if any did indeed occur, might
not have developed sufficiently to be reliably measurable. A similar experiment
involving a random array, but measuring the much greater adaptation to displace-
ment, might therefore be worth performing.
by Sheldon M. Ebenholtz
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wise. 53706
Insufficiencies in perceptual adaptation theory.
1. The problem of replication failure:
a The direction of the subject's movement in the replication was such as to
place the viewing eye adjacent to the patterned surface. The direction of
movement is not reported in the original study. Such a potential procedural
difference may have an indirect effect on attention and fixation patterns.
b. Held & Rekosh (1963 op. cit.) reported that, " . . . movements of the head
alone, if of sufficient amplitude and deviation, sufficed to produce an adaptive
change . . . " (p. 722). Although H & R instructed subjects ". . .to minimize
movements of their heads in relation to their bodies . . . " (p. 723), it remains
plausible that the occurrence of compensatory eye-head movements may hold
the key to replication. If so, the importance of fixation on a specific target during
locomotion would be critical, not merely for the purpose of noting the target
movement path (as Gyr et al. suggest), but for the purpose of retraining the
eye-head movement system.
c. A carefully-planned replication that fails, such as that of Gyr et al., indicates
that the phenomenon at issue is not as robust as it was believed to be. This
means that the relevant variables and boundary conditions have not yet been
sufficiently isolated - but it also implies that theory as thus far developed has
been insufficient for the facts. Another issue making the same point is the failure
to obtain 100% adaptation after lengthy exposure to optical tilt. Full compensation
was first reported by Mikaelian & Held (1964). There are now almost two dozen
published studies of tilt adaptation, yet none serves to corroborate the existence
of complete tilt adaptation. Furthermore, my own observations on hundreds of
subjects, including fast and slow adapters, naive and experienced subjects, and a
variety of experimental conditions, have failed to yield a single instance of full
compensation. Rather, asymptotic performance well below 100% seems to be
the rule. We require a theory of adaptation to explain these facts, as well as the
conditions under which full compensation is to be expected. The lesson to be
drawn is that the phenomena of our science deserve more attention than they are
now receiving; our theories should be Jess "ideal" and more empirically based.
2. Inadequacies of afferent-context theories of perception: In addition to the
studies of von Hoist and Sperry described by Gyr et al. (and Gyr 1972 op. cit),
which entail movement-correlated optical input, there are several classes of
research studies that rather compellingly implicate static posture in visual percep-
tion. Consider, for example, the following, chosen from among the perceptual
constancies: a. the constancies of object orientation (Ebenholtz 1977); b. the
widely known effects of convergence on perceived size and depth; and c. visual
position and visual direction constancy (Shebilske 1977).
All of these phenomena require the registration of ocular direction. It is
particularly clear that when bright targets in a reduced field are viewed, only
proprioception can provide the basis for apparent stability, visual direction, and
orientation. The obvious conclusion is that there do exist classes of visual
phenomena, some of which are determined largely by the afferent visual context;
but there are other classes that require the processing of afferent context by
events on which they are conditional, the latter frequently being proprioceptive in
nature. Thus, afferent context theories are inadequate if applied to the entire
space-perception domain.
 v
3. The need for empirically-based theories of perceptual adaptation: A second
type of eclecticism recommends itself in the distinction between sensorimotor
theories of perception and sensorimotor theories of adaptation. It is clear, as in
the case of afference-based theories, that not all perceptual phenomena can be
appropriately treated by sensorimotor theory. Thus color vision, brightness
perception, sensory after-effects associated with specific feature detectors (such
as thermal adaptations, disparity after-effects, tilt after-effects, motion after-
effects, and McCullough-type after-effects, etc.) may all be treated by afference-
based theories, with sensorimotor theory for the most part irrelevant to these
phenomena. Likewise, even within the limited domain of perceptual adaptation
there is little reason to consider that all the phenomena of perceptual adaptation
will be relevant to a single type of theory. Consider, for example, the direct
evidence (Redding 1973a; 1975) that displacement adaptation and adaptation to
optical tilt are quite independent phenomena, in that their simultaneous occur-
rence produces no interaction whatsoever. Furthermore, the same subjects fail to
yield significant correlations across the two tasks, whereas each task indeed
correlates highly and significantly with itself over time (Redding 1973b). Such
differences warrant skepticism as to whether any extant theory - sensorimotor or
afference-based - will be relevant to both phenomena.
Skepticism should be extended further to the very question of the identification
of the locus of adaptation-like phenomena. On this point the finding of hysteresis
effects associated with the tonus-control mechanisms of the extra-ocular
muscles (Ebenholtz 1974; 1978; Ebenholtz & Wolfson 1975; Paap & Ebenholtz
1976; 1977) raises the possibility that the after-effects associated with eye-
specific adaptation, displacement adaptation, adaptation to altered conver-
gence, and still others, are phenomena that represent neither a remapping in the
sensorimotor domain, a pure visual shift (i.e. a projection-level phenomena), nor a
reseating of the metric underlying proprioception.
The culmination of the application of skepticism as herein advocated should be
the development of empirically-based theories of perceptual adaptation that
encompass the major facts and functional relations generated by the study of
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perceptual adaptation phenomena. The same prescription applies no less to
theories of space perception in general.
by Ronald A. Finke
Department of Psychology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass. 02139
Nonrandom curvature adaptation to random visual displays. I wish to suggest
a few proposals as to how the apparent contradiction between the H & R study
and Gyr et al.'s attempted replication might be resolved experimentally. First, if
one maintains that the results of an earlier study are due to some uncontrolled
artifact, then one should attempt to employ experimental procedures specifically
designed to maximize whatever effects that artifact is supposed to produce. In
particular, Gyr et al. speculate that head movements ought to be a crucial factor
in determining the amount of curvature adaptation. Perhaps they should repeat
their experiments with subjects intentially moving their heads horizontally or
vertically during adaptation procedures. Gyr et al. also speculate that attention to
the transformation of specific dots or dot patterns during movement should be a
crucial factor in producing curvature adaptation. Perhaps they might consider
repeating their experiments so as to maximize attention. Another factor to
consider is how rapidly subjects walk around the circular display field. Certainly
the rate at which dot patterns pass in front of the observer should affect the
perceptual salience of nonlinear distortions produced by the prisms. If one found
that, when their alleged effect upon curvature adaptation is maximized, any of
these factors actually produced significant increases in the amount of adaptation,
a strong empirical case could be made that differences in the outcomes of the
two studies were due to differences in how that particular variable had been
controlled. Otherwise, the null results of an attempted replication reveal nothing.
Second, if the problem of replication does not lie in differences between
adaptation procedures, perhaps it lies in differences between testing procedures.
For example, the particular width of the bars used in the test gratings might be
important, given the possibility of a spatial-frequency-dependent effect. Perhaps
by using different sizes and separation distances of the dots in the display field,
crossed with different test-grating spatial frequencies, one could demonstrate
that the obtained discrepancy is attributable to uncontrolled differences in spatial
frequency matching.
Finally, I would think that at least one important prerequisite for attempting a
replication is a demonstration that one's procedures work for a standard effect.
Perhaps Gyr et al. should repeat their experiments using actual contours in the
display field, in addition to random dots. If no evidence is found for adaptation
even with actual contours, then an obvious procedural flaw has been overlooked.
Indeed, before making too much of a failure to replicate, the sensitivity of one's
procedures should first be substantiated.
by Oawid Freides
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. 30322
Motor factors in perception: Limitations in empirical and hierarchical
analysis. Gyr et al. treat the H & R study as an experimentum crucis and
conclude that they cannot replicate its results. They appear unable to decide
whether to retreat massively or just a little from the theoretical position they have
heretofore held. My reaction, in general, is to get away from the high drama of
their presentation. I will discuss some empirical issues and then a matter of
theoretical orientation.
Gyr et al. describe the earlier experiment as a between-subjects design, the
passive control condition occurring in an independent group. Actually, the same
eight Ss served in both active and passive conditions, and with prisms in both
base right and left orientations. The only independent control group consisted of
three Ss who were run in an active condition without prisms. Thus the experience
of H & R's experimental Ss was quite different from that in the replication in which
each S experienced only one condition; and overall, only one of the previous
experimental conditions (right, active) was repeated. Nevertheless, it appears
that the earlier findings were indeed replicated in seven of 18 Ss in the base-right
condition, and that ten of 18 Ss adapted with base-up prisms. Failure to replicate
in all Ss implicates uncontrolled interactive individual differences (note that
variance is high relative to means) or inadequate procedural controls or both.
Gyr et al. discuss a number of possible procedural factors that might account
for the discrepent results. I would add inadequate control of the locus of gaze,
which was not objectively constrained (collars?) in either experiment. I find it
difficult to imagine that some Ss walking alone in a circle for half an hour would not
attempt to look at their limbs or torso despite injunctions to the contrary.
Viewing unreplicated experiments with unstudied parameters as crucial disre-
gards the recurrent experience of replication failure. The place in the scheme of
things of a particular experimental finding is secure only if it recurs as its
parameters are studied in detail. In this instance Gyr et al. refer to no data about
stimulus parameters (e.g. duration of induction, eye stimulated, degree of prism
distortion, instructions and explanations about the experiment), response param-
eters (e.g. type of response used to index perception, persistence of induced
effect and interaction with measurement operations), or subject variables (e.g.
sex, handedness, eye dominance, age, intelligence, field independence). Such
information might permit a more definitive judgment as to the heuristic significance
of the original experiment. It might also provide clues to, or even explain the
mechanisms that mediate the after-effect.
Gyr et al. seek evidence for the modification of perceptual or input mechanisms
by recent motor-sensory experience. An alternative hypothesis might be that
behavior after motor-sensory input derives from altered response mechanisms,
particularly receptor-orienting behavior. For example, it is possible that some type
of nystagmus or change in eye or lens muscle tone is induced by prisms, and that
this varies with whether or not Ss have to look where they are going. Parametric
studies would bear on this hypothesis. Cegalis (1973) found accommodative
changes after five minutes of walking with base-left prisms and has related prism
distortion to field dependence (Cegalis & Young 1974).
From a purely theoretical perspective, there is a disquieting feature in Gyr et
al.'s presentation. As the empirical data base for the concepts of efference and
reafference, they cite work done on the fly and the fish. What they do not
communicate is that even if humans share characteristics with flies, they are, in
other respects, likely to be quite different. That is, humans have sophisticated,
flexibly-deployable neural mechanisms, deriving from later stages of evolution,
which function in parallel, inhibit and supersede, or are integrated with any existing
primitive mechanisms. This rather obvious idea requires theoretical consideration
of some kind of hierarchical organization in information processing and motor
mechanisms (cf. Easton 1972; Evarts 1973; Watson 1978). The gap is surprising,
since in an earlier paper (Gyr 1975, op. cit.) discussion of "epistomological
considerations" would appear to imply such an approach.
If, in a hierarchically-organized, sophisticated organism, behavioral evidence is
sought for the operating characteristics of its primitive mechanisms, a formidable
experimental challenge may be present. In order to study the primitive mecha-
nisms, the means have to be found to circumvent those most effective adaptive
resources that are likely to dominate the repertoire. A reliable analysis of primitive
mechanisms by means of voluntary behavior may be impossible for this reason,
and it may be necessary to resort to other means of observation. One precedent
may be the study of human habituation - an information-processing mechanism
shared with invertebrates. Measurement here is by means of psychophysiological
methods of autonomically-mediated reactions in Ss who have been given no
deliberate task to perform (cf. Gruzelier & Venables 1973). With regard to the
hypothesis suggested above, a definitive test might be possible only with
electromyographic recording of changes in eye-muscle potentials or some
physiologic measure of accommodative mechanisms.
We remain indebted to Gyr for keeping the issue of the role of motor factors in
perception alive. It shows up, I believe, as an unresolved question in such
disparate areas of psychological inquiry as field dependence (Witkin & Goode-
nough 1977), which must have something to do with biases in the resolution of
discrepent visual and somatosensory information; learning disabilities (Ayres
1972), where motor dysfunction is often observed but has a puzzling relationship
to information-processing dysfunction; schizophrenia, where somatosensory,
vestibular, and thought impairments often covary (Prescott 1971); signal-
detection theory, where it appears that acuity may, after all, not be totally
independent of response bias (Clark 1976); and in the very general and recurrent
finding in sensory and perceptual research (including research on hemispheric
specialization) that the response used to provide an index of information
processing significantly affects and often determines the results (Freides 1974;
1977; White 1972).
by Ralph Norman Haber
Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. 14627
When is sensory-motor information necessary, when only useful, and when
superfluous? Sensory-motor theories of perception drew their original impetus
from the need to explain various constancies of visual perception in the face of
changes produced by observer motion or orientation. Visual-orientation con-
stancy, our ability to perceive visually the gravitational upright, has been assumed
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to depend upon corrections based upon gravitational detectors in the vestibular
system (Ebenholtz 1977). Visual-direction constancy, our ability to perceive the
visually straight ahead, has been assumed to depend upon corrections based
upon eye position in the head (Matin 1976b). Saccadic suppression, the momen-
tary loss of visual sensitivity beginning just prior to the onset of the saccadic eye
movement, has been assumed to depend upon neural signals from the eye-
movement control centers initiating the saccade (Riggs 1976). Motion constancy,
in which the displacement of the retinal image across the retinal surface is not
perceived if caused by pursuit or saccadic eye movements, has been assumed to
depend upon efferent signals from the eye-movement control centers, cancelling
the effects of visual afferent displacements (Festinger et al. 1967 op. cit; von
Hoist 1954 op. cit). Fixation maintenance, our ability to maintain fixation on an
object in space even when our head and body is moving in space, has been
assumed to depend upon an interaction of afferent visual and efferent oculomotor
control signals. Fixation maintenance is a component of the more complex
sensory-motor coordination required under rapid locomotion, such as trying to
catch a fly ball on the run (Melvill-Jones 1976). Finally, sensory-motor interactions
have been assumed to be critical components of adaptation of visually-
rearranged environments. Whiie the natural environment does not normally
undergo visual rearrangement (except for adaptation to frames of spectacles, to
optically-correcting or tinted lenses, to vision under water while wearing a diving
mask, or to suddenly-induced optical errors of accomodation or astigmatism),
rearrangement tasks have been a favorite laboratory procedure to test for the
presence of sensory-motor interactions. The recent reviews by Welch (1974 op.
cit), Lackner (1977), and especially Welch (1978) provide evidence that self-
initiated motor activity (that producing efferent signals) may not always be
necessary, although the vast majority of evidence suggests that active movement
is more useful than passive movement to produce perceptual adaptation.
Gyr et al. contrast a sensory-motor theory of perception with one making no
demands on a necessary motor contribution. The only reference they cite is
Gibson (1966 op. cit), who has the most developed visual theory of visual
perception. Gyr et al. describe two theoretical conditions that would demonstrate
the necessary involvement of motor activity: evidence that with constant visual
input, changes in motor activity produce changes in perception; and evidence
that perceivers can monitor their motor activity in order to integrate that
information with visual information.
I do not feel that these conditions are a sufficient basis for claiming that
sensory-motor interactions are necessary. Furthermore, Gyr et al., along with
most other researchers, have failed to appreciate one of Gibson's theoretical
demands on all theories of perception. Virtually all research on the motion
constancies, on sensory-motor correlations, and on adaptation to rearranged
visual stimulation, has tested perception in highly-restricted and artificial visual
environments. Under such conditions the visual system is deprived of many of the
sources of information upon which it typically and regularly relies. When this
occurs, either in the laboratory or naturally (as when one is trying to see in the
dark), there are two possible resulting effects on perception. If perceptual
processing is based upon rigidly-ordered structural steps, then perception fails,
with gross errors of perception occurring in such impoverished environments. On
the other hand, if perceptual processing is based upon some flexible set of
strategies, then when some sources of useful information are missing, less useful
or more expensive (in the sense of cost-to-process) information is substituted, or
else changes occur in the procedures so that the perceiver can still construct a
reasonable layout of space.
Neither of these alternatives can support research using impoverished environ-
ments to test the necessity of a motor component in perceptual processing. A
motor component may only be necessary under impoverished conditions, but
otherwise is never used. If the visual environment is richly furnished with
information, as it is when a perceiver looks at natural scenes under the normal
range of daytime or artificial illumination, it may be that visual information alone is
sufficient for all aspects of visual perception. As soon as the most useful depth
information is removed, however, as it is with nearly every motion-constancy and
perceptual-adaptation experiment, then perhaps the only way to disambiguate
and integrate the isolated retinal changes is to relate them to changes in one's
movements.
In one of the few studies that contrast impoverished and rich information, Lee
(1974) reported a series of experiments designed to test gravitational and
orientational constancy. In the visually-rich environments the subjects stood in a
normal room in which the entire walls and surround of the room could be changed
in orientation and even set in motion. Lee found that subjects based all their
perceptions and all their judgements upon the visual information around them,
irrespective of what their gravitational detectors told them. Such results are in
marked contrast to the typical rod-and-frame impoverished scene in which
information from gravitational detectors is clearly brought into play (See Ebenholtz
(1977) for a review and a model based upon the impoverished testing setting).
Gibson has described in some detail (1966 op. cit; see also Haber 1978) the
visual information available on the retinal surface that can distinguish between
observer-induced motion and environment-induced motion of all types: saccades,
pursuits, head movements, body locomotion, object movement, full-scene dis-
placements, and their combinations. But such distinctions can only be made if the
scene is fully articulated in depth. The ground on which the observer is standing
and on which objects are resting has to be visible and not empty or textureless.
Looking at a flat screen with objects projected on it, or at glowing lines or bars in
the dark, could never provide enough information to visually disambiguate
observer motion from object motion.
It is possible that sensory-motor interactions are necessary and that an
exclusively vision theory of visual perception is inadequate. But at present neither
Gibson's claim that this is the case, on the one eye, nor the contrary
impoverished-environment evidence, on the other eye, are sufficient to settle the
question. Consequently, neither the original H & R experiment nor the Gyr et al.
replication, reported here, advance the question at all.
My comments should not be taken to mean that observer motion might be
irrelevant for vision. One of the most important sources of information about the
layout of space arises from motion parallax and from motion perspective more
generally. Without observer motion this information is unavailable. Thus, observ-
ers always get more information about space, and perhaps even disambiguate
other information, but only if they move. The information acquired in this way,
however, is strictly visual and can be interpreted without reference to the
magnitude of movement or whether the movement was active or passive. For
example, while an observer is fixating on the horizon, his head movements
displace the images of all the objects (except those around the particular fixation
area) across the retinal surface, with the amount of displacement being inversely
proportional to the distance of each of the objects from him. The ratio of the
relative displacements is determined only by their relative distances and is totally
independent of the source of the initiation of the movement and of the magnitude
of the movement. So motion perspective is very useful for visual perception,
whether it is passive or active and whether or not its magnitude or direction is
monitored.
There are other examples from research on visual perception in which
carefully-controlled laboratory studies may lead to wrong conclusions. The past
150 years have produced a magnificent body of work on the effectiveness of
different cues to depth and distance. In general, most experiments isolate all but
one cue of interest, which is then varied while all others are removed or
controlled. Every cue studied in isolation (for example convergence, accommo-
dation, interposition, adjacency, aerial perspective, etc.) has been shown to be
effective. Variation in the information from that cue produces variation in
perception.
But it is likely that some of these cues are of such low validity that they will
never be used when other cues are present. Convergence is probably the best
example. The angle between the lines of sight of the two eyes is an obvious
logical source of information about the distance of the object being fixated.
Gregory (1966) describes convergence information as the input to a human
range-finder computer. But as Ogle (1962) has pointed out, registration of
convergence is slow, it is imprecise, its range of even minimal accuracy is only for
very nearby objects, and most important, it appears to be ignored entirely in the
viewing of visually-rich scenes. Welch (1978) has also reviewed data to show that
in visually-rearranged environments, where retinal information is pitted against
convergence information, it is convergence that is recalibrated. Hence, if conver-
gence is the only source of information available, flexible perceivers will be forced
to use it. But as soon as they have other and better information, they pay little
attention to convergence.
Thus, while well-controlled laboratory studies, proceeding one variable at a
time, sound like good science, they may only tell us what perceivers can do when
pushed to the wall, and reveal little about what they normally do. As Gyr et al.
note, visual theories of visual perception are theoretically simpler to conceptual-
ize, and they make far fewer demands on the nervous system for their support. It
is possible that the behavior of perceivers reflects this as well, so that they use
visual information alone whenever there is enough of it, and only resort to more
complex and costly processing when needed.
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by Lewis O. Harwey, Jr.
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80309
Evaluating nonreplication: more theory and background necessary. Current
theorizing about the nature of perception has moved beyond the simplistic S-R
formulations popular in past decades. Indeed, the original formulation by Gibson
of "direct" perception seems as naive today as the attacks against it. The new
theoretical orientation has grown out of information-processing (Neisser 1967)
and artificial intelligence (Minsky & Papert 1969). Contemporary theoretical
interest has become focused on the nature of the processes that take physical
energy (stimuli) and calculate transformations for the purpose of creating internal
representations of stimuli (e.g. Powers 1973; Sommerhof 1974), as well as on the
processes that store internal representations of knowledge (Kintsch 1974).
These internal representations provide the basis for decisions about behavior.
A process is a computational algorithm that, given a set of inputs, allows an
output to be calculated. These inputs can of course be both external and internal
(i.e. the outputs of other processes). The computational result produced by a
process is the metric associated with that process. The distinction between a
metric and the process that produces the metric is important to make, because
the same metric could be produced by quite different processes.
Together, processes and their associated metrics form a theory (Anderson
1978) and give scientists something substantial to test, refute, and argue about.
The recent literature abounds with descriptions of processes that build internal
representations of stimuli (Lindsay & Norman 1977), that compare different
internal representations with each other (Tversky 1977; Krueger 1978), and that
make decisions (Krantz 1969; Green & Birdsall 1978). These days few doubt that
perception, memory, and behavior are mediated by neural circuitry (whether
understood at the moment or not); an additional advantage of formulating specific
processes and metrics is that they can be examined for neurological feasibility. In
fact, where two competing processes are found to be formally equivalent or
isometric, or give equally accurate predictions of empirical data, the test of
neurological feasibility may be the only way to resolve the conflict (Anderson
1978). But whether or not a process is described in neurological terms is not in
and of itself a strength or a weakness.
The major problem with the paper by Gyr et al. is that it never makes a clear
enough theoretical statement of the issues to render them testable, it does not
critically evaluate experimental evidence cited in discussion of the issues, and it
ignores published experimental findings. The authors start with a general state-
ment of the position ascribed to H & R, that motor and visual sensory processes
can interact to produce percepts, and the position of Gibson, that a detailed
analysis of external variables in the visual array can predict specific perceptual
events. I note that these two positions are not a priori in conflict with each other,
although the authors then set up an implied conflict by stating the conditions
under which motor activity should be assigned a critical role in visual perception:
"motor output must be shown to be necessary to the perceptual process." What
is meant by "critical role" and "necessary" is not defined.
Another weakness in the paper is that the review of the literature is little more
than a listing of some of the studies that have been cited as supporting the two
positions. What I kept wanting was a critical evaluation of the literature relative to
the issues. And at the end of the paper the authors draw the rather weak
conclusion that although sensory-motor interaction has a lot of empirical support,
perhaps Gibson's position is not so bad. The basis for this statement seems to be
the author's failure to replicate the findings of H & R, since they make no critical or
specific analysis of the other evidence.
Unfortunately, the current study does nothing to clarify the issues, nor does it
clarify the failure to repeat H & R's results. A replication that obtains results in
agreement with the replicated experiment has no problem. But when a replication
obtains results that differ from the original (as is the case here), the authors have
an obligation to extend the original result and offer experimental evidence
explaining the differences. Gyr et al. did uncover a procedural problem with the
H & R study, and they imply that this problem is serious. Indeed, the H & R
procedure would have introduced a response bias which, in retrospect, one
would want to avoid, but since the interpretation of the results depended upon the
difference between the pre-adaptation and the post-adaptation measures, any
response bias was subtracted out and could not have accounted for their positive
findings. The other suggestions made by Gyr et al. about the effects of attention
and the direction of flow pattern strike me as rather improbable. In any case, it is
the responsibility of the authors to put their notions to experimental test rather
than to leave the reader hanging with an inconclusive experimental finding.
The authors would have done the scientific community a service if they had
critically examined the empirical data, and instead of asking which position was
correct, to have asked under what conditions motor processes interact with
perceptual processes. The evidence that springs to my mind certainly supports a
model of perceptual processing that permits an efference copy or corrolary
discharge derived from motor commands to influence the perceptual outcome
(e.g. Stevens' replication of the classic Mach and Kormueller experiments on
perception during attempted eye movements of paralyzed eyes; see Stevens on
Roland: "Sensory Feedback to the Cerebral Cortex During Voluntary Movement
in Man, BBS 1(1) 1978 pp. 163-5), and that this motor-derived information is
generated before any movement begins (e.g. Matin 1974). An even more
valuable service would have been rendered had the authors formulated the
theoretical positions in terms of specific processes and made specific models in
an effort to integrate and explain the various data that have been offered as
support for these two views. It would then be possible to have a clear and
meaningful discussion of data and of theoretical issues in the context of the
models.
by Votker Hene
Neurological Institute, University of Zurich, CH-8091 Zurich, Switzerland
Can the brain be divided into a sensory and a motor part? Based on
discrepant experimental findings and a review of the literature, Gyr et al. present
arguments questioning whether motor systems can have a decisive influence on
sensory processing at all. In this short commentary I will limit myself to discussing
some aspects of eye movements.
In neither study were eye movements measured. Humans as well as monkeys
usually combine eye and head movements, but they will increase the size of
saccades if the head is fixed. Concerning the orientation of the prism and the
resultant vertical or horizontal displacement, there is no good argument for
assuming that the fastest or most effective adaptation occurs to the stimuli that
lead to the largest displacement. Another point to consider is that we make fewer
and smaller pure vertical eye movements than horizontal ones spontaneously. In
the active-vs.-passive-movement paradigm, with each step during the active
condition there is some vertical head movement, which induces eye movements
via the vestibulo-ocular reflex. Why do we adapt to unusual patterns of sensory
stimulation? Conflict between inputs is certainly one possible reason. Therefore,
instructions or prior knowledge of the details of the experimental set-up seem to
be important. S's mental set may play a role: is he willing to accept the
environment as it is? Is he expecting some conflicting cues for which he is eager
to compensate?
Turning now to the theories reviewed, a distinction between sensory and motor
function is drawn with some effort. Ever since Descartes introduced this sharp
distinction, there has been some heuristic usefulness to it. Recent neurophysio-
logical experiments, however, cannot support such a sharp separation. In the
vestibular nuclei, for example, secondary vestibular neurons respond differently to
vestibular stimulation, whether animals are allowed to exhibit nystagmus or
whether they are rewarded for suppressing nystagmus (Buettner et al. 1978).
These are cells that are just two synapses away from the hair cells in the
semicircular canals. In the superficial layers of the superior colliculi, cells behave
differently, depending on whether a target moves across a receptive field, or an
eye movement of equal velocity sweeps across the stationary target (Robinson &
Wurtz 1976). With such experiments in mind it becomes difficult to decide where
the frontier between sensory and motor systems is. There seems to be a
multilevel transformation between sensory input and motor output, with feedback
pathways at all levels. Trying to avoid complex sensory-motor interactions in
experiments is certainly legitimate in order to keep numbers of parameters to a
minimum. But a theory or model based on such experiments always reflects such
limitations. To generalize from such a model can be dangerous. Although we can
perceive while motor output parameters are kept constant, this can never prove
that a powerful influence from the motor system upon perception could not be
present under different experimental conditions.
Pursuing this question further, Gyr et al. discuss several experiments, starting
with flies and fish, showing that these animals cannot compensate for inverted
visual input (head or eyes rotated by 180°) with motor output. True, but these
experiments bear no relation to human psychology. Humans wearing reversing
prisms do reverse their vestibulo-ocular reflex and optokinetic response (Melvill
Jones 1977). Cats and monkeys also do so. This is the more remarkable, since
the vestibulo-ocular reflex is phylogenetically a very old one and is otherwise
elicited so reliably that a failure to do so has been accepted by neurologists,
along with other criteria, as a sign of brain death. It is a three-neuron reflex, but it
can still be modified, and even inverted. The inverted reflex leads, in turn, to a
return to stable visual perception.
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Considering optokinetic input once again, if a human subject is put inside a
rotating optokinetic drum with such accelerations calibrated so that no conflict
arises with vestibular input, humans, too, will always perceive circular vection -
that is, self-motion - and will perceive the drum as being stationary. Therefore,
although the human has so much in common with the fly that he experiences
self-motion under these conditions, he can nonetheless adapt with respect to his
perception and motor response if he wears reversing prisms [cf. Voneche].
Behrens & Grusser (1978) have recently described a new visual-motor
interaction phenomenon. Making a slow eye movement across a stationary
repetitive visual pattern can induce the illusion of pattern movement. The illusory
motion perception induces an ocular following movement, which in turn induces
the illusion.
Gyr et al.'s review goes on to examine the question of "whether organisms are
in fact able to monitor their own motor behavior at a central level." This seems to
be a strange question, unless one considers the human brain to be a simple reflex
machine. Signals about single eye movements can be reliably recorded in
different brainstem areas approximately 100 msec before the movement occurs.
Does the brain make use of such information? Yes, because some patients with
very recent oculomotor paisy complain that when eye movements are attempted
in the direction of the paralyzed muscle, there is a sudden shift of the visual world.
With vision restricted to the paralyzed eye, inaccurate visual location (e.g.
finger-pointing at objects) will persist for a long time, showing that it is not easy to
override such a central signal [cf. Roland].
Commenting from the neurophysiologist's viewpoint, in physiology it has taken
a very long time to accept that normal motor activity or information-processing
from sensory inputs is far more complex than laboratory experiments indicate.
Instead of trying to keep all parameters but one constant, experimentors should
try to explore one problem under as many different controlled circumstances as
possible. This leads to the general question: Can we understand complex
problems by singling out separate aspects and investigating them either in
isolation? or in more primitive animals? or is it necessary also to investigate these
problems under conditions of complex interaction, as different and more variable
information-processing strategies may be involved?
by Julian Hochberg
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 10027
and Leon Festinger
Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, New York, N. Y.
10003
Is there curvature adaptation not attributable to purely intravisual phenom-
ena? Gyr et al.'s experiment is an important one, for reasons that go beyond his
discussion. The theory that the space we see is built of nonspatial visual
sensations, endowed with spatial qualities by the effects of motor acts, is an old
and sturdy one. The most important component of this theoretical complex is the
hypothesis that visual direction (i.e. two-dimensional space) is a function of
memories of (Lotze 1965) or readiness for (Festinger et al 1967 op cit) tthe
movements that are needed to touch or to fixate particular places in the visual
field. Direct evidence is scant and contradictory.
Research on sensory recorrelation (e.g. the effects of adapting to distorting
spectacles) has provided one source of support, but most experiments in this
area demonstrate only a change in the relationship between seen objects and felt
directions. Such change is necessarily ambiguous as to whether visual space,
sensed body position, or only the correlation between them has changed (Walls
1951; Harris 1963; Hochberg 1963). Only intravisual changes, such as changes in
apparent curvature or shape, could provide convincing evidence of change in
visual space itself (Hochberg 1963).
Precisely that evidence of change in visual curvature was provided by the H & R
experiment. We disagree with Gyr et al. and with others who have argued that the
prism arrangement in that experiment—i.e., bases oriented either to the right or
to the left—provided distorted visual feedback only with vertical head move-
ments. Forward locomotion while wearing such prisms results in characteristic
distortions of the optical expansion pattern as well as the eye movements needed
to track or to fixate any particular point in the field during the locomotion itself.
The H & R experiment would certainly appear to be a valid test of the dependence
of visual space on visuomotor habits or readiness. It is the only experiment
demonstrating prism-induced curvature adaptation and after-effects in which
extended lines that might give rise to the purely visual Gibson normalization effect
(Gibson 1933 op. cit.) were excluded. Gyr et al.'s failure to replicate the results of
that experiment are therefore noteworthy, considering the theoretical load it
carried.
The only other experiment bearing on this point, of which we are aware, is one
by Miller & Festinger (1977); in that experiment the subject had to make straight
horizontal eye movements in order to fixate a point on a curved line that was
presented on a gaze-contigent cathode ray tube display. Despite nearly perfect
acquisition of the new visuomotor behaviors demanded by this task, change in the
measured apparent curvature of the line was unrelated to the motor changes.
The empirical question of whether and when there occurs curvature adaptation
not attributable to purely intravisual phenomena (i.e. the Gibson effect) is now a
theoretically very important one.
by Marc Jeannerod
Laboratoire de Neuropsychologie Experimental, Inserm, U94, 16, Avenue Doyen
Lepine, 69500 Bron, France
Visuomotor experiments: Failure to replicate, or failure to match the
theory? The paper by Gyr et al. raises two main points:
1. The so-called sensohmotor theory of perception. There are in fact many
theories claiming that perception is not independent of motor activity, but very few
(if any) claim that motion, or even self-motion, is the only way to give rise to
perception (i.e. the subjective experience of the outside world). My own under-
standing of this problem is not that perception is produced by movement, but that
movement is part of the perceptual process. The perceiving subject makes
assumptions about external events—assumptions that he verifies through action.
The external world can be seen as a flux of sequential events with causal
relationships. During perceptual development the predictive nature of these
sequences is progressively established. The external world becomes, for every
subject, an "assumptive world," which determines his own perceptual experience
(Ittelson 1960). Hence, the actual significance of a given external event will only
be revealed through the available consequences of the resulting action (i.e.,
through the possibility of verifying the prior perceptual assumptions about the
event.)
Perceptual conflicts may produce a mismatch between the prior assumption
and the subsequently experienced result of an action. The "error" observed
during action is a cue for elaborating a new set of assumptions. This adaptation
process would correspond to a progressive change in the subjective probability
of the perceptual assumptions in a given situation. The heuristic value of conflict
experiments comes from the fact that they represent an extreme case of normal
perceptual conditions. My suggestion is that even in the normal situation the
external world is always affected by a probability factor, and that active
verification is always required. One exception, however, may be the situation of
overtraining, in which the subject may rely more heavily on his assumptions.
These speculations may give some substance to the rather vague "complex
interaction" between sensory processes and motor responses postulated by
Held & Rekosh (1963 op. cit.). The methodology of Held's group in their
visuomotor adaptation experiments implies an absence of any error-correcting
feedback from movement during visuomotor conflict. In other words, the subject
does not have the opportunity to set an external goal for his movement—that is,
to make an assumption about the spatial location of the goal—and to compare it
with the position of his arm at the end of the intended movement. Another
suggestion, corollary to that of the preceding paragraph, is that the error-
correcting feedback that exists in most natural situations is key information for the
adaptation of behaviour to external events.
The methodological assumptions of Held's group in the eye-hand adaptation
studies in fact conflicts with those implied by another set of experiments by the
same group, in which the notion of error-correcting feedback is explicitly
introduced (Hein & Held, 1967).
2. The H & R experiment. The limited failure of Gyr et al. to replicate the
H & R results should not be considered as a failure of the theory. There are many
other results from Held's group (and from other groups as well) showing greater
efficacy of active as opposed to passive movement in producing visuomotor
adaptation. However, further to what has been said above, the mere inspection of
one's own moving arm without error-correcting feedback always produces
smaller effects. It might have been of interest to compare the results of the
present replication with a parallel study using a different kind of exposure (i.e. one
involving corrective feedback).
Another more technical point may account for the failure to replicate. In this
type of study subjects are often selected on the basis of their ability to adapt to
visuomotor conflict. Gyr et al. could have attempted to compare their 7/18
positive adaptors with those of H & R. It is not certain that the range of
after-effects obtained with these seven subjects would have been very different
from the low but consistent effects obtained by H & R.
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&yJ.A. Scott Keiso
Haskins Laboratories, 270 Crown Street, New Haven, Conn. 06510
Motor-sensory feedback formulations: are we asking the right questions?
Gyr and his colleagues would have us confront anew the evidence for assigning a
critical role to motor activity in visual perception. While their discussion of
"sensorimotor processes" suggests a tightly-coupled relationship between
perception and action systems, we believe that the authors present a potentially
misleading picture of the relationship between efference and afference. The
thrust of this commentary will be to lay out some of the logical problems
associated with a theory that utilizes the concept of efference copy. By and large,
these supplement points already raised in this journal be a number of commenta-
tors on a paper by Roland (1978). The present position is that efference copy and
its often synonymously used affiliates, corollary discharge and central monitoring
of efference, are, with perhaps a single exception, low in theoretical power. This
is the general claim to be made here. In addition, we wish specifically to point to
an alternative account for the type of data that Gyr et al. seek to explain. This
focuses on the concepts of information discordance and allocation of attention,
which, when allied, seem to provide an adequate explanation of much of the
adaptation literature without resorting to unique contributions from efference
copy.
Gyr et al. present the classical data for the role of efference in visual
perception. Many of the methodological problems in extending this approach to
human behavior have been raised by Shebilske (1977) and will not be re-
enumerated here. More damaging, however, is the elegant rationale by Turvey
(1977a; see also this Commentary and elsewhere in this issue) that an explana-
tion of visual perception, relying on a comparison of efferent signals to eye
muscles and the retinal input provided by vision, falls sadly short when we move
beyond the situation of a simple eye movement in a stationary head on a
stationary body. When one considers the complexity of the visual array (when an
individual performs locomotory activities, for example), a simple computational
explanation no longer suffices.
It is clear that Gyr et al. wish to extend the efference-copy notion to movement
coordination in general. They are, of course, not alone in this enterprise, in that
the efference-copy concept is often used to explain, among other things: 1) the
superiority of active over passive movement perception (e.g. Kelso 1977; Teuber
1964 op. cit); 2) the ability of subjects to make rapid error corrections in
step-tracking tasks well within the bounds of peripheral feedback loop times (e.g.
Higgins & Angel 1970); and 3) the motor performance of de-afferented animals
(e.g. Taub 1977). While such data require satisfactory explanation, we do not
want to place our money on an all-encompassing efference-copy/reafference
relationship. As long ago pointed out by Bernstein (1967), there is an equivocality
between motor commands and the effects that they produce. There can
therefore be no direct comparison between efference copy and reafference,
because such a one-to-one mapping between the two sources of information
cannot exist.
More important for a theory of coordination is the issue of how the multiple
degrees of freedom of the motor apparatus are regulated. Powerful arguments
can be generated against a view that efferent commands specify the states of
individual muscles. This would result in an extraordinarily detailed efference copy
that fails to take advantage of the intrinsic organization of the nervous system (for
details see Grillner 1975). Rather, we wish to view efference not in an executive
role, but as an organizationaliacior, in which the entities regulated are coordina-
tive structures (Easton 1972; Turvey 1977b)—that is, functional groupings of
muscles constrained to act as a single unit.
A specific operation of efference in this perspective is feed-forward in nature,
such that the performer is prepared for the impending motor output and the
afference arising from such activity. Thus, various experiments have illustrated
postural adjustments and descending biasing influences on the segmental
machinery in preparation for particular types of activity, such as lifting the arm or
dorsiflexing the foot (see Kots 1977). Note that efference does not necessarily
carry a central, motor-to-sensory corollary-discharge connotation (Teuber 1964
op. cit.). Such a view, while placing the motor commands in a sensory "code"
readily available for comparison with reafference, is just as subject to the
mapping-invariance and degrees-of-freedom criticisms outlined above. Rather,
efference may be viewed in terms of feedforward, which, because of its particular
biasing or tuning operations on the spinal cord, constrains the performer to a
limited set of activities (Fowler 1977; Greene 1972).
Gyr et al. refer to deafferentation research as evidence for autoregulation of
behavior at a central level. In agreement with Pew (1974), we would have to say
that the argument is really one by default, taking the following form: 1) peripheral
feedback has been eliminated; 2) the animal can perform various motor activities;
3) therefore some internal monitoring mechanism is responsible. A variety of
alternative conclusions have been offered (e.g. Adams 1976; Schmidt 1975). But
it has never been clear in this formulation what is meant by monitoring; or the
nature of the entity that is being monitored. Taub's more recent work on perinatal
deafferentation (e.g. Taub 1977 for review) can be interpreted to mean that
residues of past experiences, efference copies, and the like are unsuitable
candidates for the monitored representation. These are likely to be very impover-
ished indeed and hardly able, even if one could image them to do so, to contain
all the details of the action patterns, such as climbing, hanging, and grasping, that
have been observed. But the stronger criticism here is that it is a conceptual error
to pose the question: Is an efferent signal necessary or not for normal
perception? The tight coupling between efference and afference demands that
we not treat them as individual entities but rather seek to understand the nature of
their interaction.
Some headway has already been made in this regard. There is neurophysiolog-
ical evidence that, prior to and during voluntary movements in cats, afferent
information in the dorsal-column medial lemniscus is modified (Ghez & Lenzi
1971; Coulter 1974). Similarly, anatomical evidence reveals that descending
pyramidal fibers exert both pre- and postsynaptic influences on the transmission
of sensory information in the spinal cord (Kostyuk & Vasilenko 1968). Further-
more, human psychophysical experiments on the perception of vibratory stimuli
show that the sensory threshold becomes elevated during voluntary movement
(Dyhre-Poulson 1975). This modulation is specific to the digit being moved and is
not merely a general gating effect on sensory inputs. In sum, we have evidence
from a variety of sources illustrating the efferent modulation of afference.
Just as interesting is the rather direct influence of afferent information on
efferent activity. At a neurophysiological level, Easton (1972) has shown that
stretching the vertical eye muscles leads to facilitation and inhibition of cat-
forelimb flexor and extensor muscles. A downward-directed gaze results in
facilitated forelimb extension while upward gaze facilitates flexion. More recently,
Thoden, Dichgans, & Savidis (1977) have produced evidence that hindlimb flexor
and extensor activity can be modulated by both vestibular and visual stimulation.
Of particular note is the finding that direction-specific reflex excitability in extensor
and flexor motoneurons can be induced by rotating a visual display about the
cat's line of sight. Thus, counterclockwise rotation, indicating displacement to the
right, leads to an enhancement of extensor motoneuronal activity and a depres-
sion in flexor motoneurons, while clockwise rotation has an equal but opposite
effect. Analogous findings are available from the elegant "swinging room"
experiments of Lee (1978) and his colleagues. Even though the subject is
supplied with veridical kinesthetic receptor information that the floor is stable,
posture and balance are shown to be under visual control, as evident in the
excessive sway observed when the room is moved. Indeed, body sway can be
visually driven by oscillations as small as 6 mm without the subject being aware of
it. All this points to a tight coupling—a specification, as it were—of efference by
afference.
The general claim here, then, is that the efference-copy construct cannot
handle the vagaries of the motor system, nor does it provide a particularly useful
explanatory device for visual perception. Neither do we want to approach the
issue of adaptation via a framework that promotes a dichotomy between
efference and afference, as Gyr et al. have done. In actuality there is no need to
revert to a recorrelation formulation for an explanation of perceptual adaptation. It
is now well-documented, for example, that adaptation can occur without move-
ment (Howard, Craske, & Templeton, 1965 op. cit.) in passive conditions
(Melamed, Halay, & Gildow 1973) and in conditions where passive movement is
induced by vibration (Mather & Lackner 1975). All that is needed for adaptation to
occur is a discordance between two or more sources of information that are
normally congruent with each other. The performer's attempt to nullify this
discordance, and hence return the inputs to their previous correspondence, is
seen to be representative of the adaptive process. Numerous studies support this
viewpoint (see Kornheiser 1976 for a review) by showing that the degree to which
adaptation takes place is a function of the information available to the subject
regarding the altered state of the system.
While the notion of discordance is plausible as an account for the occurrence
of adaptive change, it lacks predictive power with regard to the exact form that
such change will take. The additional concept of attentional allocation provides a
potential solution to this problem, in that the outcome of any noncorrespondence
between two sources of information (say proprioceptive information detected
visually and proprioceptive information detected by joint, muscle, and tendon
receptors) can be predicted on the basis of the attentional demands of each
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input. Thus Canon (1970), Kelso, Cook, Olson, & Epstein (1975), and more
recently Warren & Schmitt (1978) have all shown that adaptation takes place in
the modality that is not used during the exposure period. When allocation of
attention is left uncontrolled, the dominant modality (in most cases, vision) will
remain stable, while the paired source of information will undergo an adaptive
shift.
We are accordingly left to explain, within this formulation, the consistent finding
that self-produced movement facilitates the adaptive process more than passive
movement. Viewed from the informational account, we would argue that under
active conditions S is sensitized to pay attention to the discordance between the
seen and felt positions of the limb, while under passive conditions, attention is
more evenly distributed between the two sources of information. Given the
dominance of vision and S's inherent bias to attend to it (Posner, Nissen, & Klein
1976), we would then expect greater adaptation under self-produced movement
conditions. Hence, what matters for the adaptive process is information about
discordance, which, when combined with attentional factors, seems adequate to
explain the findings attributed to motor-sensory mechanisms.
In the present view there is, therefore, no urgent need to reopen this issue
based on Gyr et ai.'s failure to replicate H & R. Many of Held's predictions have
been tested over and over again in an area already burgeoned with empirical data
(e.g. see Kornheiser 1976; and Welch 1974 op. cit. for reviews). The real need is
not for more experimentation, but rather for more understanding of the nature of
the adaptive process, with particular reference to the interaction of efference and
afference.
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Institute of Psychology, The University of Innsbruck, Austria
A provisional sensory/motor "complementarity" model for adaptation
effects. After an impressive amount of experimental research on the phenome-
non of adaptation and re-adaptation, occasionally called recalibration, recombi-
nation, re-arrangement, re-adjustment, and so forth, the moment for a more
rational pause had to come. The Gyr et al. study provides this in a very valuable
way.
From the point of view of our earlier Innsbruck studies, we did not find any
reason to deviate from a basic theory of direct visual perception in considering
general adaptation and re-adaptation processes or the special cases of prism
experiments, although in many cases motor activity was clearly coupled with the
sensory effects in question. The "complexity" of re-adaptation, as we suggested,
resides in the unusually long time that visual input remains "distorted" after prisms
are removed. A variety of contextual contingencies are operative during re-
adaptation to determine its speed and course. In our studies the pattern
appeared to approach the classical conditioning story: After frequent prior
presentation of a stimulus configuration to a sense organ under certain character-
istic conditions, those particular conditions lost their "neutrality" and became
cues for the adaptation effects, irrespective of whether the conditions were
"motor" or "sensory." In the case of prism-induced color fringes, for instance,
the cue for adaptation to color was the direction of the brightness gradient of the
contours in the visual field itself (a predecessor of the well-known McCullough
effect). In the case of apparent movement, however, various types of locomotion,
combined with head, trunk, and body movement, functioned as the special cues
for stabilizing the initially-experienced "textural flow."
Conditional processes of this sort seem to serve as generalized descriptions of
the phenomena in question rather than as explanations. Nevertheless, it may be
fruitful to adopt an oversimplified "complementarity" model, for the moment,
leaving it open as to whether a particular phenomenon should be explained by
purely sensory effects (visual or kinesthetic) or by a kind of sensorimotor link. Let
me pursue this a little further.
First of all, there exist some noncontingent adaptation (and re-adaptation)
phenomena that seem to occur completely independently of any accompanying
motor activity, neither active nor passive, other than keeping eyes open, being
seated in a chair in the lab, looking through a hole at a target, and pressing a
button at the right moment. I suspect that because the situation remains
completely unchanged under such conditions, the phenomena obtained look
purely "sensory," with no particular "cue" for the attendant adaptational
process. In addition, the testing situation is kept identical to the training situation,
a point of no small importance, as we shall see later on.
The added "complexity" in the Gyr et al. study may, at first glance, be thought
of as the effect of the systematic introduction of motor activity (locomotion, eye,
head, and body movements) into the training situation, resulting in the perceived
visual gradient changes. The latter effect would have served as a critical one, not
only in the case of the "frozen" environment of random spots on the wall of H &
R's experimental cylinder, but even in a "living" environment consisting of, say,
randomly-moving dots comparable to a swarm of flies, or the snow showers on
the screen of a television set. What is true of all these cases when one is moving
while viewing them through prisms is the peculiar change of the configurational
flux, which diverges from a lifetime of pre-experimental experience. It is this
superimposed change that seems to operate as the higher order "stimulus," not
the kind or size of the configuration itself.
So far this only describes one aspect of the antecedent training situation. The
most important variable in the work of Held and his associates is the question of
sel-induced versus imposed activity. This seemed to be the critical factor in
determining adaptation effects in a variety of experiments.
It is my personal belief, derived from some of my own observations while
wearing various experimental prisms, that a more thorough analysis of pre-
experirnental life situations may provide the key to a better understanding of
adaptation. Consider that most organisms are self-locomoting; thus, in the case
of active movement, they are the causal sources of a special group of stimulus
transformations superimposed on their own sensory inputs. The condition of
passive transportation, on the other hand, occurs rather rarely—indeed, even
artificially. Although various types of vehicles now multiply the situations of
passive transportation for human beings, nevertheless, a rolling pedestal (as in
some of the Held studies) remains a very unusual situation for a healthy man. I
should wonder whether experienced wheel-chair riders (especially passively-
moved ones), or persons with extensive escalator experience, would have shown
the same minimum effect of re-adaptation when wearing wedge prisms?
From such a naturalistic point of view one would expect a rather different result
with up/down prisms. A distortion of distance and shape with respect to the
ground we walk on causes a much more dangerous change than the deformation
of vertical shapes. We have not used up/down prisms because of the highly
attendant danger, especially when going downstairs. The same type of transfor-
mation from a methamtical point of view, due to the same optical device, may
nevertheless be connected to very different "biological" effects, due, for exam-
ple, to the asymmetry of the pull of gravity.
A personal observation by Taylor (1962) provides a further illustration. Crippled
since the first years of his life, he was strongly handicapped in walking. He thus
spent many hours a day in a chair, only occasionally standing up to get around his
work table. While wearing wedge prisms (base-left), he soon became aware of a
decrease in the bending effect and, especially, of the apparent incline of the
surface of the table and of nearby areas on the floor. After one or two weeks of
such training (four to seven hours a day) the effect became almost "regional," in
the sense that it seemed to become linked to the accustomed life situation of
sitting and writing at his table; in the case of walking about, the floor appeared
almost completely horizontal, but only within the range of his walking cane.
Outside this mysterious circle the surfaces continued to appear shifted, and the
(vertical) edges bent. This observation and similar ones underscore the impor-
tance of equating the training and testing situation.
Some further observations strongly support the existence of motor effects in
adaptation (or re-adaptation) (although not their necessity). Eyeglass wearers
must often push their spectacles back in place when they slide down the nose.
Associated with this active "correction" is a small perceptible jump of the visual
array (in the case of myopic lenses, ipsiversive with the motion of the frame; in
hypermetropics, contraversive). If habitual wearers instead move empty eyeglass
frames up and down, they see clear-cut apparent motion of the visual array (in the
direction opposite to the habitual one). But if another person performs exactly the
same movement for them, no apparent movement occurs (see Figure 1). I think a
Figure 1 (Kohler). Eyeglass correction: a-active, b-passive. (Artwork by Judith
Economos.)
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Figure 2 (Kohler). Perception of the visual median. (Artwork by Judith
Economos.)
sensorimotor theory in the sense of Held and, more recently, of Hay & Goldsmith
(1973) could not be better supported.
An observation with opposite implications (except with respect to brightness,
color, and some kinesthetic adaptations) comes from the apparent stability (lack
of vibration) of the visual array when one is sitting in a moving car and looking out
of a side window. The experience is completely altered if one attempts to observe
the image of the landscape as reflected from the inner side of the window on the
opposite side. Now, not only does the same visual scene appear to be moving in
the wrong direction, but the image is unstable and vibrating. Now let the observer
be an experimental subject wearing a pair of inverting or reversing goggles. In the
course of the experiment the vibration effect on the visual scenery, viewed
directly, decreases distinctly (as a function of the frequency of that experience).
Although the subject is passively transported, the process of re-adaptation
occurs.
Finally, I would like to present some ideas for further experiments on the
sensorimotor problem. The dependent variable here will be the so-called visual
median or the perceived "straight-ahead" point (see Figure 2a). There are many
ways to influence exclusively the motor part of the phenomenon besides using
prisms. Many decades ago an unusual experiment was conducted by the German
psychologist Kleint to examine the effects of the neck muscles on the perception
of the visual median (see Figure 2b). To study the same question with mobile
subjects, able to walk around for hours or even days, we used the edge of a hat
connected to the shoulder of the subject by means of a spiral spring or an elastic
cord so that the head is pulled toward the point of attachment (see the arrow in
Figure 2c). Another solution is illustrated in Figure 2d. Since one side of the visual
field is covered, the head must be turned toward the opposite side in order to see
objects located straight-ahead (see the arrow). The effect is similar to that of
wedge prisms (see Figure 2a), whose deviation nessitates a corresponding
deviation of the position of the gaze and/or the head etc., with the difference that
the amount of distortion (rotation) in this case also depends on the distance from
the visual target.
No doubt there exist many other ways to study the influence of motor activity
on vision in man. The question seems interesting enough to stimulate new
experimental approaches as well as improved training and testing procedures.
by Joseph S. Lappin
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn. 37240
The encoding of spatial position in the brain. The article by Gyr et al.
addresses an important problem concerning how spatial positions of visual
patterns are specified by the nervous system. What code determinesthe spatial
position associated with any given receptor, neuron, or muscle cell in the visual or
motor systems of the brain? The aim of this commentary is to provide perspective
on the relationship of this general problem to the research of Gyr et al.
Insofar as the principal function of vision is to provide spatial information, an
understanding of how the spatial positions of stimulation are specified is funda-
mental to the understanding of vision. Our understanding of this problem is
primitive, however. Present knowledge of the structure and function of the visual
system is grossly inadequate to account for observers' achievements in resolving
spatial relations. For example, Westheimer & McKee (1977) have demonstrated
that under optimal conditions in a vernier acuity task, spatial displacements on the
order of one fifth of the diameter of a single receptor can be detected in a
moving-stimulus pattern impinging upon about 90 receptors in a period of 200
msec. How can the genetics and development of the visual system ever produce
a structure that is arranged sufficiently precisely to provide such information
about the spatial organization of stimulation? Similarly, difficult problems are also
raised by the visual/motor coordination exhibited in many athletic events. How
can the positions of receptors, neurons, and muscles be specified in such detail?
We really cannot give a satisfactory answer as to how observers can discriminate
straight from curved lines either before or after experience with optically-distorted
patterns.
A persistently appealing hypothesis discussed by Gyr et al. has been that visual
positions are only loosely specified and are readily modified by feedback from
motor behavior. Thus, visual/motor interactions with the environment might be
used to continually calibrate the visuospatial position of any given neuron.
Perceived shapes and locations of stimuli might evolve from such interactions.
To assess the rationale and support for this idea, two logically separate
aspects of spatial position must be distinguished: the exocentric positions of the
component points of a pattern in relation to each other (i.e. the shape of the
pattern) versus the egocentric location of the stimulus in relation to the observer.
Though these two conceptions of spatial position must involve at least some
common aspects, they are logically different specifications of stimulation, percep-
tion, and behavioral performance. These two conceptions are intermixed in the
discussion by Gyr et al., however, as they are in much of the literature.
Empirical evidence provides very different support for the hypothesis that
motor behavior influences the observer's knowledge about either of these two
aspects of spatial position. To my knowledge there is little or no unequivocal
support for the hypothesis that either efferent or afferent information from motor
activity influences perceived exocentric spatial relations among the components
of a pattern. The failure by Gyr et al. to find such effects is consistent with many
other experiments in the area, although I can offer no suggestions as to why H & R
might have obtained a different result. Miller & Festinger (1977), for example,
have convincingly demonstrated the absence of any influence from rearranged
eye movements on perceived curvature in what might be considered a more
direct test of the same hypothesis tested by Gyr et al.
Evidence on the hypothesis that motor activity affects the perceived egocentric
spatial locations of stimuli in relation to the body is more complicated, but many
examples of such effects can be found. Most of these involve the positional
guidance of motor responses (e.g. of the eyes and hands) by visual stimuli,
though the findings have been less consistent and less convincing with more
abstract responses (e.g. verbal ones) not physically directed toward a particular
environmental location. A variety of phenomena suggest that the brain employs
separate systems for controlling the spatial position and movement of the eyes,
limbs, and body as opposed to the verbalizable subjective experience of the
location of a stimulus. The systems for controlling the spatial positions of the body
and appendages appear to be quite plastic and readily modified to adapt to
altered relations between visual stimulation and bodily position. Subjectively-
experienced egocentric locations, however, appear to be only loosely coupled to
these motor control systems and to be strongly influenced by exocentric frames
of reference.
Length constraints on this commentary preclude a review of the vast and
confusing literature on this problem, but a few examples may be suggestive. Miller
& Festinger (1977) found that pursuit eye movements were quickly reprogram-
med to adjust to an altered correspondence between eye movements and locus
of retinal stimulation; but despite this plasticity in eye-movement control, the
perceived curvature of stimulus patterns was essentially unaffected by the
changed visual/motor correspondences. Hansen & Skavenski (1977, 1978) have
reported that the brain maintains precise information about the positions of retinal
loci during eye movements, so that a brief flash during an eye movement may be
accurately refixated or located by hand, whereas other experiments have
demonstrated that subjectively-experienced egocentric spatial positions of brief
flashes (as judged in relation to subsequently-presented stimuli) are inaccurately
and inconsistently influenced by eye movements (e.g. Matin 1972). Finally, Harris
(1974) has demonstrated that egocentric judgements of "straight ahead" are
systematically biased by external frames of reference, as if knowledge of the
relative positions of the body and external stimuli were inaccurate, although the
skillful visuomotor coordination exhibited in athletics indicates very precise
egocentric localization. In sum, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that control of
the positioning of eyes, limbs, and body is more accurate than the subjective
experience of egocentric position. The plasticity of subjective egocentric spatial
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position is unclear, but this conception of spatial position seems to be strongly
influenced by exocentric frames of reference.
Questions about whether and how motor activity influences perception are
entwined with conceptions of the organizational interactions between sensory
and motor subsystems of the brain. Traditionally, these have been implicitly
considered as two discrete subsystems, connected at only one main junction
between an implicit "sensorium" and a hypothetical site for initiating voluntary
responses. If the afferent systems were isolated in this way from the efferent
systems, then analysis of the locus of perceptual learning might be relatively
straightforward. It would be appropriate to ask whether changes were visual,
proprioceptive, motor, and so forth.
However, an alternative conception suggested by evidence on the varieties of
spatial representation in the brain could consist of multiple, partially-coupled, and
nested feedback-control systems, involving multiple spatial reference systems.
Sensory-motor interactions probably occur in many different ways, depending on
the particular tasks to be performed. Perhaps it is not sufficient to ask whether
"motor" activity influences "visual perception," for these may not be unitary
processes. Instead, we might ask how sensory and motor processes are
integrated in representing spatial positions for the performance of various
activities.
Parenthetically, J. J. Gibson's approach seems more compatible with this latter
conception of perception—as an implicit aspect of interactions with the environ-
ment—rather than the narrower characterization given by Gyr et al. (See Mace
(1977) for an excellent discussion of the breadth and implications of Gibson's
approach.)
by Arlen Mack
Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, New York, N. Y.
10011
Non-Visual Determinants of Perception. There are a host of reasons why the
question of whether perception is determined by non-visual as well as visual
factors cannot rest on whether or not there is perceptual adaptation to an
imposed curvature distortion. Let us briefly consider two of these reasons. First,
despite the many theoretical differences among investigators, there has been
almost unanimous agreement that adaptation to curvature distortions is, at best,
minimal. Both Held (1968) and Rock (1966 op, cit), who otherwise have sharply
conflicting views about the nature of perceptual adaptation, have argued that
adaptation to curvature distortions, unlike adaptation to rotations or displacement
of the field, may be inherently limited. Why then choose curvature as a means of
investigating the questions of the nonvisual or sensorimotor contributions to
perception?1
Second, as the authors correctly point out, the principal case for the contribu-
tion of motor factors to perception has been made by the work of Von Hoist &
Mittelstadt and Sperry, cited by the authors. This work is directly related to the
phenomenon of position constancy, perceiving that objects in the visual field
appear stable despite the movement of their images over the retina caused by
movements of the observer. It is the literature on position constancy and the
adaptation of position constancy that is, I believe, the literature most relevant to
the question of whether there are motor determinants of perception. The literature
in this area makes very clear, not only that position constancy is a robust
phenomenon (Bridgeman et al. 1975; Stark et al. 1976; Mack & Herman 1978;
Mack 1970), but that the adaptation of position constancy occurs (Wallach &
Kravitz 1965a), occurs rapidly (Wallach & Kravitz 1965b), and is completely
dependent for its occurrence on movements of the observer. It is therefore an
exemplary case of the involvement of motor factors in perception, since this
adaptation cannot occur unless the observer is moving. The adaptation of
position constancy involves a recorrelation between motor factors, the observ-
er's head or eye movements, and visual factors, the rate, extent, or direction of
image movement contingent on movements of the observer.
Gibson and his followers (see Lee 1974) have tended to explain position
constancy in terms of what they call "visual proprioception." Because the total
displacement of the visual field is invariantly related to movements of the
observer, and not with movements of objects in the field, it is argued that this kind
of image displacement always signifies observer, not object, movement. Similarly,
relative displacements within the retinal image are invariantly related to object
motion and thus signify movement in the external world. Gyr et al. point out that
Gibson attempts to deal with the Von Hoist & Mittelstadt and Sperry findings in
much the same way that he attempts to explain position constancy. This
explanation, however, cannot account for a corollary of position constancy—
namely, that an afterimage viewed in complete darkness, or a moving object
accurately tracked by the eyes and viewed against a homogeneous ground,
appears to move. In fact, in the case of the afterimage its apparent movement
closely parallels the motions of the observer's eyes (Mack & Bachant 1969). In
neither instance is there any image movement, total or relative; nevertheless,
object movement is perceived. These situations present no problems for theories
of perception that allow for motor determinants. They are accounted for in terms
of the presence of eye-movement information and the absence of image
displacement. This mismatch leads to the perception of object movement just as
inevitably as the match between observer and image movement leads to the
perception of position constancy. These instances are, of course, what Gibson
might describe as minimal-stimulus situations, possible only in a laboratory, but
that interpretation merely inappropriately dismisses rather than explains these
highly reliable events.
To the question of whether there are non-visual or motor determinants of
perception, the answer then would seem to be affirmative, but it should also be
recognized that there are occasions in which perception is strictly determined by
visual input alone. These, in fact, may be considered two separate modes of
perception: a subject-reiative and an object-reiative mode (see Mack 1978 for a
fuller discussion of this distinction). All instances in which perception is jointly
determined by visual and non-visual (motor) factors would seem to be instances
of subject-relative percepts—that is, instances where perceiving is in relation to
the observer rather than other objects in the visual scene. This mode of
perception may be distinguished from object-relative perceptions, which are
strictly determined by visual information only, and where perceiving is in relation to
other objects in the scene. For example, the perception of an objects's size may
be a function both of its retinal image size and information about the distance of
the object from the observer derived from the extraretinal sources of conver-
gence and accomodation. This is clearly a subject-relative precept. On the other
hand, the perceived size of an object may also be based on its size relative to an
enclosing framework, where distance or extraretinal information play no part
(Rock & Ebenholtz 1959) This is an object-relative percept. Similarly, the
perception of motion or of the apparent speed of an object may be based on the
latter's motion with respect to the self or with respect to other objects in the field.
In the first instance the perception is determined by retinal-image motion coupled
with extraretinal eye- and head-movement information, while in the second
instance the perception is determined by retinal information alone. It is based on
the retinal motion or speed of motion of an object relative to its retinal surround,
as in the case of the "transposition of velocity" (Brown 1931), in which apparent
speed is a function of the rate of relative displacement of an object with respect
to its visual surround, rather than its rate of displacement with respect to the
observer.
An interesting feature of object-relative perception is that it is frequently in
conflict with subject-relative perception and thus represents the overpowering of
subject-relative and veridical perception by object-relative and illusory perception.
This description characterizes both instances of object-relative perception
discussed here. To illustrate: where the apparent velocity of an object is based on
its rate of retinal displacement relative to its surround, objects moving at very
different rates are perceived as moving at the same rate when they are being
displaced at the same rate with respect to their visual surrounds; meanwhile the
eye-movement/image-movement information on which the subject-relative
percept is based, and which is simultaneously available to the perceptual system,
would lead to the veridical perception of velocity.
In summary, to deny that perception is determined by motor factors or to assert
that it is always so determined seem to be equally mistaken views. What we must
determine is when and why it is one rather than the other.
NOTE
1. There is an experiment by Held (Mikaelian & Held 1966) examining
adaptation to field rotation and closely parallelling the Held & Rekosh (1963
op. cit.) study. In one condition of that experiment, which also employed
conditions of active and passive movement, observers were exposed to prisms in
an environment that contained no visible lines, but only dimly-luminous
spheres. This was done to control for normalization of tilt and is thus quite
analogous to the Held & Rekosh study, which controlled for the normalization
of curvature in much the same way. Since adaptation to tilt distortions is known
to occur (see Stratton 1897; and Mack & Rock 1968), it would appear to make
somewhat more sense to examine the question of sensorimotor contributions to
perception in this context, rather than in the context of curvature adaptation
(although it will be argued in the text that there is still a far more relevant
context for examining this question).
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"identification" mode of stimulus analysis; its processing was more or less
hard-wired, its plasticity limited, and its operation dependent upon such cortical
units as edge detectors, feature analyzers, and so forth. Beyond a critical period,
developmental influences on these processes were said to be limited. In contrast,
the "localization" mode of processing, which mediated information such as
position relative to the environment, movement of self vs. the environment,
orientation or distance in space, and so forth, was said to be highly labile and
integrally related to the sensory motor system. Held suggested that rearrange-
ment experiments were relevant primarily to the latter category of perceptual
responses.
Considering such a dual mode and the conditions that evoke one or the other
mode of analysis of spatially-distributed stimuli, this commentator is not surprised
that Gyr et al. were unable to obtain reliable curvature after-effects. Stimulus-
contour (or texture) density is an important variable in invoking one or the other
mode of analyzing the visual array (Held 1970), with impoverishment favoring the
locus-specific mode of operation. Gyr et al's experimental condition drastically
reduced the relevant reafferent information (due to the low density of viewing
contours), which, added to the limited modifiability of form perception, produced
the observed results. An illustration of the very high-density random-dot spot field
used in the H & R study may be found in Held & Hein (1967). (It is unfortunate that
H & R did not publish this information in their original article.) [See figure 1.)
In replicating prism studies, or in designing new ones, useful information can be
gained by making a distinction between the dual modes of processing spatially-
distributed stimuli. I would hazard a guess that if, in addition to curvature, Gyr et al.
had measured egocentric localizations, they would have obtained significant
adaptive alterations.
Figure I (Mikaelian). The upper pair of scenes are shown as viewed normally,
the lower pair as viewed through a wedge prism. The left-hand scene, with its
linearly ordered contours, appears curved and distorted by the prism; whereas,
the right-hand scene, composed of randomized spots, appears unchanged.
(Reprinted with permission of M.I.T. Press.)
. SHigcaeflian
Department of Psychology, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B. Canada
E3B5A3
Adaptation ot the distortion of shape is different from adaptation to the
distortion of space. The sharp difference between the H & R results and Gyr et
al.'s attempted replication is another instance of conflicting results from similar
experiments, a situation not that uncommon in prism studies, and one that
probably arises from subtle differences in procedural or equipment details that
workers fail to report. Gyr et al. offer an elegant and critical analysis of the
implications of the H & R study. Held and his co-workers interpreted their early
prism studies as instances of the involvement of the motor system in vision, with
many of the investigators preferring to use the term "perceptuo-motor" response
when referring to the perceptual responses being investigated (such as shape,
distance, orientation, localization, etc.). Most of these studies were conducted
within a conceptual framework that considered perception to be a unitary
process, and it was assumed that adaptation to rearrangement of visual space
followed the same rules, whether one considered adaptation to the distortion of
shape, spatial localization, or other variables (all induced by wedge prisms).
A major difference between adaptation to the distortion of shape and to spatial
localization was evident, however. Prolonged active viewing through prisms
produced curvature after-effects that were a small fraction of the prism-induced
curvature (Kohler 1964) and comparable to those obtained by passively viewing
an array of curved lines (Gibson 1933 op. cit). Full and exact compensation to
the visual displacement could, of course, be obtained (Held & Bossom 1961).
The possibility that there may be two processes operating in adaptation to
rearrangement was discussed in a subsequent paper by Mikaelian & Held (1964),
although these discussions were in relation to adaptation to prism-induced visual
tilt.
In later papers Held expanded on his formulation of the extent of the
involvement of the motor system in the processing of shape (Held & Hein 1967;
Held 1970). Along with other investigators (Ingle 1967; Schneider 1969;
Trevarthen 1968) he suggested a dual process in the analysis of spatially-
distributed stimulation, referring to the dual modes as "identification" and
"localization" (Held 1968). Processing of shape information was ascribed to the
6yJoelM. Miller
Department of Psychology, York University, Downsview, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada
Visual-motor conflict resolved by motor adaptation without perceptual
change. In their closing comments Gyr et al. suggest that the sensorimotor model
may be more readily validated for situations in which an experimentally-produced
conflict cannot be ignored but must be resolved by the subject. Measurement of
motor adaptation, which might provide one kind of evidence for conflict resolu-
tion, is, unfortunately, absent from both the Held & Rekosh (1963 op. cit.) study
and from Gyr et al.'s replication. Such measurements have been obtained in an
adaptation study by Miller & Festinger (1977), which involved conflict between the
shape of a visually presented curve and the pattern of eye movements necessary
to scan that curve.
Briefly, the experiment was as follows. Subjects viewed a computer-generated
display consisting of horizontally-oriented, concave-up curved lines. The position
of these curves was contingent on the horizontal position of the eye so that, in
order to scan a curve errorlessly, the eye would have to execute purely horizontal
saccades. In one condition this was achieved by moving the curves vertically so
that the point fixated always had the same vertical location. Eye movements were
reprogrammed rapidly to eliminate the vertical components of the saccades that
were present at the start. Thus, subjects did effectively deal with the sensorimotor
conflict. There was, however, no change in the perception of curvature in excess
of that measured following equivalent viewing of a stationary display (i.e. the
Gibson normalization effect). In another condition the eye-position-contingent
display was again moved vertically, but in such a way that the vertical compo-
nents of scanning movements would need to be double what is normal for
fixations to be accurate. Again, eye movements were rapidly and appropriately
adjusted and, again, there was no perceptual change in excess of normalization.
In yet another condition the curves were displaced horizontally so as to simulate
the effect of viewing a straight line through a base-down wedge prism on a
contact lens. A small amount of perceptual adaptation in excess of normalization
was found in this condition, but it was quite unrelated to oculomotor retraining and
apparently due to some property of the stimulus situation.
Thus, this experiment implies that, at least with the afferent visual and
oculomotor systems, sensorimotor conflict is resolved by altering motor programs
without altering either perception or, presumably, afferent visual processing. This
position is consistent with that of Harris (1965 op. cit.), who concludes that in
such conflict situations it is the felt positions of body parts that change, and not
visual perception.
It is possible that information based on relative retinal location is essentially
unalterable and dominates other conflicting sources of information. If this is true,
perceptual adaptation to sensorimotor conflict may only be possible for cases in
which such intravisual information is not involved.
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by K« S. K. Myrthy
Division of Neurosurgery, University of Texas Medical School, Houston, Texas
77030
Centrifugal contributions to visual perceptual after effects. Although the
purpose of the experiments by Gyr et al. has been to replicate the study by Held &
Rekosh (1963 op. cit), there are some important departures.
1. The subjects of the Gyr et al. study were not investigated in the "passive"
condition of being wheeled around inside the experimental cylinder, as in the
H & R study. The main feature of interest in the H & R study is the distinction
between the subjects during "active" locomotion and those during the "passive"
condition mentioned above. Moreover, all of the H & R subjects were tested under
both conditions. Thus each subject served as his own control. Gyr et al. only
tested their subjects during "active" locomotion.
2. Gyr et al. make an important point in the addition of a base-up prism. Their
arguments for the use of the base-up prism are reasonable. However, they should
still have tested their subjects under "active" and "passive" conditions with both
the base-up and base-right prisms.
3. There may be other minor differences in the experimental apparatus used in
the two studies that contributed quantitatively to the observed differences in
parameters.
This commentator feels that Gyr et al. should have questioned the conclusion
arrived at by H & R more critically, rather than their experimental technique. Much
of the background literature reviewed by Gyr et al. seems to be concerned with
the importance of motor-sensory feedback (resulting from voluntary movement)
in contributing to visual perceptual effects. There is no adequate discussion of
possible effects due to centrifugal control of the retina (Granit 1955 a,b). It is
known that efferent modulation of the impulses of the ganglion cells in the retina
may be achieved by stimulation of the reticular formation (Granit 1955a).
Stimulation of the same area also modulates the impulses in muscle spindle
receptors through the gamma efferents (Granit & Kaada 1952). Thus, the
centrifugal effects of visual perception may occur simultaneously with voluntary
movements as a result of a common centrifugal drive, rather than following the
effects of the voluntary movement. It is also known that the main feature of such a
centrifugal drive to the retina is to produce an inhibition of the receptor, followed
by an excitatory rebound when the stimulation of the reticular formation is
stopped (Granit 1955a). Thus, the perceptual after-effects may be due to such a
phenomenon.
When von Hoist & Mittelstaedt (1950 op cit.) postulated their "Reafferenzprin-
zip," the idea of centrifugal control of sensory endings was rather unknown. With
current anatomical and physiological knowledge, the Reafferenzprinzip can surely
be modified. In fact, current data favor the idea of central nervous system control,
not only of the sensory endings themselves, but also of the information transmit-
ted in the ascending spinal tracts at the level of the second-order neurone (Ghez
& Lenzi 1971; Ghez & Pisa 1972; Coulter 1974). In psychophysical experiments
on human subjects, Dyhre-Poulsen (1978) has shown that the threshold for a
vibratory stimulus increased before ballistic movements and during a tracking
movement of the vibrated finger. Similarly, the perception of electrical stimuli to
the finger-tip may be abolished during an active movement, with a gradual
reduction before the start of the movement (Coquery 1978). The changes in
visual perception observed in the H & R study are probably due to a similar
mechanism.
The discussion of de-afferentation literature in the background analysis is not
necessary. In any event, there is some arguement as to whether dorsal root
section can effectively produce de-afferentation due to the recent discovery of a
large number of nonmyelinated afferents that enter the cord through the ventral
roots (Coggeshall et al. 1975; Appelbaum et al. 1976; Clifton et al. 1976).
by Kenneth R. Paap
Department of Psychology, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, N.M. 88003
Position information versus motor programs: two levels of sensorimotor
theory. The lasting significance of the Gyr et al. study will depend upon the
reason for the absence of significant adaptive shifts. Suppose that the null results
reflect the true state of the world, and that the H & R findings resist replication,
even under conditions of exact duplication of dot density, attentional set, method
of testing, and so forth. This would suggest that the remarkably consistent shifts
reported by H & R in the active condition must be chalked up to sampling error or,
perhaps, to uncontrolled exposure to straight-line contours. Even if we do
eventually find ourselves in this position, it would seen that the fundamental role of
the motor system in a variety of visual phenomena would still go unquestioned.
For example, there can be no doubt that the registration of eye-position
information contributes to the perception of visual direction (Paap & Ebenholtz
1976), object rotation in either the sagittal or horizontal plane of the observer
(Ebenholtz & Paap 1976), and convergence-based distance (Paap & Ebenholtz
1977). Similarly, the effects of registered head position have been shown to
influence the perceived orientation of a line rotated in the observer's frontal plane
(Ebenholtz & Benzschawel 1977) and the perceived direction of a luminous target
presented in the dark [Ebenholtz 1976). All of these examples fit neatly into the
invariance-algorithm approach to the visual constancies, simply requiring the
visual system to correct the retinal input by taking position information into
account. When muscle potentiation or reflexive movements are induced, small
departures from constancy commensurate with the error in registered position
are observed.
We should probably view the contribution of the motor system to the percep-
tion of direction and orientation as qualitatively different from the possible role of
the motor system in the extraction of form. One difference is with respect to the
time and number of position values that must be used to construct each type pf
perceptual attribute. For example, the perceived direction of a point source
relative to the median plane of the head requires the registration of a single
eye-position value—namely, the position of the eyes at the time the target is
presented. Because the required eye position corresponds to the current eye
position, it need not be the case that the information comes from an efference
copy. In fact, Shebilske (1976) has argued convincingly that visual direction may
be mediated by inflow information. On the other hand, for the perception of
curvature to be mediated by motor correlates would require the activation of a
number of positions integrated over time. If shape is to be resolved in advance of
the actual excursions of the eye/head system across the contours, then it must
be further assumed that perceived curvature is mediated by efferent readiness.
Clearly, a sensorimotor account of shape perception must rely on much more
complicated mechanisms than those needed for direction or orientation.
A recent study by Miller and Festinger (1977) supports the view that oculomo-
tor programs may have little or nothing to do with adaptive shifts in perceived
curvature. In one condition of this study a computer-generated display is used to
mimic the curvature effects of a wedge prism mounted on a contact lens. On-line
recordings of the subject's eye position show that oculomotor retraining follows a
time course different from that of curvature adaptation and reaches considerably
larger magnitudes; for example, after five days ain the 16.7-H (Horizontal Curve
Movement) conditon, adaptation has reached a level of only 4 min. of arc,
whereas the improvement in oculomtor guidance would predict an effect of at
least 10 min. of arc. Miller & Festinger correctly conclude that their results are
inconsistent with theories such as those offered by Held (1961 op. cit.), Taylor
(1962), and Festinger et al. (1967 op. cit), since these sensorimotor theories
require a close relationship between motor relearning and perceptual change.
The results of the Gyr et al. study, together with those of Miller & Festinger, do
seem to bring a serious challenge to the position that stored efferent programs
underly the perception of curvature.
We should also consider the possibility that the present failure to replicate
reflects a critical difference in experimental design, and that the H & R findings will
be replicated when the appropriate missing link is reinstated. Gyr et al. draw our
attention to an extremely promising interaction between dot density and atten-
tional set. Epstein (1975) has summarized a number of studies that indicate that
allocation of attention may greatly influence cue dominance and, consequently,
the locus and magnitude of adaptive changes. He further suggests that the
allocation of attention, rather than the special contributions of re-afference, may
be responsible for the frequently reported failure to obtain significant adaptive
shifts under conditions of passive movement. This argument rests on the
reasonable assumption than when movement is active and self-directed, the
subject is more likely to process task-relevant information. It is tempting to
suggest that the density and configuration of the dots used in the H & R study may
have been more conducive to the perceptual isolation of specific sets of dots,
and that the active subjects paid attention to the systematic, but aberrent,
transformations of those specific sets, whereas the passive subjects did not.
by Gordon M. Redding
Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, HI. 61761
Attention as an explanatory concept in perceptual adaptation. Replication is
perhaps the most powerful but also the most neglected procedure in psychologi-
cal research. In the face of multiple, unknown, and practically-unknowable
variables, realistically-limited experimental control, and necessarily-fallible statisti-
cal tests, successful replication is the most convincing evidence of the "reality"
and, to a lesser degree, the generality of a result. For the same reasons,
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unsuccessful replication is £mong the more problematical events in research.
Short of doubting the ethics of the researchers, which is at least counterproduc-
tive, one is left with the noisome task of seeking explanations among the
numerous, minute, and inevitable differences between studies, and of construct-
ing tests among the various hypotheses. The very clear failure of Gyr et al. to
replicate the findings of H & R is certainly an instance of such a problem. The
intent of this commentary is to make a positive contribution toward solution. First,
several differences between studies are noted which may be important, but which
the authors either did not notice or for which they lack an explanatory rationale.
The last part of the commentary constitutes a word of caution against the use of
"attention" as an explanatory concept in the absence of a theory of attention.
As Gyr et al. point out, their procedure counterbalanced prism base direction in
the test, while H & R maintained the same base direction in the test as was used in
the exposure. Therefore, it seems possible that H & R's test period might have
induced "Gibson effects" that appeared as "adaptation." Also, apparent adap-
tation could be due to some response bias induced by the constant starting
direction. Of course, such artifactual adaptation should also have appeared for
H & R's passive group, but perhaps such effects might somehow interact with
adaptation to cancel out when test and exposure base directions are different. In
this regard, it would be interesting to know if those Ss in the Gyr et al. study who
did show adaptation were also the subjects who received congruent base
directions during both exposure and test.
H & R made a point of keeping the Ss head stationary and preventing any sight
of the body during exposure, while Gyr et al. report no such precautions. To the
extent that Ss did move their heads and see body parts, proprioceptive/kines-
thetic adaptation could have occurred. There is some evidence of a reciprocal
relationship between adaptive components (Redding 1978), such that increasing
proprioceptive change is accompanied by decreasing visual compensation. Thus,
it is possible that adaptation in the Gyr et al. study was largely nonvisual and
consequently did not appear on their test. Also, H & R's precautions could have
directed "attention" to proprioceptive/kinesthetic input, causing adaptation to
appear in the "nonattended" visual modality (Canon 1970; Kelso, Cook, Olson &
Epstein 1975; Uhlarik & Canon 1971). Gyr et al.'s instructions apparently did not
include such a "directed-attention" manipulation.
Finally, the exposure environment used by H & R consisted of "small spots of
irregular shape" (p. 722), while Gyr et al. used circular, colored dots. Possibly the
varied shapes used by H & R induced greater overall vigilance or selective
scanning than did the more regular shapes of Gyr et al. Of course, the more
actively the S "looks" at the environment, the greater should be the level of
adaptation.
The authors suggest that the most likely explanation of their failure to replicate
H & R is differences in attention, and several of the above hypotheses also involve
the idea of attention. However, the word "attention" should be used cautiously,
since it seems to carry a large amount of pseudo-explanatory power. Indeed, in
most traditional perception literature there are few instances where "attend"
could not be replaced with "perceive" with no substantive change in meaning
(Kaufman 1974). In particular, it seems unnecessary and misleading to invoke the
idea of attention to explain so-called directed-attention effects. These studies
(e.g. Canon 3970; Kelso et. al. 1975) suggest that when two spatial modalities
are providingidiscrepant information about a distal object, it is the nonattended
modality that, become recalibrated. However, the attentional manipulations in
such studies may be more simply interpreted as specifying the information source
controlling exposure task performance (see, also, Warren & Schmitt 1978), while
the nonconttolling information source (e.g. modality) is subject to adaptive
recalibration. AWith this interpretation, adaptation must be restricted to the
noncontrolling, "nonattended" modality, since recalibration of the controlling,
"attended" modality would disrupt task performance.
Thus, there is a serious question whether the idea of attention adds any
explanatory qc predictive power beyond that which might be achieved by a careful
delineation of situational performance requirements (including instructions).
Instructions that specify a controlling modality may be considered simply another
task variable, and without a theory of attention, identifying such instructional
variables as Vattentional" creates an illusion of explanation.
Current information-processing theory includes a theory of attention that might
be applied to perceptual adaptation research (e.g. Posner & Snyder 1975;
Schneider & Sniffrin 1977). Attention is conceptualized as the regulation of a
limited-capacity, central-processing mechanism that comes into play when
nonhabitual behavior is required. Available processing capacity may be intention-
ally directed to a particular task (selection), but when conscious attention must be
given to several simultaneous tasks (distribution), processing demands may
exceed available capacity, with resultant interference. Thus, in novel situations,
information processing is intentional, may give rise to conscious awareness, and
may preclude other mental activity. Otherwise, processing is "automatic," not
limited in capacity, and without intention or conscious awareness.
Such a theory of attention is capable of objective test and imparts explanatory
substance to the idea of attention. However, until such a theoretical position has
been articulated for perceptual adaptation, it is best to avoid use of the term
attention, since it obscures rather than enlightens, and it may misdirect research
effort.
by Austin H. Riesen
Department of Psychology, University of California at Riverside, Riverside, Calif.
92502
Re-afference in space and movement perception. Motor re-afference (cen-
tral) and motor-sensory feedback (central-peripheral-central) both cooperate
with vision and hearing as well as with somatosensory information in space
perception. Perception of motion in the environment, self-movement, and change
in rate of movement are critically dependent upon re-afference. Cell assemblies
(Hebb 1949) and phase sequences are established early in ontogeny as
neural-event sequences, or they are innately determined (as in the looking
response of infants) as integrative mechanisms for appropriate perceptual and
behavioral adaptations. These aspects of space perception require exceptionally
fine tuning if motor behaviors are not to remain awkward. Sensorimotor correlates
of hue, tonal qualities, or odor perception are, by contrast, far less critical.
Clearly, a re-examination and refinement of data are called for in relation to
more specific applications of sensorimotor theory. Re-afference and motor-
sensory feedback need isolation and individual evaluation. Although difficult,
de-afferentation studies have contributed to this and provide some of our best
evidence in support of the contribution of re-afference.
The experience of external motion must often be distinguished from that of
self-movement by virtue of re-afference. Disturbing perceptual discrepancies
result when expected correlations of events fail. An automobile driver misper-
ceives when he presses on the accelerator (or brake) when normal change in
speed fails due to malfunction. When the accelerator is ineffective, an apparent
slowing of the vehicle results. With brake failure the car is felt to increase in
speed. These paradoxical effects of re-afference are akin to the familiar example
often cited by Teuber: The attempt to move the eyes laterally, if prevented by
paralysis of eye muscles, makes for perceived movement in the environment. [See
Stevens, on Roland BBS 1(1) 1978].
Within limits, which should be more adequately studied, correlations between
sensory events and between motor-sensory sequences are not only possible but
absolutely necessary. Bodily growth changes are in themselves going to be
disruptive unless re-correlations occur. As psychologists, we are still groping for
improved experimental specifications for the conditions and consequences of
both variable and constant shifts in the time and space domains of environment.
by irwin Rock
Institute for Cognitive Studies, Rutgers University, Newark, N.J. 07102
The problem of adaptation to prismatically-altered shape. The H & R
experiment that Gyr et al. repeat has been regarded as one of the crucial findings
in the area of perceptual adaptation. It not only seemed to demonstrate the
necessary role of active compared to passively-imposed movement, but it also
seemed to elegantly rule out explanation in terms of after-effects or normalization
effects from mere exposure to certain configurations. That an observer would
undergo adaptation to shape (along the curvature-straightness continuum) with-
out exposure to any such shapes had been a dramatic - indeed, surprising -
finding. It was even more surprising, considering that obvious prism effects would
be quite limited for an observer wearing base-left or right prisms but moving only
horizontally. Prisms in this orientation displace visual objects differentially along
the vertical axis as a function of angle of the incidence of light rays. Therefore
vertical movements of the observer would provide at least potentially usable
information about the distorting properties of the prism relevant to curvature in
terms of the differential "flow" of images at different vertical positions in the field.
But there could hardly have been very much vertical movement from the bobbing
of the head during walking movements especially since Ss were told not to move
their heads. Ss who were moved passively in a cart may not have moved their
heads at all (thus the active and passive conditions may have differed somewhat
in the degree of vertical head motion - an uncontrolled variable that assumes
some significance in the light of the greater relevance of vertical over horizontal
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movement in the experiment). For further analysis of this issue, see Victor (1968
op. cit.) and Welch (1978).
To maximize information about the optical effect of the prisms, it would be
desirable to place them in a base-up or down position, because then the
differential "flow" referred to above does occur with horizontal walking motion. In
fact, Victor (1968 op. cit.) tested this by comparing the effectiveness of base-up
vs. base-right prism orientation and showed very clearly the greater effectiveness
of the former condition. But his experiment, unlike that of H & R, was performed in
the more typical adaptation environment containing straight contours. At the
outset, straight horizontal contours on a wall will, of course, appear curved when
viewed through base-up or down wedge prisms. But during movement parallel to
such contours, the region straight ahead will always appear at the same
elevation. Thus, information is available that the line is horizontal and straight. Had
the H & R experiment been done with base-up or down prisms, the information
would not have been this direct, but the up-down flow of images of spots, if
interpreted by the perceptual system to be the result of observer motion rather
than object motion, could at least conceivably have provided indirect information
about curvature.
The results of the Gyr ef al. study thus leave us with several mysteries. Why did
they not obtain any significant adaptation when the only changes in procedure
from that of H & R, as far as one can tell, were trivial (e.g. dot density on the
surface of the drum)? Only about half of their observers showed a shift in the
predicted direction. (Given this finding, there is no possibility of expecting any
difference between active and passive conditions, which is why, I take it, the
investigators did not even bother to run a passive condition.) Or is the real
mystery why it is that H & R obtained adaptation in the first place? A second
mystery is why Gyr et al. did not obtain any adaptation, even in their base-up and
down conditions. Or is the answer to this question that the indirect information
provided by differentially displacing spots is simply not adequate for adaptation to
contour shape?
Let us assume that what is important for adaptation of the kind under
discussion is available information concerning how the optical device distorts or
otherwise alters the retinal image. Then, if no experiments had yet been done on
this problem, it would be plausible to predict that adaptation to prismatically-
altered curvature would occur if the following three conditions held: 1) The
observer moves around during the prism-exposure phase (or, perhaps alterna-
tively, objects are moved around). Without such movement it is difficult to imagine
how any information concerning the prism distortion would be available. Passive
movement might suffice, as long as the observer appreciated the direction in
which he was moved (again, see Victor 1968 op, cit.). 2) Straight or, for that
matter, curved contours as well, are visible in the scene. 3) Observer movement is
parallel to the axis of curvature distortion rather than orthogonal to it. Given these
suggested preconditions, the Gyr et al. negative findings are not surprising at all,
since precondition 2 is not fulfilled; but the H & R positive findings would indeed be
surprising, since preconditions 2 and 3 are not fulfilled. It would obviously be
important now for Held himself, or others, to re-run this kind of experiment, so that
we can at least be sure of the facts.
But perhaps the most important mystery of all about perceptual adaptation to
altered shape - not touched on in the Gyr et al. paper - is why it is so slight (a
matter of a few diopters only) even after 42 days of continuous exposure to
wedge prisms (Pick & Hay 1964). While it is significantly greater than the effect
achieved within a minute or two by staring at a curved line with the naked eye
(Gibson 1933 op. cit.), it is not very much greater. That being the case, one is led
to wonder whether there really is adaptation of this kind or, if there is, what factor
or factors constrain it from progressively increasing toward full adaptation. To my
knowledge, the only plausible hypothesis advanced about this question is that
information from eye movement is not altered by wearing prisms in goggles, and it
thus continues to support the perception of a curved-image contour as curved.
Only prisms that moved with the eyes - or the optical equivalent achieved in some
other way - would alter curvature. But now the advocates of this hypothesis have
tested it and found it wanting (Miller & Festinger 1977). So it seems to me that this
question—i.e. the minute degree of adaptation to altered curvature - ought to be
the one to receive priority by investigators in this field.
by P.E. Roland
Department of Clinical Physiology, Bispebjerg Hospital, DK-2400 NV, Copenhagen,
Denmark
Voluntary movement and perception in intrapersonal and extrapersonal
space. The very general hypothesis concerning whether neural processing of
sensory input is dependent on the organization of motor activity requires further
specification before it can be treated theoretically and experimentally. Gyr et al.
have judiciously restricted themselves to the experimental testing of a very special
hypothesis concerning whether visual perception of straightness with one eye is
influenced by voluntary movements in extrapersonal space. Their results seem
clear to me: that a 30-min. exposure to extrapersonal space distorted by a prism
does not change visual perception of straightness.
The theoretical explanations that sometimes accompany studies of perceptual
distortions and illusions, however, make one suspicious as to whether the
conceptual framework might not likewise have been distorted! Consider, for
example, the classical experiment (Helmholtz 1867) in which displacing one eye
(while the other is closed) apparently causes extrapersonal space to move in the
opposite direction. To me this statement is meaningless. It is usually assumed that
the subject recognizes that extrapersonal space is moving while he is not. But
even this statement is inaccurate, because it is not clear what is meant by "the
subject is not moving." If the movement is referred to the same reference system,
the statement is a contradiction: although extrapersonal space is moving, the
subject is not moving with it. If two different reference systems, intrapersonal and
extrapersonal space, are introduced, this problem can be solved, but the solution
would be a quite special one: The subject is not moving in intrapersonai space,
but extrapersonal space is moving. On the other hand, if the subject reaches out
and gets hold of a table, this table is not moving relative to intrapersonal space,
but the rest of extrapersonal space is moving. By induction, the subject will soon
arrive at the conclusion that extrapersonal space is not moving relative to him,
and the final answer provided by any sensible subject would be: "Somebody is
pulling my eyeball!" The apparent movement disappears; the visuomotor conflict
is a conflict in concept definition. In this example it is assumed that proprioceptive
and cutaneous receptors inform the subject that he is not moving. This is
reasonable, because many proprioceptive receptors can signal steady joint
position, and some even signal passive displacement of the eyeball (see
Skavienski 1971; and Shebilske on Roland 1978 op. cit. pp 161-64). Further-
more, no "corollary discharge," "efference copy" or the like is involved here,
because no voluntary movements are attempted by the subject.
If one hopes for an answer to the question as to whether or not voluntary
movements can influence the perception of extrapersonal space, the first
prerequisite is to specify the reference system in which the voluntary movements
are executed. The body is a natural and mobile four-dimensional reference
system for voluntary movement [cf. Fraser on Kupfermann & Weiss: "The
Command Neuron Concept" BBS 1 (1) 1978 pp. 22-3]. The eyes, limbs, head,
and neck can be moved relative to one another or to the rest of the body.
Whatever the voluntary movement in question, the brain is continuously informed
concerning the relative positions and positional changes of different body parts
by proprioreceptive receptors maintained in calibration in the periphery (see
Roland & Ladegaard-Pederson 1977). The bodily reference system is an
automatically-updating system. When voluntary movements are to be executed in
intrapersonal space, the task for the subject is to move a part of the body relative
to other body parts.
Movements in extrapersonal space, in contrast, are movements executed in a
three-dimensional reference system fixed by points in the surroundings. The
number of extrapersonal reference systems is infinite. Reaching for a teacup on a
table is an example of a voluntary movement in extrapersonal space. Unless it is
assumed that we are genetically provided with information concerning every
conceivable transformation between intrapersonal and extrapersonal space,
there is no unique coreference between intrapersonal and extrapersonal space.
(The special situation in which the bodily system and the extrapersonal system
are under the same influence of gravitional forces requires special treatment, for
which there is no space here.) Execution of voluntary movement in intrapersonal
and extrapersonal space requires different types of information. To be able to
execute a voluntary movement in a particular extrapersonal space, the subject
must know the spatial relations as well as transformation between the extraper-
sonal and intrapersonal space. Extending an arm always involves extension in
intrapersonal space, but reaching for a teacup on a table will sometimes consist
of arm extensions, sometimes abductions, and sometimes more complicated
movements (e.g. when the table moves relative to the subject). Consequently,
voluntary movements in intrapersonal and extrapersonal space are always two
different tasks for the human brain.
My own cited work (Roland 1978 op. cit.) concerned voluntary movement in
intrapersonal space in which the thumb and index finger moved relative to each
other. It was shown that subjects were aware of both tension and effort, but the
explanation provided went no further than to assume that man has a memory for
motor commands [cf. Kupfermann & Weiss: "The Command Neuron Concept"
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BBS 1 (1) 1978] - in other words, that subjects know what they are going to do
when they attempt voluntary movements and are able to remember this. To
describe this finding as a central monitoring of one's own motor activity is not
wrong, but it is awkward. Voluntary movements must be programmed before they
are executed, and this programming takes place in the cerebral cortex outside
the primary motor area (Roland et al. 1979a). Any "motor information" prior to
this planning is nonsense; during the planning, it is a tautology; and during the
execution, it is simple sensory feedback (see also Evarts 1972). Yet, there has
been no physiological evidence of any corollary discharge, re-afferent signals, or
efference copy during voluntary movement.
Very recently, however, we have been able to show that the cortical activation
pattern in man during voluntary movement is dependent on whether the move-
ments are executed in intrapersonal or extrapersonal space (Roland et al.
1979b). The main difference is that the superior parietal region is activated only
during voluntary movement in extrapersonal space. Our technique does not allow
us to say whether the activation of these neurons in the superior region is due to
signals from the programming premotor regions or is a manifestation of altered
neural processing of sensory input, or both. At present, we believe that this
finding is best described as consisting of neurons activated in parallel with the
other participating cortical areas to provide information both about spatial
trajectory in the extrapersonal space in question and the actual transformation
between the extrapersonal and intrapersonal (proprioceptive) reference systems
for the use of the motor-programming neurons in the premotor area.
In conclusion, there are no "visuomotor conflicts;" the sensory information
from an arm pointing toward a target in extrapersonal space bears no relation to
the external reference system in question. The relation or transformation function
between intrapersonal and extrapersonal space has to be learned in each case,
whether we are jet pilots, sailors, astronauts, or subjects provided with wedged
prisms.
feyWayneL. Shebilske
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. 22901
Oculomotor hysteresis: implications for testing sensorimotor and ecologi-
cal optics theories. Oculomotor hysteresis, which is a change in muscle
responsiveness after certain eye-movement activities (cf. Collins 1975; Shebilske
1977), can account for many kinds of prism adaptation (cf. Ebenholtz 1974,
1978; Paap & Ebenholtz 1976, 1977) and could be involved in the Held & Rekosh
paradigm. It must accordingly be controlled in future investigations within that
paradigm. It may also provide a tool for tests of the main issue raised by Gyr et al.
- namely: whether motor processes interact with visual processes to produce
percepts.
Tests are needed because, although many experiments confirm the domi-
nance of visual information over motor information when the head and body
moves or when the environment moves to simulate observer movement (cf.
Shebilske 1977), few experiments have investigated the functional significance of
visual and motor information in static situations, even though many important
percepts, such as the perception of curvature, tilt, and direction, occur when an
observer and the environment are relatively stationary. The Gyr et al. pre- and
post-tests are relevant to one of these (curvature), which makes their study a
welcomed exception, but additional tests are still needed.
The lack of empirical observations has not stood in the way of the generation
of theories, especially theories about the perception of direction. In 1950 Gibson
speculated that the perception of body parts, including the nose, is an important
source of visual information for seeing direction. A recent rendition of this
hypothesis was stated by Bower (1974) and tested by Shebilske & Nice (1976),
who found it wanting. In 1966 Gibson proposed another hypothesis, based on the
fact that the fields of vision for successive fixations have large overlaps, which
contains a common structure that could provide the necessary information for
directly seeing a constant direction of objects with respect to the self, despite
changes in the direction of objects with respect to the direction of gaze. Both of
Gibson's hypotheses assume that visual information is sufficient and motor
information is irrelevant, which is typical of his more general theory of ecological
optics.
An obstacle to the wide acceptance of Gibson's hypotheses about direction
has been the observation that people with paralyzed eye muscles see the world
move in the direction of intended eye movement, which in turn causes pointing
errors (e.g. Stevens et al. 1976); [see also Roland 1978, BBS 1 (1)]. Since the
pointing errors happen in the presence of visible body parts and structural overlap
between fixations, they are contrary to Gibson's hypotheses. This, and the fact
that direction is seen accurately without visible body parts or structural overlap,
has caused many to hold a sensorimotor theory according to which a critical
process in seeing direction is the central registration of the direction of gaze by
means of nonvisual information within the oculomotor system (e.g. von Hoist &
Mitelstaedt 1950; Matin 1976a; Shebilske 1977; Skavenski 1976).
Gibson has not commented on the paralysis studies, but his attitude about
similar observations has been clearly expressed (Gibson 1966 op. cit.). He
considers extreme conditions like paralysis to be inappropriate for testing
theories of perception. His argument must be taken seriously, because the most
commonly employed perceptual processes could have boundary conditions
beyond which qualitatively different processes take over. For example, visual
information is used to stabalize eye position in a structured environment, but
proprioceptive information takes over in a homogeneous environment (Matin,
Matin, & Pearce 1970; Skavenski & Steinman 1970). Similarily, visual information
may dominate in the perception of direction, except when it is not available or
when extreme motor anomalies exist. Thus, Gibson's argument against the
experiments of sensorimotor theorists, along with his failure to provide empirical
support for his theories about the perception of direction with the head and body
stationary, has created a stalemate.
Hysteresis in the oculomotor system may provide a way to break the deadlock.
In a series of experiments still in progress, I have found that hysteresis causes
significant pointing errors in a fully-structured visual environment, and that these
errors are significantly smaller than those caused by the same amount of
hysteresis when the structured visual environment is removed. The first result
supports the functional significance of motor information in seeing direction.
Unlike past results, it should not be dismissed as being caused by conditions
outside the normal operating range of the perceptual system, because hysteresis
is within the spectrum of the usual conditions under which the perceptual system
must operate in everyday situations (cf. Shebilske 1977). The second result
supports the view according functional significance to structured visual informa-
tion in seeing direction. (In my experiments, extraneous response strategies such
as lining up the pointer with the remembered position of a background object
were controlled.)
Thus, the results of hysteresis studies add to those of Gyr et al. in calling for a
more serious consideration of both the sensorimotor and ecological optics
theories of perception. Perceptual systems may be hybrids of the systems
suggested by both theories.1
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Motor system changes are not necessary for changes in perception. Gyr et
al. are concerned with the hypothesis "that the neurological processing of
sensory input is dependent on the organisation of motor activity," and they
translate this hypothesis into operational terms as follows: "It must be shown that
with visual input constant, changes in the state of the motor system do produce
changes in perception."
These statements refer to a general all-pervasive connection between "all"
motor events and "all" perceptual processes. Parsimony in neural interaction,
however, would suggest the existence of functional connections between specific
motor and perceptual processes. For instance, visual input can signal either
subject movement or stimulus movement. If the visual stimulus moving across the
retina is the only cue, then it would seem impossible for the organism to make
differential interpretation of these two types of movement. However, re-afferent
information about eye movement or head movement would provide sufficient
information to enable differentiation. The neck and eye muscles are involved in a
particular efference-afference feedback loop that involves re-afference. If one
eye is closed and the other eye is gently tapped, the visual field will appear to
jump about. When the eyeball is moved by the finger, the efference copy is
irrelevant or has no reference to the eye. The mismatch, consisting of the
movement of the eye and the lack of an efferent copy signalling a motor
command for the eye to move, endorses the percept as being the visual array
that moved.
The specificity of efference-afference feedback loops in perception is often
ignored. The above method of moving the eye can be regarded as exafferent
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input, simply because the eye movement seems to be independent of any motor
command by the organism. Touching the ribs with the fingers in trying to tickle
oneself sets up an efferent copy that is relevant to the tactile experience.
Re-afference affirms the sensation with the percept of self-initiated touch, and no
tickle is perceived. When someone else lightly touches the ribs, there is no
efferent copy with the CNS, and the exafferent stimulus is interpreted as tickle.
The above examples illustrate how necessary it is to particularise the relation-
ships between sensory and motor components in perception. A problem with
many visuomotor feedback experiments is that they fail to specify those particular
motor activities involved in the neurological processing of sensory input that
generate specifiable perceptual effects. In a series of experiments Collins has
shown that it is essential to specify the relevant muscular stimulation involved in
the interpretation of space (Collins 1971; Collins & Lahy 1972; Collins & Lord
1971). Prior to these experiments all sorts of claims concerning motor involve-
ment in judgments of kinesthetic space were being made. Many experimenters
(Bakan & Weiler 1963; Moylan 1964; Zacks & Freedman 1963, and many others)
used irrelevant muscular stimulation in studying kinesthetic spatial judgments. In
much the same way, we feel that it is important to specify the nature of the
visuomotor feedback and the processes involved.
The failure to replicate the Held & Rekosh study by Gyr et al. is just another
instance of failing to replicate an experiment in this area. In a number of studies
(Singer & Day 1966a; 1966b) we have tested Held's active-passive hypothesis
relating to prism adaptation and have shown that motor activity is not a necessary
condition for adaptation to occur. In one of these experiments adaptation was
achieved with a perfectly still hand viewed through a wedge prism (Singer & Day
1966c), while S was making verbal judgments of hand position on a scale moved
by the experimenter. These data suggest that judgmental activity, but not motor
activity, may be a necessary condition for the adaptation process to occur when it
is indexed by a motor response.
Gyr et al. recognise that systematic scanning of the visual field may be an
important variable in their research. We maintain that this, not walking around in a
cylinder, is the most crucial aspect of the experiment - because systematic
scanning is likely to introduce judgmental activity. A passive condition - for
example, the cylinder moving with S sitting, or someone else moving S about the
cylinder—would have helped to sort out the relevance of walking. More specifi-
cally, experiments are needed to articulate clearly just what aspects of the motor
system interact with visual-sensory processes to produce changes in spatial
judgments.
The large literature on adaptation to transformed sensory input makes it clear
that the necessary and sufficient condition for adaptation is a discordance
between two sources of spatial information. If the change is to occur in a sensory
modality and not just to consist of a learned compensatory motor response, then
one source of information must be derived via that modality. The other informa-
tion can come from many different sources, such as from self-produced move-
ment, from the vestibular system and kinesthetic receptors in the neck that signal
gravitational information, or from other sensory spatial modalities such as hearing
or kinesthesis.
The only form of adaptation that can throw light on Gyr et al.'s question of
whether the efferent motor signal is necessary to visual perception is a change in
a visual judgment, not a change indexed by any form of motor response. As Gyr
et al. note, sensory spatial adaptation of the kind described by Gibson must also
be excluded. Of the comparatively few studies concerned with a change in the
visual system, some must be excluded, since viewing a laterally-displaced visual
field has been reported to produce an oculomotor change in eye position that can
also be measured in the post-exposure phase (McLaughlin et al. 1966; McLaugh-
lin & Webster 1967). One report of visual change (not confused with oculomotor
change) in the absence of any movement comes from Rock (1966 op. cit), who
found that 30 minutes of exposure to an optically-reduced image of familiar
objects resulted in a significant after-effect no different from that obtained under
conditions allowing active manipulation of the objects viewed.
An example of a large change in the visual system that can occur without active
motor involvement is the after-effect following exposure to a tilted room (Austin et
al. 1974). Ss viewed a miniature room tilted 22° and made 10 judgments of the
vertically of a bar at the back of the room (but without receiving kinesthetic
stimulation from it); they showed a visual after-effect of 4.05° when tested 15
minutes after the exposure period ended. This procedure clearly precludes
Gibson's sensory spatial adaptation.
Finally, the suggestion that motor activity has a critical role in visual perception
is an extreme interpretation of the sensorimotor theory and one that the Gyr et al.
replication does not test. It is also inconsistent with our present knowledge of
nervous system functioning. With respect to the question broached by Held &
Rekosh as to whether "the subjective geometry of the visual field can be altered
by movement-dependent feedback" (1963 op. cit. p. 722), the examples given
above should suffice to show that there is evidence that, while centrally-monitored
motor output may be a sufficient condition for a change in the perceptual
process, it is not a necessary one.
by Martin J. Steinbach
Department of Psychology, Atkinson College, York University, Downsview, Ontario,
Canada M3J 2R7
Methodological considerations in replicating Held and Rekosh's perceptual
adaptation study. Perhaps the Gyr et al. failure to replicate the H & R result could
be due to small differences in method. I would be reluctant to dismiss the H & R
finding because of this negative result, especially since one very thorough study
has found curvature adaptation beyond that attributable to normalization (Cohen
1965).
Gyr et al. hint at, but do not spell out, what may, I think, be a crucial difference.
H & R do not specify the texture density of their "random" field. They also fail to
specify the visual angle of the bars in their test grating (Gyr et al. also omit this).
We now suspect that the visual system processes not the specific features in a
given scene, but rather the spatial frequency content (see Campbell 1974, for a
summary). If the visual system is doing a Fourier analysis on input, then common
spatial-frequency components between exposure and test conditions may be
necessary for the curvature after-effect to be demonstrated. Thus, H & R may
have fortuitously hit upon a "random" pattern whose fundamental Fourier
components were similar to those of their test grating. Gyr et al.'s exposure and
test-stimuli's spatial-frequency components may have been too widely separated
for an effect to be generated. (For examples of perceptual after-effects depen-
dent upon spatial frequency, see Anstis 1974, or Ware & Mitchell 1974.)
One additional point: Walking involves some vertical displacement. In the H & R
passive condition Ss were wheeled about in a cart. The active condition therefore
involved some vertical displacement as well as horizontal translation, and this
could provide additional information leading to active-passive differences.
The appropriate experiment remains undone. The basic H & R experiment
should be repeated with: 1) movement in the active and passive conditions
restricted to pure translation of the head toward the random field, and 2) test and
exposure fields having equivalent spatial-frequency content.
NOTE
Support for preparation of this paper was provided by NRC grant A7664.
by M» T. Turwey
Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn. 06268; and
Haskins Laboratories, New Haven, Conn. 06510
The thesis of the efference-mediation of vision cannot be rationalized. I
wish to argue that there is neither an evolutionary nor a logical reason for an
efference-mediated mechanism of visual perception. If this argument is valid, it
follows that any experiment intended to evaluate such a mechanism is evaluating
something quite different, and that both classical and contemporary data
gathered in reference to the efference-mediation issue will require careful
re-examination and re-interpretation.
Optical flow perspective and physical facts at the scale of ecology. Let me
identify at the outset a physical fact at the scale of ecology that, by any
reasonable account, has held true for the entire course of evolution: When an
animal locomotes, its body moves as a unit relative to the surroundings, but the
surroundings (say, for a terrestrial animal, the ground plane and the objects that
clutter it) never move as a unit relative to the animal. (Earthquakes might appear
to be an exception. We could easily rule them out of contention on grounds that
their occurrence is too uncommon to pressure the evolution of perceptual
mechanisms. But it is more important to note, given the argument that follows,
that earthquakes will not structure the light in ways identical to the ways light is
structured when an animal moves relative to its surroundings.)
Here is a rough description of the light to the eyes of animals as they move
about in their cluttered habitats. The surfaces comprising habitats are opaque
and textured. A texture element is tentatively defined as a surface region bounded
by a closed curve so that no intensity transitions exist within the region but a
discontinuity in intensity does exist at the boundary. For any point of observation
in an animal's habitat, the light reflected to that point from the variously-
articulating opaque surfaces may be construed as a set of polar projections from
the (unoccluded) surface-texture elements onto a projection surface. The polar
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projections from a natural surface-texture element onto a mathematically-
convenient projection surface can be referred to as an optical-texture element;
and the set of those optical-texture elements can be referred to as the optic array
(Gibson 1961; 1966 op. cit; Lee 1974; 1976).
When an animal - be it terrestrial, aquatic, or aerial - moves relative to its
surroundings, the optic array will undergo a concurrent transformation in all its
parts. Thus, if an animal advances rectilinearly in any transparent medium (air,
water), there will be an outflow of optical texture (with the center of the outflow
specific to the direction of locomotion); if an animal drops from a higher to a lower
ledge, there will be a concurrent upflow in all optical-texture elements, and so on.
The point to be doubly underscored is this: A global transformation of the optic
array is specific to a movement of an observation point relative to the surround-
ings. This specificity holds for any contemporary animal locomoting in its natural
habitat, and it has held, by all reasonable accounts, for any present-day animal's
ancestors. Importantly, no sensible case can be made for the claim that global
transformations of the optic array specify for an animal a unitary movement of the
surroundings relative to the animal. For the latter claim would be tantamount to
saying that it has been common-place during evolution for the planet earth to
move relative to the animals that inhabit it. In contrast, a sensible case can be
made for the claim that transformations of parts of the total optic array relative to
the total optic array are specific to changes in parts of an animal's surroundings
relative to the animal.
No evolutionary motivation for efference compensation. There is therefore no
substance to the often-voiced assertion that movement of the animal and
movement of the surroundings are signalled by identical stimulation. On the
contrary, the two kinds of movement are specified in the circumstances in which
animals live and with respect to which they have evolved by very different patterns
of visual stimulation. And we see, in short, that there is no evolutionary motivation
whatsoever for "mechanisms that compensate for" the visual stimulation
produced by movements of the perceiver relative to the surroundings. To be
terribly redundant, these efference-mediated mechanisms have been promoted
over the years on the assumption that self-movement and environment movement
have the same visual consequences, and that an animal therefore needs some
special, extravisual mechanism to distinguish its movements from those of its
surroundings. But since the optical consequences are not identical and never
have been, in the lengthy past of evolution, we should not suppose that nature
was pressured into engineering the special brain mechanisms advocated.
The significance of the above line of reasoning—that there is no evolutionary
rationale for the mechanism proposed by von Hoist (1954 op. cit.) and by Sperry
(1950 op. cit.) - seems to have escaped Gyr and his colleagues. They try to
disarm the argument of Gibson (1966 op. cit.), that is under elaboration in this
commentary, by the feeble conjecture that while global visual transformations
may not be equivocal for a fly, they could be equivocal for a human. The
conjecture is curious on two counts. First, Gyr et al. offer no logical or
evolutionary reason why humans should be special in this regard. The facts of
optical flow perspective are commensurate with the facts of physics at the scale
of ecology - why should humans compromise them? Second, there is already
substantial evidence in the literature contrary to the conjecture. Thus Lee and his
co-workers (Lee & Aaronson 1974; Lee & Lishman 1975; Lishman & Lee 1973)
have demonstrated repeatedly that in a room whose floor is stationary but whose
ceiling and walls can be made to move as a unit, humans perceive themselves to
be moving relative to the room when the room is moving relative to them.
Moreover, when the room moves rectilinearly with the person, at the same
velocity and in the same direction (that is, no global optical outflow accompanies
the act of walking forward), the perception tends to be that of not moving relative
to the surroundings, although the parts of the body are perceived as moving
relative to each other in the manner of walking.
Efference is equivocal. The latter observation coupled with a more simple
phenomenon - that of walking on a treadmill - brings home a fact of some
considerable importance for the von Hoist (1954 op. cit.) model and for
efference-based models of perception in general. Recall that the raison d'etre for
von Hoist's model is that afferent signals are equivocal on the issue of whether
the animal moves relative to the surroundings or the surroundings move relative
to the animal; therefore, one appeals to efference to resolve the equivocality. But
efference, it can be argued, is itself equivocal; in the case of walking forward in
Lee's moving room or on a treadmill, the efference is the same whether or not one
is displacing as a whole relative to the surroundings. Presumably, then, advocates
of efference-mediated visual perception should propose an additional mecha-
nism, one that appeals to afference - more properly, optical-flow perspective - to
resolve the efferent equivocality so as to determine whether or not forward
locomotion is taking place!
We ought to note that the treadmill case is not especially exotic. For the bird or
insect flying into a wind, the fish swimming upstream, and the primate pushing or
pulling a relatively immovable object, patterns of efference in these natural
circumstances can be said to equivocate on movement relative to the surround-
ings, whereas optical flow perspective would be singularly univocal. In sum, the
ambient optic array is expropriospecific (Lee 1978); efference is not.
Visual information for the control of activity rather than response-eliciting
stimuli. The arguments above and elsewhere (Turvey 1977a) underscore the
absence of sensible reasons for efference-mediation of visual perception. Let us
accordingly take another look at the experiments directed at demonstrating its
existence.
It is assumed in the experiments of von Hoist & Mittelstaedt (1950 op. cit.) that
a striped drum rotating about an insect triggers a reflex, the optokinetic reflex,
that rotates the animal in a direction opposite to that of the rotating stripes. The
"stimulus" for the reflex is said to be a difference between the angular velocities
of the stripes and the animal. But Varju (1975) has shown that when the insect is
allowed to move freely and make normal scanning movements, the insect rotates
with the rotating stripes at a constant rate rather than lagging behind at some
value correlated with detection of slippage. Indeed, an insect rotating with the
stripes, and taking one of them as a piece of the surround to keep aligned with,
may - if it finds itself falling behind the fixated stripe - make a fast turn backwards
against the direction of rotation and alter its fixation to a following stripe. On other
occasions the insect may make a jump that takes it ahead of the rotating stripes.
These observations suggest that rotation of the visual array relative to the animal
is not a stimulus triggering a response but information about the fact that the
animal is being rotated relative to its surroundings, and that the animal behaves in
varied ways to preserve a fixed relation to its surroundings.
Consider another example. Srinivasan and Bernard (1977) superimposed a
pursuable object on a large moving pattern. Normally, for a fly tethered in front of
the pattern in such a way as to permit it to fly, the moving pattern would be
responded to by wing-amplitude adjustments that right the insect with regard to
the coordinates of the surroundings. In the presence of a pursuable object,
however, the fly selectively ignores the large moving pattern that normally elicits a
classical type of optomotor response until the pursuable object disappears [cf.
Henn, Voneche).
"Rules" for controlling locomotion. There are two points to be made: First,
that the optical flow perspective, jointly specifying the surroundings and the self, is
information for the control of behavior; and second, that the role that information
plays depends on the control "principle" or "rule" in operation at the time.
Consider the following as examples of the "rules" for v/si/a//y-controlling locomo-
tion: In order to hold one's position relative to the surroundings, move so as to
cancel any global optical transformation; to turn the body toward an object, move
so as to produce a rotational optical flow away from the location of the object; to
approach an object, move so as to make the optic array flow outwards, with the
object at the center of the outflow.
My strong preference is against construing these as rules or commands,
invested in the brain or issued from the brain (see Fitch & Turvey 1978; Gibson, in
press; and Kupfermann & Weiss: "The Command Neuron Concept" BBS 1(1)
1978); rather, they are laws of physics at the scale of ecology. Writing them in
sentence form encourages the idea that they are rules to be enforced by an
enforcer; but this self-actional interpretation is at best regressive and at worst
implies sui generis control (see Bentley 1954; Dewey & Bentley 1949; Shaw &
Turvey, in press). What is needed is an interpretation that is considerably more
consonant with the scientific enterprise and considerably tougher to come by -
namely, that the control "rule" arises within the animal-environment system as a
consequence of the mutual constraints of an animal and its environment. I make
this remark here because Gyr et al. comment on the "complexity" of the
efference-mediated view of perception versus the "simplicity" of the direct-
realism view advocated by Gibson and others (such as myself). If, by a complex
theory of perception, they mean that it prescribes very involved mental gymnas-
tics to achieve perception, then the contrast is fair. But if by complex they mean
the kinds of concepts required by science to account for perception and the
control of activity without fall-back concepts that intimate unanalyzable internal
interpreters, ascribers of meaning, and initiating powers, then I must take issue.
The program of a committed (direct) realism is conceptually far more demanding
(Shaw & Turvey, in press; Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, in press). And, on the subject of
demandingness, it is not relatively easy, as Gyr et al. claim, to observe and
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control the variables of vision - not when one is describing light at the scale of
ecology in reference to the activity of animals (Lee 1974, 1976) and the
perception of environmental events (Shaw & Pittenger 1977).
The fly of von Hoist and Mittelstadt Returning to the fly in the optomotor
drum, when the drum is rotated about the fly and the extant control rule is to stay
put, the optical flow specifies that the fly is turning,relative to its surroundings, and
it accordingly trys to rectify matters. When the extant rule is to turn to an object,
the optical flow specifies that the animal is turning relative to its surroundings and
in the right direction. Thus it keeps turning until aligned with the object.
Now consider the case where the fly's head is rotated 180°. The consequence
of rotating the fly's eye would be interpreted by some as consonant with
conventional physical optics and the idea of a retinal image, and contrary to the
ecological optics promoted in this commentary. This is not the place to repeat the
arguments against the retinal-image concept. Those arguments have been given
in considerable detail (Bentley 1954; Gibson 1966 op. cit.\ Turvey 1977), and they
are sufficiently strong on independent and broadly-based grounds to suggest that
the consequence of rotating the head (or the eyes) is only an apparent anomaly
for the ecological-optics perspective. For the present it suffices to point out that a
resolution of the anomaly must begin with the fact that the optical structure that
the fly's visual system uses is not symmetric under the head-rotation transform
(Mace, personal communication). At all events, given that the optical flow
perspective under the 180° head-transformation specifies movement away from
the object, and that the extant control principle is for turning toward the object,
the fly engages in behavior to oppose the turning away.
On reinterpreting the passive versus active data. Vision is capable of
obtaining three kinds of information (Lee 1978): exterospecific information about
the layout of surfaces (objects, events), propriospecific information about the
layout of parts of the body relative to each other, and expropriospecific
information about the body and body parts relative to the layout of surfaces.
These three kinds of information hold for vision with prismatic distortion just as
they do for normal vision. And the claim is easily ventured that different
experimental manipulations (see Kornheiser's review 1976) impinge differently on
these three kinds of information. The following also holds for distorted and normal
vision: Variation in optical structure reveals nonvariation and permits the distin-
guishing of styles of change from nonchange. It follows, therefore, that the richer
and more varied the natural transformations of optical structure that the observer-
wearing-prisms experiences, the greater the opportunity to distinguish the novel
transformational invariants specifying styles of change (e.g. observer relative to
surroundings, limbs relative to body, objects relative to surroundings and relative
to observer) from the novel structural invariants specifying the structures partici-
pating in the changes (see Pittenger & Shaw 1975; Turvey 1977). On such an
ecological-optics analysis, active-passive is not the dimension of significance for
the study of adaptation (cf. Kornheiser 1976). Rather, the concern should be a
rigorous (mathematical, experimental) analysis of the various transformations
(including the null case) of optical structure arising from movements of the animal
or changes in the surroundings and the kinds of information those transforma-
tions make available. The latter concern, and that for understanding control rules
and how they arise, define well-motivated scientific problems. The proposal for
the mediation of vision by efference does not define a well-motivated scientific
problem; in my view it is a proposal without any "residual plausibility" (in the
words of Gyr et al.) whatsoever.
by J. Jacques Woneche
Faculte de Psychologie et dies Sciences de I'education, Universite de Geneve,
CH-1211 Geneve 4, Switzerland
Visuomotor feedback: A short supplement to Gyr's journey around a
polka-dotted cylinder. My intention is to write a short supplement to Gyr et al.'s
study, dealing with two of the points in the paper: 1) the theoretical question as to
the necessity of observer movement for perceiving the properties of an object,
and 2) the empirical findings under dicussion. I shall propose the embryo of an
experiment to test visuomotor feedback in animals and humans.
It seems to me that the French mathematician Henri Poincare has shown once
and for all the logical necessity of movement for the existence of object
properties such as shape, size, and permanence in space. Without his "group of
displacements," such invariants could not be established, and we would all be in
the position of Sperry's frog trying to catch our daily flies in the wrong quadrant of
the trigonometric circle. There is an American phrase that expresses the same
thing more forcefully by alluding to a hole in the ground to be distinguished from
another one located on the observer, but BBS is too academic a journal to print
anything about academy figures.
Gyr et al.'s subjects seem to demonstrate that such a distinction is not clearly
made by human beings under certain conditions, so I would like to submit two
pieces of experimental evidence that I have collected that could help us
understand Gyr et al.'s results, especially since nonadaptation could be explained
in a variety of ways.
In an unpublished experiment run for the Geneva Astronomical Observatory on
the question of the existence of star rings in the sky, I showed that astronomers
could detect "rings" in a computer-simulated series of "star photographs," in
which the location of the various stars was randomly distributed on the
photographic surface presented to the Ss (who were not Geneva Observatory
astronomers). But - and this is the relevant piece of data - the distribution of
ring-detectors in the sample of Ss was not significantly different from chance
level. This result persuaded us to follow up this point with a larger sample of
"naive" Ss (astronomers are not so numerous, and they are very busy), who had
to observe random arrays of colored dots of the sort described by Gyr et al. in
their experiment. The same results were obtained, with the following additional
effect: Ss would find "lines" and "rings" significantly more readily when instructed
to "look for regular configurations" or just "regularities."
This last result could indicate that H & R instructed their own subjects in such a
way as to induce a certain type of response instead of another, since the
organization of randomness into order seems to depend so evidently on directed
attention.
The second piece of evidence is briefly mentioned in my book on figural
after-effects (Voneche 1971). In an experiment conducted with David Bearison to
separate the Gibson effect from adaptation, we presented a curved line of dots to
children (aged 5 to 12 years) wearing prismatic lenses that made the line appear
vertical. We expected this procedure to rule out what Gibson calls the "normaliza-
tion" effect. The results were surprising: the younger children did not show any
adaptation, while the older ones displayed adaptation only to the upper part of
the "line."
This result tends to show that dotted lines are not perceptually equivalent to
continuous ones; hence, when put together randomly, they require highly-trained
observers to be perceived as lines, especially since the sequence of dots chosen
as "line" dissolves as a function of head movement.
What, then, could be a good test of visuo-motor feedback? It seems to me that
it should consist of a procedure allowing for a clear distinction between the
optomotor reflex and compensatory movement. The following condition could be
critical for this: instead of having just one stationary cylinder, as in H & R's and Gyr
et al.'s experiments, I would propose having two concentric cylinders of almost
the same diameter (just enough to allow for rotation without friction) of which one,
the inner one, would be stationary and half as high as the other, which would be
rotating at a constant speed. Both cylinders would be painted with alternating
white and black vertical stripes. S would be brought inside the apparatus
blindfolded. Once the cylinder was rotating, the blindfold would be removed and
S's responses observed. Visually, it is impossible for an observer to distinguish
between real and apparent movement inside the cylinders, since the two cylinders
seem to move in opposite directions, as far as the mere succession of retinal
images is concerned. On the basis of Wapner and Werner's (1957) sensory-tonic
theory, my expectation would be that lower animals (and probably brain-injured
patients) would exhibit ipsiversive visual tracking of the rotating cylinder, followed
by active pursuit of it, whereas normal human adults would track with compensa-
tory movements in the opposite direction. In addition to verbal (when possible)
and motor responses, a double check could be provided by separate optometric
measurement of S's vestibular, optokinetic, and post-rotatory nystagmus [cf.
Henn].
This is only a thought experiment, and things are certainly more involved than
this test. The only aim of this contribution is to lay the groundwork for spelling out
the necessary and sufficient specifications for a good, crucial experiment of the
central problem tackled by Gyr and his collaborators.
by Richard D. Walk
Department of Psychology, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
20052
Attentional factors in depth perception. The H & R study is, in my opinion, an
excellent one. That they both predicted and obtained adaptation in the random-
texture condition was not surprising to me; the experiment was an extremely
ingenious demonstration of their own position. What of the Gyr et al. replication?
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The studies seem dissimilar enough so that I, for one, would prefer to suspend
judgment until others have tried to replicate the study. If the replications fail, and if
they do not shed any light on the conditions under which the H & R results appear
or do not appear, then we should consider the theoretical implications.
My own position is in disagreement with Held's, in that I feel that some of the
developmental phenomena that he feels are acquired through interaction with the
environment are unlearned. To this end, in a modified replication of Held & Bauer
(1967) we tested monkeys reared without sight of the hands and found little
deficit in visual reaching (Walk & Bond 1971). We also reared kittens for a short
time in the dark - shorter than did Held & Hein (1963 op. cit.) - and found
evidence for depth discrimination when the passive and dark-reared kittens were
tested (Miller & Walk 1975). Held & Hein (1963 op. cit.) had found depth
discrimination for active, not passive, kittens. But, except for their position on the
early development of visual-motor behavior, I am basically neutral as to the role
of re-afference in behavior.
Three experiments that we have performed with kittens (and are still carrying
out) are relevant to this issue. The first experiment, referred to above (Miller &
Walk, 1975), involved raising kittens under four conditions: 1) normal rearing in
the light; 2) dark rearing for 17 days and then active locomotion for 3 hours a day
for 10 days; 3) as in Group 2, except the kittens were passive, confined to a
holder, able to see the environment, but unable to see their limbs; 4) in the dark
until tested at 27 days of age. We found active animals to be similar to passive
ones except for the first visual-cliff test. All groups discriminated shallow from
deep sides of the visual cliff on a "calling test" in which they were called by the
experimenter to come to him.
We next had a closer approximation to the Held & Hein (1963 op. cit.) study
with the same four groups. The deprived animals remained in the dark for 56
days, then Groups 2 and 3 had ten days of visual exposure, and all groups were
tested on the 66th day. These results were almost exactly like those of Held and
Hein. The active group was excellent, as was the normally-reared group, while the
passively-exposed and the dark-reared kittens were poor on depth descrimina-
tion on the visual cliff and when called by the experimenter from the shallow and
deep sides.
These results led us to pick a middle period to test for the effects of increased
attention on depth discrimination (Walk, Shepherd, & Miller 1978). We had the
same four groups and added two "attention" conditions for the passive animals.
Kittens were raised in the dark for 40 days before the active and passive groups
were given 3 hours a day of visual exposure. The attention groups were, first, a
group that watched a visual display and, second, a group that could control
forward locomotion. The first, attentional (or "car-watching") group remained in
their holders while they watched a toy roller-coaster with small cars that
continually circled a track. The other attention group was a passive locomotion
(or "go-cart") group; these kittens remained in their holders, but they could lift
their heads to close a microswitch that controlled forward motion in a circular
path. One animal made as many as 300 revolutions in the 3-hour period.
Our results are preliminary, but the two passive-attention groups seem roughly
similar and not different from the active group, while the poorest groups are the
regular passive kittens and the dark-reared ones. We hope that additional kittens
will continue the same trend.
What might this mean? It would mean that "attention" can maintain depth
perception that would be lost without it. The regular passive animals in holders
typically seem to close their eyes for long periods; with nothing interesting in the
environment they shut it out. Many experiments on prismatic adaptation have
appealed to attention as a factor in perceptual-motor adaptation (Kornheiser
1976). Is attention, then, an alternative to self-induced locomotion? Is self-induced
locomotion no more than a method for maximizing the attention of the animal? It
would be premature to conclude this, even if our results continue to be the same
after further testing. In our enthusiasm we had three animals that went 56 days in
the dark before receiving additional attentional exposure. These animals were
impaired and more similar to passive animals than to active-locomotion animals.
Suppose all of these results hold up? I would then hypothesize that depth
discrimination is unlearned, that attentional factors can maintain it for some time,
but that self-induced locomotion is needed for its efficient maintenance or
recovery after prolonged periods of deprivation. Is this "re-afference" in the Held
sense? I do not know, but the re-afference of self-induced locomotion is indeed
powerful for recovering or maintaining depth perception.
Despite my disagreement with some interpretations of the Held research, I am
indebted to him, as is psychology, in many ways. First, the experiments produced
by him and his associates are ingenious, creative, and productive. The best-
known research ranges from the prismatic adaptation research with adults to its
thematic extension with orphanage children, kittens, and monkeys. Recently, he
has produced distinguished research on the visual acuity of young infants with
many practical implications. Second, the theory has been productive in terms of
the research produced by him as well as by others. A strong theory inspires both
refutation and extension, and psychology is the richer because the interaction of
theory and experiment has helped us to understand visual-motor behavior.
Indefinite theories spark little research. It takes a strong person to stick his neck
out, and I feel perception and psychology have been enriched, and will continue
to be enriched, both by Held's theory and by his experiments.
by Hans Wailach
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Penna. 19081
Three functions of motor-sensory feedback in object perception. What is the
function of motor-sensory feedback in visual and auditory perception? I shall try to
answer this question by discussing three kinds of object perception where
motor-sensory feedback is essential.
1. Processes that bring about the perception of a stable environment. When
we move we produce relative displacements between the environment and our
eyes or ears, leading to visual or auditory stimulation that, taken by itself, is
indistinguishable from stimulation that might be provided by some objective
motion. Such stimulation would, therefore, cause perception of environmental
motion were it not accompanied by motor-sensory information representing the
body movements that caused the relative displacements. A compensation takes
place in which the visual or auditory information about motion is more or less
accurately matched up with motor-sensory information, leading to nonperception
of movement-produced displacements. We now know of five movement-
produced sensory inputs for which such compensation occurs. They are: image
displacements due to eye movements (Mack 1970; Mack & Herman 1978);
changes in visual direction due to head-turning or nodding (Stratton 1897;
Wailach & Kravitz 1965a; Wailach & Bacon 1977); changes in auditory direction
due to head-turning (Wailach & Kravitz 1968 in Wailach 1976); rotation of the
visual field due to head tilting (Wailach & Bacon, 1976); and rotation of objects
one passes when moving forward (Wailach et al. 1974 in Wailach 1976). The
accuracy of these compensations has been measured by a method designed by
Wailach & Kravitz (1965a). The method consists in adding objective motion that is
physically dependent on the subject's movements to the relative motion caused
directly by the subject's movements. The proportion of added objective motion
needed to cause perception of that objective motion measures the accuracy of
the compensation - the precision with which the visual (or auditory) input and the
motor-sensory information are being matched up. This proportion was found to
vary widely. It is about 20% for eye movements, 3% for head-turning and visual
direction, 15% for head-turning and auditory direction, 5% for head-tilting, and
about 40% for rotation caused by moving forward.
The variety of these compensatory processes is actually quite limited - namely,
to subject-relative displacements - as the following case shows. When one turns
one's head, the amount of displacement of a stationary object relative to the eyes
also varies with its distance from the eyes. This effect of distance is taken into
account in the compensation process as well (Wailach et al. 1972 in Wailach
1976). Of two objects at different distances from the eyes, each one will be seen
as stationary during head-turning when it is given singly. But when they are
simultaneously visible, one object will be seen to move. Then they are also
displaced relative to one another, and this object-relative displacement amounts
to a change in configuration. Although the object-relative displacement is caused
by one's own movements, there is no compensation; one of the objects is seen to
move. While there is compensation for the movement-produced displacement of
each object, there is none for the emergent configuration change. This is a
striking instance where motor-sensory feedback cannot touch figural perception.
It fails to have an effect on the configurational process, although it affects its
parts.
2. Perceptual processes where movements have an information-gathering
function. In order to interest us here, such a process must have two characteris-
tics: that movements elicit sensory inputs unavailable without them, and that
motor-sensory information about the movements be needed in the processing of
these inputs. I know of only one instance where the second characteristic is
certain - namely, auditory localization. Perceived sound directions vary in two
spatial dimensions. One dimension, the angles that the sound direction forms with
the aural axis, is mediated by time-of-arrival differences at the ears. Information
about the other dimension, the angle that the sound direction forms with the
horizontal plane, is obtained by head movements. This angle of elevation is given
as a quotient between the changing angle representing the time-of-arrival
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difference and the changing angle representing the head rotation (Wallach 1940
in Wallach 1976). Elevated perceived sound directions can be produced by
displacing a sound source in the horizontal plane dependent on the head-turning.
If, with the displacement of the sound source constant, the head rotation is made
larger or smaller, the elevation of the sound direction becomes smaller or larger.
I do not believe that it is possible to conclude from this particular case, and
others like it which may yet be found, that motor-sensory feedback plays a
pervasive role in object perception. Such cases fill specific gaps where stimulation
of the pertinent modality alone cannot provide needed information.
3. Adaptation in visual perception of shape that requires movements on the
part of the subject. In addition to the displacement of the visual direction, wedge
prisms cause two major shape distortions: straight lines parallel to the base of the
prism become curved, and there is a distortion of distances in the apex-base
dimension, in which distances near the apex are lengthened and distances near
the base are shortened. As long as the observer remains motionless, these
distortions could be properties of the visual environment. Only when the observer
moves in such a way that the shape distortions shift relative to the visual
environment and cause deformations in the pattern reaching the eyes are the
distortions revealed as matters of the viewing conditions.
Wallach & Flaherty (1976) obtained rapid adaptation such that the distance
distortions caused by a wedge prism became diminished. During the exposure
period Ss wearing base-up or base-down prisms made nodding head movements
while looking at a regular pattern of horizontal stripes. After exposure the regular
pattern looked distorted, and this effect was measured by compensation. During
exposure the nodding head movements caused the prism to tilt up and down, and
this tilting transformed the distance distortion caused by the prism into deforma-
tions.
It seemed possible that head movements were needed here only to transform
the shape distortions into deformations; in that case motor-sensory feedback
would have no role in this adaptation. Wallach & Flaherty, however, showed that
this is not so. In a variation of their experiment, head-nodding was replaced by
having the prism, no longer fixed to S's head, tilt on its own. Although this
arrangement caused the same deformations to reach S's eye that were caused
by nodding, the adaptative alterations failed to develop. Motor-sensory feedback
did play a role in this adaptation.
A corresponding result was obtained by Wallach & Barton (1975), who
changed the curvature effect of the prisms into a depth effect, which was much
more conspicuous then the curvature. They used the curvature effect to produce
retinal disparities, which, in turn, caused a strong concavity to be perceived in
patterns located in S's frontal plane. Again, only deformations produced by S's
nodding head movements caused adaptation; deformations produced by shifting
the pattern relative to the distortion, with S's head stationary, did not. Here, then,
are two instances where motor-sensory feedback is essential for shape adapta-
tion.
The experiment by Gyr et al., in which the walking subject was a dot pattern
shift through the prism worn base-up, corresponds in most essential features to
the successful experiment by Wallach & Flaherty. Gyr et al. probably did not
obtain an adaptation because the deformations caused by the curvature distor-
tion were too small. No deformation connected with the curvature effect would
occur under the conditions used by Held & Rekosh - that is, from a horizontal
displacement between the head and the environment when the prism is worn
base-right. I agree with Gyr et al. that no adaptation can be expected to develop
under these conditions.
Do the experiments of Wallach & Flaherty and of Wallach & Barton demon-
strate that motor-sensory inputs play a role in shape perception as such? I think
not. To be sure, their results show that deformation by itself is not sufficient to
cause adaptation, and that the deformations must be accompanied by head
movements. But the motor-sensory feedback from these movements has no
direct bearing on the shape distortions that are eventually altered by adaptation.
The feedback is covariant with the deformations, and this covariance apparently
initiates the adaptation process. There are no grounds for believing that the
feedback has a direct effect on shape perception.
To sum up: motor-sensory feedback has several functions in object percep-
tion, but there is no evidence that it directly affects the perception of shape and
configuration.
by Robert B. Welch
Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans. 66045
Separating the issues involved in the role of bodily movement in perception
and perceptual-motor coordination. Gyr et al. have used Held & Rekosh's
(1963 op. cit.) comparison of active and passive movement in adaptation to
prismatically-induced curvature, and the current attempt to replicate this experi-
ment, as the context in which to raise three important theoretical questions: a)
Can non-optic factors influence or determine visual perception? b) To what extent
is motor activity involved in the neonatal development of perception? and c) Is
motor activity a necessary condition for visual adaptation to prismatic distortion in
adult subjects? Although related, these questions must be addressed separately.
This is particularly important here because, as will be seen, it is only the last of
these to which H & R's experiment and the present attempted replication are
directly relevant.
Non-optic factors in visual perception. As Gyr et al. note, the fact that
movement of the visual image across the retina is experienced quite differently if
this motion is the the result of active head or eye movement than if it is due to
physical motion of the environment, would appear to provide an affirmative
answer to the first question. The authors argue that in order to refute Gibson's
claim that visual experience can be completely understood in terms of the optic
array (the "direct" theory of visual perception), it must be demonstrated that it is
the central (efferent) component of the motor activity that is crucial in the
maintenance of visual stability during bodily movement. This may be an unneces-
sary requirement, however, since even the demonstration that proprioceptive,
vestibular, or other nonvisual inputs can serve this purpose would represent
negative evidence for Gibson's theory. Indeed, very recent evidence suggests
that neural feedback (afference) may be used to maintain visual stability during
active eye movements (Shebilske 1977), contrary to the long-held belief that the
extraocular muscles are incapable of signaling eye position.
In any event, it is incorrect to use the results of H & R's study as support for the
conclusion that concurrent nonoptic factors can affect visual perception. That is,
even if it were shown that active bodily movements are necessary for visual
adaptation to prismatic curvature, and that the central component is crucial for
this process, it would not therefore have been demonstrated that under these
circumstances visual perception has a motor component. Gibson (or others)
might merely claim that as a result of active motor involvement the observer
comes to detect new things about the visual array which result in adaptation.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between motor activity as a neccessary
pre-condition for subsequent visual change and motor activity as a necessary
concomitant of a unique visual experience. Presumably, only the latter constraint
would represent a blow to Gibson's theory.
Motor activity and perceptual development. Studies of adult adaptation to
prismatic distortion do not directly illuminate the issue of perceptual development.
As Held and his colleagues acknowledged at the very outset of their brilliant
series of studies on prism adaptation, the presence of perceptual plasticity in the
adult organism is no guarantee that the perceptual capacity in question was
originally acquired from experience, or that it was acquired in the same fashion as
adaptation in the mature, experienced organism. In short, it is invalid to generalize
from adult re-arrangement studies to perceptual development in the neonate. To
properly evaluate this question one must examine neonatal organisms, as Held,
Hein, and their associates (e.g. Held & Hein 1963 op. cit; Hein, Held, & Gower
1970) have done. Unfortunately, the initially promising results of these studies
have been subjected to serious criticism and re-interpretation (e.g. Ganz 1975).
Motor involvement in prism adaptation. Finally, we come to the issue of
whether active (versus passive) bodily motion is necessary to produce (partial)
adaptation to prismatically-induced curvature in adult observers. Although H & R
found support for their prediction that active movement is a necessary condition
for curvature adaptation, it has never been apparent how their "re-afference
theory" actually applies to visual perception - a mystery that Gyr et al. have not
attempted to resolve. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated by Victor (1968 op.
cit.) that curvature adaptation can be effected by passive movement, given
certain types of input (e.g., that resulting when the observer moves parallel to
prismatically-curved lines). The latter fact suggests that it is not the presence or
absence of active bodily movement that is crucial for the occurrence of
adaptation, but the availability of unambiguous information about the nature of the
prismatic distortion. Under some circumstances, as for example the random-dot
environment of Held & Rekosh and the present experiment, active movement may
provide particularly good information about the distortion. Furthermore, as Gyr et
al., along with Victor (1968 op. cit.) and Rock (1966 op. cit), have observed, an
especially informative combination of bodily movement and visual feedback is
provided by locomotion with base-up or base-down prisms.
Parenthetically, it is important to note that the relevant movements are of the
entire body or head, but not the eyes (as Gyr et al. inadvertently suggest by their
use of the term "scanning"). Clearly, unless the prisms are attached to contact
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lenses, eye movements will in no way inform the subject that anything is wrong
with his vision. This is not to be confused with the point that Gyr et al. raise about
the importance of fixating a given spot while walking within the cylinder, a
procedure which, although probably not necessary for adaptation, might facilitate
it.
It is unclear from a comparison of the two studies why it is that Gyr et al. were
unable to replicate the H & R results. Unfortunately, their criticism of the latter
investigators for failing to use the optimal situation for curvature adaptation is
greatly weakened by their own inability to find any adaptation with either this or
the "traditional" prism-base orientation.
Clearly, there is a need for further research aimed at delineating the conditions
under which adaptation to prismatic curvature will occur. It is conceivable that the
advantage of avoiding the Gibson effect by eliminating all straight lines in the
visual field is more than offset by the potential disadvantage of not providing the
salient information about the nature of the distortion that arises when straight lines
are present. Since a few minutes of stationary prism exposure to these lines prior
to the adaptation period will produce all of the Gibson effect that will ever occur,
pre-exposure measures taken at that time should be free of this effect, and
therefore any pre/post shift in apparent curvature should represent an unambigu-
ous measure of "genuine" curvature adaptation.
Authors' Response
by John Gyr, Richmond Wii!ey5 and Adele Henry
Motor factors In perception
The points of view represented in the commentaries on our
attempted replication of the H & R study on motor-sensory feedback
and the geometry of visual space fall into three broad categories.
There are commentaries that are broadly theoretical (1) and those
that are more narrowly focused on the possible reasons why the
replication, or experiments on adaptation in general, might produce
negative results (2). The former can be further subdivided in terms of
those that are supportive of the theoretical position one can ascribe to
Held and his coworkers on these matters (1.1) and others that, for a
large variety of reasons, are critical of such a position (1.2). All these
points, together with still finer subdivisions, will be taken up below.
1. Comments pertaining to the general theory of
motor-sensory feedback in visual perception
1.1 Comments supportive of Held's theoretical positions 1.11.
Support from logical considerations. Voneche reminds us that the
eminent French mathematician Henri Poincare (1952, 1958)
concluded by logical argument that the delineation of object
properties like shape, size, and permanence, presupposes observers
• who can move around and who know when they have moved. Only
under these circumstances, according to Poincare, can the distinction
between changes of position and changes of state (e.g. changes in
color) be made. The former are changes that an organism can bring
about by its own movements, or for which it can compensate.
Starting from this premise, Poincare brings principles of
mathematical group theory to bear on the formalization of the
various possible changes of position. This is the same group theory to
which Gibson (1966 op. dt.) alludes, without perhaps taking into
account that his notions of how the organism obtains information
about Its own movements does not, logically, comprise the whole set
of "knowing that one has moved." From a purely logical point of
view, at least, such a set might well include efferent information. Our
Response will consider whether, in addition to the logical argument,
there are psychological and neurophysiological reasons for expanding
the set proposed by the theorists of direct visual perception.
1.12. Supportive comments based on psychological
considerations. Several authors list a number of perceptual domains
in which motor events are thought to play a direct role in the
perception of certain properties. (Haber, Ebenholtz, Wallace, and
Welch provide a systematic overview.) An example of such a
property is position constancy, discussed by Wallach. There is
general agreement among these commentators (with the exception of
Haber, who appears open on the question) that this constancy occurs
because perceivers are able to discriminate environmental
displacement caused by their own movement from those caused by
movement on the part of the environment. Voneche proposes a new
experiment in this connection which, he thinks, would allow a
refined test of the von Hoist theory underlying the explanation of
many of the above phenomena. It is essentially aimed at ascertaining
whether organisms make the crucial distinction, assumed by von
Hoist's theory, between environmental movements and
self-movement, or whether all movement is always interpreted as
self-movement, as claimed by Gibson's theory.
To be sure, Gibson (1966 op. dt.) has attempted to show how some
of these discriminations could be made on the basis of input from the
optic array alone, including visual input produced by S's movements
and input derived from S's perception of parts of his own body. This
will be considered in detail in 1.21. However, as Shebllske notes, the
perception of direction has been shown to be accurate without
visibility of body parts and without the availability of those structural
overlaps of successively-visible portions of the optic array upon
which Gibson's theory is based. That is, direction perception is
available to a stationary observer, suggesting that it may be based on
the direction of gaze.
Additional evidence for position constancy and for the
concomitant role played by motor events in the production of this
constancy it cited by Bridgeman. He reviews the familiar case of
pressing against the eyeball with a finger and seeing the environment
move in a direction opposite to the passive rotation of the eyeball. To
this demonstration Bridgeman adds his own experiment, in which
the eye fixates a point in space while being displaced by a finger. In
this case the eye does not move, but the envrironment is seen as
moving in the same direction as that In which the finger presses.
Bridgeman points out that there is in this instance no Gibsonian
relative-movement cue, as there would be in a tracking test, from
which S could glean information about direction of movement. The
only events that can explain the resultant perception are motor: the
extraocular muscles must resist the pressure of the finger In a
direction opposite to that induced by the finger. Thus, he argues,
muscle Innervation explains the perception.
1.13. Supportive comments based on neurophysiological
considerations. Mwrthy discusses the role of the reticular formation
In modulating impulses from both the ganglion cells in the retina,
and the stretch receptors in muscle spindles. He thus points to the
existence in the CNS of integrated centrifugal control of more
peripheral sensory and motor events. From this he adduces the
reasonableness, or the likelihood, of concomitant and interconnected
motor and sensory processes as a widely applicable principle in visual
perception [see also Roland: "Sensory Feedback to the Cerebral
Cortex During Voluntary Movement in Man" BBS 1(1) 1978].
Taking cognizance of the fact that higher centers in the CNS
modulate sensory and motor activity in concert, Murthy suggests a
modification of von Hoist's reafferenzprinzip. Murthy's conclusions
about brain organization, it seems to us, were at least implied in the
theories of von Hoist, Sperry, and Teuber, and they were explicitly
assumed in the work of Festinger, Burnham, Ono, & Bamber (1967
op. cit.) when these authors argue that perceptual readiness, rather
than actual sensorimotor activity, Is adequate for perceptual
adaptation. Arguments similar to Murthy's have also been advanced
by Konorski (1967 op. cit.) and Pribram (1971), among others.
Other evidence from neurophysiology is contributed by Henn.
Agreeing In general with Murthy on the essential impossiblity of
separating purely sensory and purely motor processes in brain, Henn
considers as "strange" the question asked by many psychologists in
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adaptation research — namely, whether organisms are able to
monitor their own motor behavior at a central level. "Certainly," is
Henri's response, citing as an example eye-movement signals
recorded centrally 100 msec before the movements occur. He
proceeds to present various examples of motor paralysis that illustrate
the presence of central motor factors in perception, and he cites cases
of plasticity even in phylogenetically-older sensorimotor systems.
The latter examples, which reveal the probable influence of efferent
central activity in human behavior, are especially interesting in view
of the hypothesis stated by Freides that phylogenetically-older
efferent systems 'in humans get "bur ied" under
phylogenetically-newer systems. The implication is that the effects of
the operations of efference may be hard to ascertain experimentally,
judging from the evidence referred to by Henn, this is not so - at
least not under conditions of certain abnormalities such as ocular
paralysis. Nevertheless, Freides' suggestion to include
psychophysiological measures of autonomically-mediated reactions
such as EMG in adaptation research, in addition to behavioral ones,
may be fruitful.
Comments by Roland add a few cautions as to how much is known
from neurophysiology that would support Held's theory. As will also
be mentioned in 1.21, he sugggests that there is at present no
neurophysiological evidence for an efference copy.
Unfortunately, neither Heen, nor Murthy, nor Roland go into
detail on such specialized topics as shape perception, about which
there is a great deal of argument among psychologists. On the basis of
evidence reported by Henn and Murthy, and to an extent by Roland,
the question is not whether motor and sensory factors are directly
related in perception, but whether there are unusual conditions (of
learning, etc.) under which these factors become relatively
independent. It needs no belaboring that most psychologists ask the
question in reverse.
1.2. Comments critical of Held's positions 1.21. Direct visual
perception as an alternative to motor theories of perception.
References to, and possible support for, theories of direct visual
perception as possible alternatives to theories that posit direct
involvement of motor effects in the formation of percepts were made
by Haber. However, a full-blown challenge comes from Turvey, who
devotes a long commentary solely to this issue. As usual, the strong
points of theories of direct visual perception - such as the search for
optic-array invariants - shine strongly and clearly. Error intrudes
when these invariants are accepted as absolutes, or when there is
indifference to empirical findings from both psychology and
neurophysiology that are not in accord with direct theories of visual
perception. Nor does the stated abhorrence of "intimating
unanalyzable internal interpreters" make sense, since it appears to
presume that neurophysiology does not exist.
As to neurophysiology, one might refer to Henn's and Murthy's
findings and their applications to perceptual theory by Kelso, to the
effect that the central nervous system "knows about" motor
responses before they occur, and that there is centrifugal modulation
of both motor and sensory phenomena. This implies feedforward,
attentional mechanisms (also suspected in data reported by Walk and
Paap), and feedback between motor and sensory factors in
perception. This in turn presumes something like a comparator
process, in which internal representations ("copies?") are confronted
with afferent visual input. True, the presumptions at this point
appear to run ahead of the evidence, since Roland suggests that there
is at present no direct neurophysiological evidence for efferent copies
nor, one assumes, for comparators. However, many, including
Roland, agree that there are CNS representations of specific
voluntary motor activities - so, one might ask, why not of voluntary
activities and their anticipated afferent effects?
What about behavioral studies and their contributions to the above
questions? Turvey considers the study by von Hoist & Mittelstaedt
that dealt with these issues. In considering this study, Turvey has to
get into the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
movement in formulating his control rules. That is, he has to consider
the state of the organism as well as the state of the optic array. This is
doing something that no theorist of direct visual perception is happy
to accept.
1.22. Basic problems with the notion of effereece copy. Kelso
attacks the general notion of efference copy as being low in
theoretical power. He wants to replace the concept by a theory based
on information discordance and attention. Citing scores of
references, Kelso makes the point that efferent commands do not
specify states of individual muscles but control feedforward
processes. The function of these is to prepare organisms for
impending motor output and for afference arising from such action -
that is, presumably, for von Hoist's re-afference. There is, says Kelso,
efferent modulation of afference. But is all of this really
fundamentally different from von Hoist, or is it a modern update?
We would venture to propose that it is the latter.
Kelso rightly stresses attention as important in adaptation
processes. He reminds us, for example, that adaptation occurs in that
modality which in re-arrangement studies is not exercised during
exposure, and that when attention is left uncontrolled
experimentally, vision dominates. But what is attention? Kelso argues
that self-initiated movement may be a contributor to adaptation
because it sensitizes the organism to pay attention. Thus attention
appears to be hooked into the feedforward and efferent paradigm,
for Kelso as it is for von Hoist, as well as for Held and others using
von Hoist's theory.
1.23. Held's theory of motor-sensory feedback in perception is
in principle incapable of explaining adaptation of position or
shape. The issue of positional adaptation is broached by Welch.
According to Welch (1974 op. cit.), it was originally advanced by
Howard (1970, 1971), who is supposed to have argued that motor
outflow controls amplitude, direction, and speed of limb movement
but not position. However, a close reading of Howard (1970) suggests
that the above is an incorrect interpretation of pertinent statements
made by him. What Howard (1970) says is that, whereas the training
received by Ss in several of Held's studies involved amplitude of arm
movement, the pre- and post-tests administered to them involved
positioning of the limb. The argument is not that outflow to the limb
per se is unconcerned with position control, but that the outflows
controlling the training and the test behaviors in Held's experiments
were totally different. Thus the issue raised by Welch may be laid to
rest. It might be mentioned in passing that Rashbass (1961) reports a
definite outflow for position, at least in the case of the eye.
Parenthetically, the idea that training and test conditions must be as
similar as possible is also mentioned and expanded upon by Kohler.
1.24. Motor events do not play a direct role In shape adaptation.
This rather important limitation to the applicability of motor-sensory
feedback theory has been stated not only by Craske, Day, Lappln,
Mack, Miller, and Wallace, but, to an extent, by Held (1968)
himself. It is also of central concern to Mock, who is willing to at least
entertain this propostion as a hypothesis.
Wallace's arguments deserve particular attention. His starting
point is the well-known observation that experimental subjects,
viewing a line through prism goggles while moving their heads, will
see the line (whose shape is transformed) move around in the visual
field in phase with their own head movements. Wallach proposes the
insightful hypothesis that the visual system attributes environmental
movements that covary with bodily movements to the latter source,
since genuine environmental events do not covary with movement of
the head. Therefore, according to Wallach, the above covariance
signals a nonobjective perception to S, and this sets the stage for
subsequent visual adaptation. When the process of adaptation starts,
the role played by motor activity ceases, according to Wallach.
Hence his claim that movements play no direct role in the formation
of the perception of shape itself.
Wallach's hypothesis concerning the implications of the
covariance of head movement and the movement of the stimulus
vis-a-vis perceptual objectivity is interesting. Nonetheless, it leaves an
important question unanswered - namely, which direction
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subsequent visual adaptation will take. Is the visual system really
unaided in this matter by motor information that might be available
and germane? For example, is it totally inconsequential for the
system to know that, when viewing an apparently curved line, the
eye can retain fixation of each part of it if the head moves along a
straight trajectory rather than the one suggested by the apparent
curve of the line? In general, since a given apparent shape in
re-arrangement studies can be the result of a potentially infinite
number of "real" shapes, experimental subjects have to rely on
auxiliary information such as that obtainable, say, from scanning the
stimulus. We might add that in our own laboratory we have evidence
(unpublished) that the shape of an eye-scan required to fixate
prismatically-transformed contours strongly affects contour-shape
judgments.
Also important to the issue of the direct participation or
nonparticipation of motor factors in the formation of shape
perception are the comments of Miller and of Lappln. Both base
much of their argument on findings reported by Miller & Festinger
(1977). Summary conclusions are that the shape adaptation that
occurred during experiments simulating prism conditions was
unrelated to oculomotor retraining. By this is meant that, while
saccadic eye movements showed progressive and regular changes
over five days of tests, successive adaptation measures showed a
much more erratic developmental course. Moreover, Miller &
Festinger report additional data from two experiments showing that
two quite different (indeed, opposite) learned eye movements
corresponded to essentially similar visual adaptation scores.
However, if we read Miller & Festinger correctly, in both of the
above experiments visual adaptation was at the chance level. From
insignificant relationships and data, even if multiplied by two, no
significant conclusions can be drawn.
Two considerations thus stand in the way of unhesitatingly using
the above findings to support the hypothesis of the absence of a
connection between motor factors and shape perception. 1) Few
people would regard this connection, were it to exist, as very simple
or one-to-one. While the motor learning itself may be easy (and
Miller & Festinger show that it is), sensoritnotor learning may be
difficult. Is it surprising, then, to find a relatively erratic (though in
the aggregate somewhat consistent) process? 2) The second point to
keep in mind is a finding obtained by Miller & Festinger, contrary to
the overall conclusion: There was a highly significant connection
between ease of motor learning and amount of visual shape
adaptation in cases where easy movements were contrasted with
difficult ones - surely not a finding in support of a hypothesis of total
independence between sensory and motor processes.
Paap suggests that shape adaptation is a complex instance of
direction adaptation, and that it may be especially hard to produce
because the adaptation of numerous locations integrated over time is
required.
Held's own view on the matter (Held 1968) must also be cited.
Noting the relatively limited extent to which shape perception
appears to be subject to adaptation in re-arrangement experiments,
he proposed that limits to shape adaptation might be set by the
so-called straight-line and curvature detectors that investigators such
as Hubel & Wiesel (1965) claim to have found in various animals.
This would be a cogent hypothesis if one were to accept the Hubel &
Wiesel detectors as templates for the determination of absolute
orientation and shape. However, as has been proposed by Caelli
(1977), Hoffman (1966), Uttal (1973), and many others, there is
much more to pattern analysis than is apparent from a template
point of view. For example, both Caelli and Hoffman suggest that
cortical cells extract differential information (in the mathematical
sense) from impulses from retinal ganglion cells. In so doing, holistic
(as opposed to local) characteristics of shape are computed as
algebraic derivatives. Under such conceptions of shape the absolute
nature of local features of a pattern are far less important than the
differences between local features under internally- or
externally-produced transformations. For example, what would be
important about straightness on such a view would not be the
absolute shape of a straight contour, or the firing of specific
detectors, but whether cells responsive to similar orientations were
fired successively under a scan of a contour, whether parts of the line
translated across the retina at a constant rate, and so forth. Thus
relations between successive cells, rather than the absolute response
of each, become important. On premises such as these about shape
perception, Held's remarks about the limits of adaptation to shape
based on a template conception become irrelevant. Shape perception
might, in fact, be extremely plastic, as is implied, for example, in
Rock's (1966 op. dt.) remark that fitting a newborn with prism
goggles might not result in any perceptual dislocations whatever.
1.25. Motor events have no direct perceptual role In rich visual
environments; it is hence doubtful whether such events should be
considered in perceptual theory at all. The proponent of this view,
or one very close to it, is Haber. It is true that, as he claims, many of
the re-arrangement studies have been done under relatively
impoverished visual conditions. This is not the case, however, in the
studies by Kohler (1964) nor in some better-controlled studies such as
those by Held and his colleagues, whose subjects locomoted through
hallways both actively and passively. Riesen's observations, obtained
under normal visual conditions, also go counter to Haber's
generalization. One of Riesen's observations concerns the illusion of
speeding up in an automobile when one steps on a nonoperative
brake. The illusion obtains in spite of contradictory input from the
optic array. Many more exceptions could be cited.
Haber adds that, even under the visually-impoverished
experimental conditions of most visual re-arrangement studies, the
motor parameters are the ones that normally adapt, whereas vision
does not. Hence the claim that observed motor contributions to
perceptual phenomena are excessively weak and can be eliminated
from perceptual theory without great loss. Clearly, Haber's
statements should be of concern to all who would like to understand
whether and how motor events participate in perception. From the
full range of phenomena discussed in this paper and the literature as
a whole, the question that motor events participate directly in at least
some perceptual events under some conditions cannot at this point
really be ruled out. Even on the assumption that the direct
involvement of motor events is normally extremely limited and
weak, the problem of how this involvement is accomplished
constitutes an exceedingly challenging theoretical (and possibly
clinical) problem. Neither neurophysiology, as we understand it, nor
psychological experimentation rule out a direct motor contribution to
perception. Much work remains to be done to explore the whens and
the hows.
1.26. The role of hysteresis in adaptation. The issue of hysteresis
is mentioned by Ebenholtz and SheMIske and harks back to some
studies by these authors and others, including a recent one by Willey,
Gyr, & Henry (1978). In these studies, most of which contrast
situations favoring central recalibration or potentiation, it is shown
that visual adaptation to the re-arrangement of spatial location is due
to hysteresis (muscle potentiation) rather than sensory-motor
recalibration. Muscle potentiation is a peripheral effect and involves
an involuntary and unconscious component of innervation to the eye
muscle induced by sustained offcenter eye position such as occurs
when one wears displacing prisms and, say, walks down a hallway.
The continuous, unconscious innervation to the eye muscles during
the post-test makes subjects look further to the right or left
(depending on prism orientation during training) and induces the
adaptation effects.
It is clear that the research on hysteresis has introduced a new
parameter into adaptation research. However, it is not evident that
the hysteresis principle can explain all observed adaptation effects.
For example, in the case of adaptation to re-arrangement of shape, in
which no motor activity is allowed in either the pre- or the post-test,
potentiation can hardly have had an effect. The same should be true,
even for adaptation to re-arrangement of location, if pre- and
post-tests were to include tests of motor systems other than those
involved during training. Finally, it has been shown in experiments
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on adaptation to re-arrangement of size and depth by Wallach, Fry,
and Bode (1972) and by Wallach & Halperin (1977) that not all their
results are interpretable in terms of hysteresis.
2. Experimental factors favoring adaption In
H & R type adaptation experiments
2.1. On the possible Independence of motor and sensory events
In the visual system. It may be recalled that we proposed in the
conclusion section of our target paper that a possible reason for our
negative results may have been that our experimental subjects
decided to "live with," rather than confront, the conflict between
visual-sensory and motor information. The fact that this may occur is
neatly demonstrated in research reported by Bridgeman & Lewis
(1976). Their findings suggest that while Ss, do not suffer from any
spatial disorientation after making large saccades, and can point
accurately to a target that had been displaced 2° during a saccade,
tests performed while the saccade was in progress demonstrate that
Ss were not consciously aware of the displacement. Bridgeman &
Lewis conclude that visual information about position can enter the
visuomotor system without influencing the cognitive system. This
kind of effect deserves further study, since it could clearly be
responsible for negative results in adaptation experiments in which
motor and visual sensory information is confronted.
2.2. The requirement of explicit attention to contour In shape
adaptation. Burnham explicitly raises the question of the conditions
that will produce adaptation. He proposes the requirement of
specific attention to contour during movement and sees this principle
violated in the H & R experiment and in our replication. Our own
comments (and Day's) about the complexity of attending to the
displacement of specific dots in a random dot environment are in
line with Burnham's critique. In these latter studies it is of course not
so much contour but the spatial displacement of the dots that is
systematically transformed.
It would appear that Burnham's maximally-adaptive subjects
were in a situation analogous to our own (and H & R's), except for the
important difference of having to "aim" at specific points and of
having to make "blind" responses (i.e. in the absence of close
sensorimotor feedback). Perhaps the latter is the requisite condition
in order to skirt the problem of the independence between motor and
visual sensory processes alluded to by Bridgeman.
2.3. The role of simultaneous eye and head movements In prism
adaptation. Ebenholtz raises a point concerning the information
that is available when both eye and head movements are encouraged
in subjects, inasmuch as the visual feedback due to eye movements
when one is wearing goggles is normal, while that due to head
movements is not. He proposes the hypothesis that adaptation
resulting from an H & R paradigm will be maximal when both eye
and head movements are involved.
Flnke proposes that head movement could be used as a variable in
the H & R paradigm. Noting the absence of explicit instructions to Ss
not to look at their bodies, Redding raises the possibility that,
viewing their bodies while walking around inside the cylinder, Ss
may have undergone proprioceptive adaptation which, in turn, could
have eliminated any visual adaptation effects. This is undoubtedly a
potentially cogent observation. We can only say that, having acted as
experimental pretest subjects ourselves, we were never tempted to
regard our own movements. This was in part because viewing the
walls of the cylinder somehow helped to orient one while walking
around in such relatively strange surroundings; also, and perhaps
more importantly, the limited aperture afforded by the prism would
have made self-viewing awkward in the extreme. It is not clear that
there were any controls that kept H & R's subjects from disobeying
the Instruction not to look at themselves, thus leaving open the
possibility that they behaved essentially Identically to our own
subjects.
2.4 Considerations about spatial frequencies. Steinbach, starting
from the strong effect that spatial frequency has on pattern
perception, raises the point that both the training stimulus (array of
random dots) and the test stimulus (grid of parallel lines) in the H &
R study have strong spatial-frequency characteristics. He asks
whether the reason why the replication of the H & R experiment
produced negative results, while the original experiment did not,
might not be that, by pure chance, the spatial-frequency
characteristics of the training and test stimuli in the H & R study
were much more alike than those in our replication?
The above is certainly a novel, though not a very likely, possibility
(ie., what is the range of possible spatial frequencies from which
either study could have chosen?). Probability aside, one might ask
which specific hypothesis Steinbach has in mind: that curves were
actually seen by Ss walking around in an environment specifically
designed to eliminate the perception of contours, and that there was
a neuronal adaptation after-effect that carried over to the viewing of
a straight line grid? Are such curvature adaptation effects known to
occur? (We are only familiar with threshold elevation, percieved
frequency, and tilt after-effects.)
Even if Steinbach's hypothesis of such a powerful effect due to
differences in spatial frequencies were pertinent to both studies, one
wonders how the subjects in the H & R study escaped this effect
during the passive phase, especially when many of them had passed
through the same supposedly powerfully-effective visual stimulus
field previously during the active condition. Nonetheless, on
theoretical grounds, it may well behoove experimenters in
adaptation research to pay attention to the dimension of spatial
frequency. A similar point is raised by Flnke.
2.5. Absence of shape-relevant Information with
base-rlght/base-Ieft prisms under transformations produced by
walking. Craske went to the trouble of partially replicating the H &
R training conditions for himself. He notes that the flow of images
over the retina was orthogonal to the stripes later used to test for
adaptation, and thus that movement did not produce stimulation that
was at all relevant to the subsequently perceived change in the
straightness of verticals. Craske also notes that wearing either
base-right or base-up prisms made the cylinder look curved. He
proposes that this, via the Gibson effect, could have led to adaptation.
Perhaps. Why It might have done so for H & R and not for us is, of
course not explained.
2.6. Density of the stimulus. Mikaelian mentions the possibly
important point of a higher dot density in the H & R study. The
actual density used was not reported in the H & R study, nor was it
specified in subsequent private correspondence between the present
authors and Held. As Mikaelian informs us, it was reported in
another reference. The greater density in H & R could conceivably
have led to more Information, although we still feel, with Craske and
others, that the Information available was not maximally relevant to
contour, or was far too complex to attend to. Craske, in fact,
informally used an array approximately as dense as H & R's without
observing effects required to make H & R's hypothesis work.
However, it would have been useful to use an identical stimulus in
our replication.
2.7. Testing whether the experimental procedure Is effective for
a nonrandom stimulus. Flnke raises the interesting point that trying
out the experimental procedure in a cylinder that does contain
apparent straight-line contours would allow for a check on the
adequacy of the procedure. This suggestion, of course, is valid for
both the H & R study and our replication.
3. Conclusions
Harvey wants to see a more precisely stated adaptation theory on our
part, and presumably on the part of other theorists as well. To him,
this tends to mean that kind of precision that Is present in models of
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artificial intelligence. Many, if not most, models of artificial intelli-
gence, however, tend to be special-purpose models. To specify
general models for sensorimotor perception that include - without
undue simplifications - a wide variety of perceptual constructs and
sensorimotor systems would be an enormous task. Thanks to many of
the commentaries that have been made, including Harvey's, some of
the logical, psychological, and neurophysiological reasons for
motor-sensory feedback in perception have at least been stated more
or less exhaustively.
It would seem that in some perceptual phenomena - e.g. position
constancy, direction, distance, movement - motor events play a
direct role, at least under some conditions. With respect to other
perceptual phenomena such as shape, many researchers have serious
reservations as to the direct involvement of motor processes.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the question is still very much
open. It has been shown that some of the theoretical arguments
against such direct involvement are subject to criticism; moreover,
there exist some supportive experimental findings. The fact that, so
far, shape- adaptation effects appear to be minimal makes sense in
terms of the positional relearning that probably accompanies them.
Moreover, the meaning of the limited degree of shape adaptation in
re-arrangement studies also needs to be experimentally re-examined
in view of the possible and paradoxical independence that may exist
between "perceptual consciousness" and motor-sensory processes
(Bridgeman; see also Roland: "Sensory Feedback to the Cerebral
Cortex During Voluntary Movement in Man" BBS 1(1) 1978). On all
these questions much important research remains to be done. Simi-
larly, the question of perceptual plasticity to re-arrangement in
newborn organisms (Mock), and the question of the conditions under
which purely Gibsonian parameters of the optic array control
perception (Haber) - or, conversely, when it is that motor parame-
ters play a larger role - would seem worthy of further research. All
these amount to a test of the limits of Gibson's theory of direct visual
perception - not, as Harvey seems to imply, a full retreat from a
broader sensorimotor theory when that theory appears to be in
trouble. It may of course be that both theories need to be extensively
modified.
We owe to Freides a delineation of the wider behavioral areas in
which the role of motor factors in perception may be germane. He
lists, among others, field-dependence, schizophrenia, certain learning
disabilities, problems involving a coupling between vestibular and
thought problems, signal detection, and so forth. Suggestions of this
kind should stimulate interest in expanding the search for sensorimo-
tor processes in perception.
On the issue of how positive results could be obtained in the case of
the H & R paradigm, the findings reported by Burnham do not offer
much encouragement. His findings would suggest that adaptation
occurs only under a very stringent set of conditions - far more
stringent than the conditions imposed in the H & R study and in our
own attempted replication. How such strong positive results were
obtained in the former study still seems to be shrouded in mystery.
Only a detailed further study, along the lines indicated in our paper
and incorporating the ideas present in Buroham and Bridgemae's
work, would appear to offer some hope of resolving the riddle.
The hypothesis that motor events participate directly in the
perceptual process thus appears to be partially supported by the
evidence at this point. Is this hypothesis important enough to warrant
further research, or is it the case, as is more or less implied in Haber's
commentary, that the hypothesis explains very little in terms of
everyday perceptual processes? It is argued here that the hypothesis
is crucially important to provide a model with an integrated concept
of attention, expectation, or feedforward, as well as a concept of
sensitivity on the other. Gibson (1963, p. 12) himself formulated the
central task for perceptual theory as follows: "We had to suppose that
the role of the senses, their sole function, was not to yield sensations.
Instead of receptors, i.e. receivers and transducers of energy, they
appear to be systems for exploring, selecting, and searching ambient
energy. . . . This new picture of the senses includes attention as part
of sensitivity, not as an act of the mind upon the deliverances of the
senses" (emphasis added). In spite of this program, Gibson seems
vague about the determinants of attention, referring, for example, to
areas of "high information" and of "movement" in an optic array as
"attention-getting." These principles are ad hoc and, as pointed out
by Mace & Pittenger (1975), independent of the theory of percep-
tion. It would appear that attention, expectation, and feedforward
processes are far more integrated with the process of perception itself
in the theories of von Hoist, Sperry, Held, Kelso, and others. The
latter, in effect, constitute the theoretical standard-bearers of the
basic program for perception that was so well formulated by Gibson.
Needless to say, the exploration of the precise nature of attentional
processes along lines that include the sensorimotor nature of percep-
tion has only begun. We fully agree that some of the old lines of
attack on these problems should be abandoned in favor of new
approaches, of which a good many candidates have been brought
forward in this Commentary.
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